PSCRP-BESA Reports No 248 (November 4, 2026)
by Boris Ginzburg
In 2026, state elections were scheduled in five German federal states. Germany’s centrist forces are coming under increasing pressure due to the electoral successes of the far right and the far left. The Kremlin welcomed these electoral successes of Germany’s political fringes. The political overlap between the narratives employed by the Kremlin and those of the extreme right and left has long been an open secret. Delving deeper into the relations between Moscow and the German far-right – impersonated by the party “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) – this analysis highlights another – often overlooked – perspective on the relationship between Russia and the AfD: Simply assuming that the Kremlin and the AfD are “kindred spirits” is analytically insufficient and could lead to missing the generation of important policy recommendations regarding this political phenomenon. It is not ideology that draws the Kremlin closer to the AfD, but rather tactical and opportunistic considerations. By elaborating on this argument further, significant policy recommendations can be derived for Israeli (and German) foreign policy towards Russia, as well as for dealing with the German far-right movement.
Introduction
The German language is known for creating unique compound terms—usually formed from several nouns—that subsequently become a fixed part of everyday German vocabulary. The term “Superwahljahr” (English: “Super Election Year”) is one such example. In Germany, it refers to a political event in which multiple state elections take place across the country’s 16 federal states within a single year. This “super election year” is often used as a barometer of public approval for the incumbent federal government. It is not unusual for opposition parties to emerge as winners in these state elections; however, the 2026 super election year will hold a special place in post-war German history.
State elections were scheduled in five German federal states for 2026. Elections took place in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate in March 2026. In both contests, centrist parties prevailed over the political fringes, despite losing votes. The party of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz—the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)—secured a place in the governing coalitions of both states. It was notable, however, that the far right—represented by the “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) party—managed to more or less double its vote share compared to the previous elections in these states.
By September 2026, the picture had changed again across three state elections in Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Berlin. In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD emerged as the strongest party, more than doubling its vote share to 43.8 percent compared to the 2021 election; it very nearly secured an absolute majority. The AfD is now likely to assume the reins of government in Saxony-Anhalt in December 2026. The far right also became the strongest force in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (38.2%). At the same time, the CDU—polling at 4.9%—failed to clear the 5% threshold required to enter the state parliament, a first since reunification. However, since the Social Democrats are in second place with just under 35.5%, they can form a governing coalition in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania with the Greens (5.7%) and the Left Party (6.5%).
As for the elections in Berlin, the last-mentioned party—Die Linke (The Left)—emerged victorious with 25.7% of the vote. Berlin’s branch of the Left party is known for its radical fantasies of expropriation and its proximity to the Islamist scene in Germany. Another characteristic is its antisemitism, which hides behind a veneer of alleged anti-Zionism—a political-racist smokescreen that actually originated in the Brezhnev era of the Soviet Union and is nothing new to the Jewish State. Thus, Israel is well aware of how to deal with this phantom from the past (nevertheless, the second, separate part of this policy paper explicitly addresses the German, and specifically, Berlin’s Left party).
The international reaction to these elections is also noteworthy. US President Donald J. Trump highlighted the AfD’s election victory in Saxony-Anhalt without explicitly naming the party. European right-wing forces—some of which participate in their countries’ governments—showed mixed reactions, ranging from praise to silence (pointing to mistrust of the AfD even within the European right). Russian President Vladimir Putin went a step further, offering a “political science” analysis of the AfD’s election victories. During a brief press engagement while visiting India on September 11, 2026, he interpreted the domestic political developments surrounding Germany’s “super election year 2026” as follows:
“They [European states] are currently talking about considering sending troops into Ukrainian territory [referring to a French-British proposal from 2024 about a western peace contingent in post-war Ukraine]. That means war with Russia. And, I believe the citizens of European countries understand what is happening. It seems to me that the current results in the Federal Republic [of Germany]—and the trends in political processes across Europe as a whole—are based on this” [own translation].
With this assessment, Putin deliberately aligned himself with the AfD’s narrative. According to this view, the current German government—through its support for Ukraine and its sanctions policy against Russia—is bringing the European continent closer to a war between NATO and Russia. It was also notable how much attention Putin devoted, during his conversation with journalists in India, to the issue of European—and specifically German—energy supplies. This circumstance serves as further evidence of how closely the Kremlin monitors the political discourse in Germany. In particular, the issue of rising energy costs—which have climbed since the start of the second Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and were further exacerbated by the second Iran War starting in February 2026—is fueling resentment among many German business owners and ordinary citizens toward their own coalition government of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.
In fact, the political overlap in the narratives employed by the Kremlin and the AfD has long been an open secret. Even before the second Russian invasion of Ukraine, there were increasing reports of links between individual AfD officials and the Kremlin. This connection has increasingly fostered the view within analytical circles that the AfD acts as a German proxy for the Kremlin. This analysis does not attempt to recount the specific episodes detailing the connections between the German Right and Moscow; numerous studies and investigative reports on the subject have been produced in recent years and are available for further reference.
However, this analysis highlights another—often overlooked—perspective on the relationship between the AfD and Russia: Simply assuming that the Kremlin and the AfD are “kindred spirits” is analytically insufficient and could lead to overlooking important policy recommendations for dealing with this political phenomenon. It is not ideology that draws the Kremlin closer to the AfD, but rather tactical and opportunistic considerations. This argument is elaborated further below. From this, significant policy recommendations can be derived for Israeli (and German) foreign policy toward Russia, as well as for dealing with the German far-right movement. Interestingly, the analysis’s results also allow for producing recommendations for Israeli security policies towards the new regime in Syria.
Every Day Brings Its Own Bread
As early as 2014, in a short Russian-language essay titled “Putin’s Loneliness” for the Ukrainian news portal “Obozrevatel,” Stanislav Belkovsky – an internationally often invited Russian political commentator and former political advisor to the late and highly controversial Russian politician Boris Berezovsky, who was allegedly involved in Putin’s rise to power in the 1990s—examined the Russian president’s psychological-political profile. According to Belkovsky, the Russian autocrat is not a strategist pursuing a « la grande stratégie » of the kind often portrayed in Western media. Rather, he is a tactician who aligns his policies with prevailing political demands in his country to consistently secure his hold on power. Another aim of the “tactician Putin” is to exploit the current vulnerabilities of his political critics—both at home and abroad—as a means of “trolling” them. This perspective aligns with research on Russian authoritarianism, which advises against using the term “Putinism.” Modern-day Russia lacks an ideology directed towards a final goal—such as the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the Soviet Union and leftist movements, or the aspirations for a global caliphate propagated by Islamist groups.
Admittedly, one could easily criticize Belkovsky’s perspective by pointing out that a full-scale war—such as Russia’s against Ukraine since 2022—could not be launched overnight; it required preparation and a “vision.” Yet, when one considers the duration of the war, the struggles and losses suffered by Russian forces in seizing Ukrainian territory, and the many unexpected side effects for regime stability in Russia (such as the Wagner mutiny in June 2023), Belkovsky’s thesis no longer seems so far-fetched.
A Friend with a Dark Side
Be that as it may, Belkovsky’s thesis warrants attention again when applied to the relationship between the AfD and Russia. Indeed, the thesis helps refute the often-stated assumption in Western media that the AfD and Russia are ideologically aligned. Nevertheless, the conclusion drawn from applying Belkovsky’s lens does nothing to diminish the challenge posed by the inherent danger of the Russian-AfD liaison for a democratic Germany as well as Israel, as will now be shown.
It is therefore worth taking a closer look at a specific episode in May 2023 regarding the relationship between Russia and the AfD—an event that is often overlooked. On May 8, 2023, AfD co-leader Tino Chrupalla visited the Russian embassy in Berlin to attend the commemorations of Victory Day—marking the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in World War II—an occasion held in almost sacred regard in Russia. Chrupalla’s visit sparked a wave of fierce criticism among the party’s moderate supporters (predominantly based in West Germany), who at that time viewed the party’s closeness to Russia critically following the country’s second invasion of Ukraine. However—and this is far more significant for the subsequent course of this policy paper—Chrupalla’s visit was also viewed critically by some within the AfD’s “völkisch”-nationalist wing, which is concentrated largely in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). This faction saw no reason to celebrate the victory over the so-called Third Reich and criticized Chrupalla for his presence at the Russian embassy in Berlin. Four months later, in September 2023, the AfD’s other co-leader, Alice Weidel, appeared to attempt to mitigate the aftershocks of the internal party discontent surrounding this event. In an interview with the German TV station ARD, Weidel explained her own absence from the celebrations at the Russian embassy as follows: “So, celebrating one’s own country’s defeat with a former occupying power—that is something I have personally decided not to take part in, especially given my father’s history of fleeing” [own translation].
What indication does this episode offer for further examination of the liaison between Russia and the AfD? Moscow certainly did not overlook these specific historical perspectives from the highest echelon of AfD. When one also considers that the Russian parliament passed new laws in February 2021, which increased penalties (e.g., imprisonment for a term of up to five years) for the “rehabilitation of Nazism” and “the public dissemination of knowingly false information regarding the activities of the USSR during World War II,” Moscow’s silence regarding this specific AfD behavior around the May 8 celebrations appears all the more interesting.
The Kremlin’s silence regarding the AfD’s historical revisionism becomes all the more suspicious when one considers that Moscow now accuses the current German federal government of that very same revisionism. When German Chancellor Merz announced his plan in May 2025 to transform the Bundeswehr into Europe’s most powerful military force in response to security challenges in and from Eastern Europe, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused Berlin of forgetting history, stating: “Many were immediately reminded of the last century, when Germany twice became the leading military power, and how much trouble that caused […].”
However, when viewed in light of Belkovsky’s description of Putin’s political and psychological profile as well as research on Russian authoritarianism, this anomaly no longer appears anomalous; rather, it seems to indicate the pragmatism and opportunism that characterize the Kremlin’s foreign policy. As long as the AfD can act as a political spoiler within the German political landscape, the “tactician Putin” pays no heed to the German right-wing party’s “problematic” aspects. Taking the proposed analytic lens of Belkovsky mentioned above: From Moscow’s perspective, the new German Right serves the immediate moment rather than any specific overarching ultimate goal. It allows Moscow to make life more difficult for the current German government—which is determined to counter Russian provocations—and to “troll” Berlin. Thus, Russia analysts can interpret the Kremlin’s positive reaction to the AfD’s electoral successes during Germany’s “super election year” of 2026 in this light.
Conclusion: Why is this Issue Relevant for Israel’s Foreign Policy?
For Israeli foreign policy, this analysis of the relationship between Russia and the German far-right party AfD offers three key insights:
- Russian foreign policy and Putin’s political leadership style are rooted more in tactical than strategic calculations.
- The German “New Right” – impersonated by the AfD – espouses historical revisionist views that run counter to the central founding pillars of the modern German state (such as the culture of remembrance, democratic principles, and alignment with the West).
- Germany’s centrist forces—committed to preserving and strengthening German-Israeli relations—are coming under increasing pressure due to the electoral successes of the far right (and the far left).
Based on these insights, several recommendations for Israeli (and German) foreign policy can also be derived (a small selection of them is listed below). These also aim to politically strengthen Israel’s key European economic and security partner, Germany. Such development serves Israel’s interests as well, as demonstrated by Berlin’s support for the Jewish State in major international forums—such as the European Union (with its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas—a political figure not only highly controversial in Jerusalem but also in Berlin) and the United Nations, an institution extremely biased against Israel, as several studies have already portrayed in recent years:
- Differentiating between Noise and Information: Within the Israeli political and media landscape, some actors underestimate the danger posed by the AfD. Based on the analysis above, Jerusalem can conclude that the culture of remembrance in post-war Germany holds little significance for the AfD. The protection of Jewish life in Germany and Israel’s security—advocated by the AfD, particularly since the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023—is merely instrumental in nature. The AfD’s aim here is to engage in a form of “political whitewashing” regarding accusations of right-wing extremism against the party, while framing the problem of rising antisemitism in Germany (and Europe) solely as an ideology imported from Muslim migrants. However, this does not alter the ongoing utility of so-called “secondary antisemitism” for the AfD. According to antisemitism researcher Claire Burchett of King’s College London—and her study on the AfD—“secondary antisemitism” manifests as “a rejection of guilt […] [and is] often communicated implicitly or through so-called “dogwhistling”, which would be recognised by an audience familiar with antisemitic codes but ignored by those who are not […].” In this respect, Israel should maintain its current policy of boycotting contacts with the AfD.
- Acknowledging Germany as a “Semi”-Post-Socialist Country: When dealing with German politics, it is important to bear in mind that a unified Germany is nonetheless a country that is “half” post-socialist. Followingly, it means that the socialization of citizens from the former GDR—currently a political stronghold of the AfD—followed different patterns than in Germany’s western part. This difference is also reflected in the realm of memory culture. Unlike West Germany, the former socialist leadership of the GDR never considered itself bound by the German memory culture prevalent in the West, since it viewed the GDR as a state founded by German socialists. According to the GDR’s founding fathers, German socialism—much like European Jewry during the so-called Third Reich—had itself been a target of National Socialist aggression. It is important to keep this in mind when examining Germany’s political landscape. Personal conversations with other Germans often reveal that this specific form of socialization is frequently not fully grasped, particularly by West Germans. This circumstance also explains why many East Germans still do not feel that the West German political establishment truly connects with them. Moreover, as past cases of East European post-socialist states have shown, it is not unusual for citizens of these states to turn to so-called anti-establishment and nationalist parties. Given its experience and success in the 1990s in reintegrating over a million people via the “Aliyah” from the post-Soviet region—who had undergone socialization similar to that of East Germans—Israel ought to be particularly attuned to this socio-political distinction.
- Avoiding any Association with the AfD-Russia Liaison: On September 18, 2026, Reuters reported on previously secret plans by the AfD leadership and Moscow to hold a summit in 2027 between the two actors on neutral territory. Ideally, the USA would also be involved, according to the report. The meeting is reportedly intended to address Germany’s possible reactivation of energy supplies from Russia. None of the parties mentioned have verified this report so far. This report is relevant to Israel because “neutral territories” proposed by the participants for the meeting reportedly include states in the Middle East. According to the report, the AfD and Russian organizers are also considering Israel as a potential venue. Here, it is necessary to reiterate the first recommendation mentioned above, which calls on Israel to maintain its current policy of boycotting contacts with the AfD. Furthermore, this analysis wants to emphasize that, due to its close ties with a democratic Germany, Israel cannot serve as “neutral negotiating territory” for such plans. Moreover, given that the AfD holds no federal-level governmental responsibility in Germany—and thus has no constitutional authority to regulate German energy policy—it becomes clear once again that the party is merely seeking to burnish its political image through this initiative. For Russia, this would again be a matter of “trolling” Israel’s ally, Germany—a tactic that, as previously shown, aligns with the psychological-political profile of Putin described by Belkovsky.
- Keeping the New Syrian Regime and its Turkish Patron Erdoğan in Check for Israel, while keeping Syria Stable for Germany: In a previous BESA-policy paper from June 2026, the author of this analysis pointed out that Israel—aided by improvements in Azerbaijani-Russian relations—should strive to secure at least a limited Russian military presence in post-Assad Syria. This development could enable Israel to counterbalance Turkish neo-Ottoman aspirations in Syria. Europe and Ukraine could also gain advantages from this development, as Russia would be forced to tie up its already strained military capabilities in Syria (once again) rather than concentrating them more heavily near Eastern Europe. Since then, many of the proposed points have materialized. Azerbaijan and Russia experienced a reapproachment in July 2026 after a period of friction. Additionally, Moscow and Damascus reached a framework agreement in August 2026 that will ensure a Russian military presence in Syria. The continued stabilization of Syria also offers direct benefits for German domestic policy. It could allow Germany’s centrist government to justify further and accelerate the repatriation of Syrian refugees in Germany (numbering just under one million people) to Syria. This would enable the current centrist government in Germany to deprive the AfD of a key campaign issue, thereby weakening the far-right party. This would also be in Jerusalem’s interest, as it could prevent the Muslim electorate in Germany—which holds strongly anti-Israel political views—from growing further in the near future through the acquisition of German citizenship. In this way, Israel can help prevent the emergence of a political landscape in Germany—a key strategic partner for Israel—as the one observed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom: there, political parties find themselves compelled to cater to their growing Muslim electorates by pursuing anti-Israel policies, even while relying on Israeli intelligence for their own security. Jerusalem should factor these aspects into its strategic calculations regarding the Al-Julani regime in Syria and its Turkish patron, Erdoğan, as it could strengthen Israel’s key European strategic partner, Germany, and the Israeli-German ties.
Boris Ginzburg is a doctoral researcher at the Institute for East European Studies (Politics Department) at the Freie Universität Berlin (Germany) and an analyst.