PSCRP-BESA Reports No 133 (May 26, 2025)
by Alexander Shpunt
On May 21, the Chisinau Court of Appeal left the head of the Gagauz autonomy, Eugenia Gutul, under house arrest. Gutul was detained on March 25 at the Chisinau airport and arrested in a criminal case related to the financing of her election campaign in 2023. This arrest opens the way for the initiation of the procedure for removing the head of the dissident autonomous region from office after May 25, when she will have been unable to perform her duties as the head of the region for 60 days. The legitimate parliament of Gagauzia, the People’s Assembly, has effectively come out against the supreme power of Moldova and has expressed full support for Gutul.
There is probably no other state in the post-Soviet space, except Moldova, where the political struggle is conducted so openly and aggressively, using the entire toolkit of administrative power, attracting external intervention, judicial mechanisms, and even foreign military contingents located on the territory of Moldova, including its rebellious autonomies — Gagauzia and Transnistria. Without exception, all the countries that emerged from the USSR went through this stage but left it in the 1990s. Only in Moldova does the unconventional political practice of the 90s still shape the political reality.
The reasons for such a sharp confrontation, on the verge of a civil war, are the same as those we indicated in our publications about Georgia and Armenia. This is a conflict of goal-setting between the economic and political elites of new states, which is not encountered anywhere else in the world except in the post-Soviet space. While political elites see their personal career tracks only in integration with the Euro-bureaucracy — the entry of their countries into EU structures — economic elites realize that the business models they have formed are oriented exclusively to the East, toward Russia and the EAEU countries. These business models are not adaptable to the European status of their countries (and European regulation). This is why the struggle of these two macro-elites — political and economic — around the movement toward the EU is existential in nature in the post-Soviet countries.
But even against this background, the confrontation in Moldova is distinguished by its unusual intensity and severity.
Relations between Chisinau and Gagauzia have been deteriorating since Gutul won the elections for the head of the autonomy in the spring of 2023. Her candidacy was presented by the Shor party, which the Moldovan authorities subsequently declared unconstitutional due to accusations of illegal financing. This led to criminal cases being opened against the party’s leaders.
The central authorities ignored the inauguration ceremony of the Gutul on July 19, 2023, without sending a single representative. Moldovan President Maia Sandu has not made a decision to include the head of Gagauzia in the government, despite the law’s explicit requirements.
But the new authorities of Gagauzia did not try to find points of rapprochement with Chisinau. Let us give one example. In April 2024 Gagauzia signed an agreement with the Russian Promsvyazbank, allowing citizens of the autonomy to open direct accounts. It is important to note that Promsvyazbank (PSB) effectively forms the financial system of budgetary support for the autonomy — the bank will ensure the opening of salary accounts for public sector employees and pensioners of Gagauzia. Even more importantly, PSB is the official support bank of the Russian defense industry complex, headed for seven years by Petr Fradkov, the son of Mikhail Fradkov, the former Prime Minister of Russia, who later headed the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Russia’s equivalent of the CIA, for many years. Today, Fradkov Sr. is the director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia’s main state think tank.
It is unlikely that any state would put up with such direct intervention by another state into the key budgetary institutions of one of its autonomous territories.
The economy of Gagauzia itself is small and uninteresting; moreover, it is much more oriented towards the EU than towards Russia. According to the Ministry of Economic Development of Moldova, 49% of exports of enterprises registered in the autonomy go to the EU countries, and only 2% to Russia.
But for the Moldovan (not Gagauz) economic elites – and their Russian counterparties – it is extremely important to have such an “internal offshore”, deeply integrated into the Russian banking system. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the business elite in Chisinau to solve their problems of building business with Russia – the central government is increasingly linking its future with Europe – and in this situation, autonomous Gagauzia is becoming an important bridge for Moldovan business oriented to the East.
A strange, but internally logical configuration is emerging: the central political elites of Chisinau see their personal career tracks only in the direction of the EU, the Moldovan business elite is unable to resist them in this, and supports the political leaders of Gagauzia, who de facto are pursuing not a pro-Russian policy, as it may seem at first glance, but the same sectoral policy – but already in favor of large Moldovan businesses, rather than the political leadership.
If you look at the formal structure of Moldova’s foreign trade balance, the republic does not look dependent on Russia. The main consumers of Moldovan goods are Romania ($1.42 billion) and Ukraine ($595 million); Russia is significantly behind with $144 million. But it’s not that simple.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, in 2023, re-export of foreign goods from Moldova amounted to 1178.5 million US dollars (29.1% of total exports), which is 13.7% less than in 2022. At the same time, in January-August 2024, re-export of foreign goods from the Republic of Moldova decreased by 32% and amounted to 577.3 million dollars (24.7% of total exports). Re-export of goods after processing amounted to 14.3% of the total volume, and classic re-export of unprocessed goods (e.g., gasoline, diesel fuel, sunflower oil, data processing equipment, medicines) — 10.4%.
Let us focus on two indicators: the initially large volume of re-exports — more than a third of Moldova’s total exports — and the rapid decline in re-exports.
Moldova was one of the main beneficiaries of the numerous multidirectional sanctions that appeared immediately after February 24, 2022 — the beginning of the military phase of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. From legal schemes for producing goods from customer-supplied raw materials from territories where such production was limited or impossible due to sanctions or war, to direct resale by Moldovan companies of foreign goods whose distribution was restricted — all contributed. The first figure — total re-exports as one-third of national exports — is due precisely to this.
The second figure — the rapid decline — shows that Moldova is no longer a convenient bridge for businesses wanting to continue trade under wartime restrictions.
But the reason is not the success of the pro-European government of Chisinau in developing national exports (in 2024, Moldovan exports fell by 12.2% to $3.6 billion, while imports rose by 4.5%, leading to a 19% increase in the trade deficit to $5.5 billion), but rather growing political instability — primarily in relations between Gagauzia and Chisinau.
As shown above, the power crisis in Gagauzia can be seen as an elite struggle over creating an “internal offshore” in the autonomy, in which the Russian–Ukrainian–Moldovan (we believe this is an accurate term) business elite could solve its problems bypassing wartime restrictions.
However, this model does not explain why the elite conflict received such broad support from Gagauzia’s population. Here, an ethnic factor must be considered.
At the end of March 2025, the head of Gagauzia, Eugenia Gutul, turned to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for support: “I am sure that at this critical moment, when the Gagauz people are facing the threat of losing their autonomy, their identity and their future, you, Mr. President, and the entire brotherly Turkish people will not remain indifferent. We count on your voice, on your authority, on your international support… Gagauzia needs Turkey – as many years ago, when Ankara’s voice helped preserve peace and justice,” she said in a statement delivered through her lawyers.
The Gagauz are a Turkic-speaking people. Their national language belongs to the Oghuz subgroup of southwestern Turkic languages. Many historians believe the Gagauz are descendants of Seljuk Turks who migrated to Dobrudja in the 13th century and founded an Oghuz state there with the Polovtsians.
The already tense relations with Chisinau over language and identity are further strained by President Sandu’s de facto path for Moldova’s EU accession — through unification with Romania (a member since 2007).
A citizen of both Romania and Moldova, Maia Sandu does not distance herself from this idea, but sees it as politically unformed at the moment. “There is support for reunification with Romania, but it is not enough. There are people who promote this idea, but they are also not enough. There is also support for integration into the EU. This is what we are striving for,” Sandu said two years ago, in May 2023.
However, the practical steps of Chisinau are aimed precisely at this political formation of the idea of reunification with Romania.
In March 2023, the Moldovan Parliament adopted a law renaming the state language of Moldova from “Moldovan” to “Romanian”. This decision was made in connection with the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, which in 2013 recognized Romanian as the state language. Thus, all official documents and the Constitution now contain the term “Romanian language” instead of “Moldovan language”.
Of the three million citizens of Moldova, about one million citizens of Moldova already have Romanian passports.
The number of Romanians in Moldova’s government is growing. Former Romanian Finance Minister Anca Dragu has taken over the National Bank of Moldova, while former head of Romania’s National Anti-Money Laundering Office Marius Staicu has taken up a similar post in Chisinau. Romanian career diplomat Cosmin Dinescu has been appointed head of the EU Civil Partnership Mission in Moldova, focused on countering hybrid threats and strengthening crisis management structures in internal security. These are not isolated examples – there is a deep integration of the political nomenclatures of the two countries.
Almost all activities on Moldova’s integration into the EU are carried out by figures from the Romanian political elite. Nine high-ranking political bureaucrats from Romania have been sent as advisers and high-level advisers of the European Union to the executive authorities of Moldova. This includes the former Minister of Education of Romania, Daniel Funeriu , former president of the National Scientific Research Authority of Romania Dragos Ciuparu , former manager of the National Bank of Romania Nicolae Grigore , former Prosecutor General of Romania Gabriela Scutea , former head of the National Energy Regulatory Authority of Romania Alexandru Sendulescu , former first deputy head of the Romanian police, quaestor (brigadier general) Victor Apreutesei , former head of the Secretariat of the Romanian Government Victor Giosan . Also seconded to Moldova is former Minister of Transport of Romania Anca Boagiu , and former Secretary of State of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Romania, quaestor (brigadier general) Irina Alexe.
Bucharest is even more open in its support for the idea of reuniting Romania and Moldova. In an interview with DC News on April 8 last year, Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu said that he supports the unification of the two countries, as he considers Moldova to be part of Romania, “illegally torn away and included in the USSR in 1940.” Ciolacu admitted that the unification of Romania and Moldova could be implemented both within the EU and outside it. At the same time, he noted that this requires the support of Moldovan citizens. “I support this, I have no prohibition. This is my right!” — Marcel Ciolacu said.
On the same day, the head of the autonomy, Eugenia Gutul, stated that Gagauzia could separate from Moldova if the latter unites with Romania, and added that Moldova could introduce troops into the territory of the Gagauz autonomy if it declares independence.
If we abandon emotional approaches, we can see that the behavior of each of the actors in this conflict is rational and logical – from the point of view of their interests. The Chisinau authorities are using the unique opportunity to join the EU through joining Romania, bypassing the mechanisms for gradual accession to the European Union, which are practically blocked today. Bucharest is solving the historical task of reuniting a single state. Business elites are looking for ways to circumvent the sanctions and wartime risks imposed on them by politicians.Russia is playing on Gagauzia’s fear of Romanianization , trying to form a second outpost in Moldova. Turkey, like everywhere else in the Turkic-speaking world, is exploring the contours of a new location of influence. This is the main danger of this conflict. Politics is not a zero-sum game. And even the most logical actions of any of the actors – if they ignore the interests of others – only lead to everyone blocking the efforts of all other participants in the big game around little Gagauzia.
Alexander Shpunt is Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics, resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999 – 2011 he also served as the Executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think-tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.