PSCRP-BESA Reports No 147 (August 18, 2025)
by Alexander Shpunt
1. Our July review opens with an article by Dinissa Duvanova, a researcher from the Department of International Relations, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA, United States, titled “Syndrome of populism and the evolution of post-Soviet regimes”, published in the July issue (No. 7) of Frontiers in Political Science.
The study by this young scholar boldly challenges the prevailing view in academic publications regarding the place and role of populism in the political process.
Professor Dinissa Duvanova’s article explores populism in the post-Soviet space, examining its manifestations and evolution under the pressure of authoritarian consolidation. The author questions traditional conceptualizations of populism, which often associate it with democratic institutions, and instead proposes a broader definition based on the notion of a “syndrome of populism”—a set of ideological, strategic, behavioral, and socio-cultural manifestations.
The central thesis of the article is that in post-Soviet states, the consolidation of repressive authoritarianism leads to the decline of populism rather than the reverse. The author argues that populist parties, movements, rhetoric, and policies thrived in transitional political conditions characterized by political pluralism, elite competition, electoral mechanisms, and a certain degree of civil liberties. As authoritarian regimes consolidate restrictive and non-participatory mechanisms of control (dominant parties, centralized propaganda machines, repressive apparatus), populist tactics become less widespread, and populism as a conceptual tool for describing political life loses its relevance.
Duvanova analyzes the manifestations of populism in the post-Soviet region, beginning with the early years after the collapse of the USSR, during periods of regime crises, under participatory autocracies, and under increasingly repressive dictatorial rule. To do this, she employs a definition of populism as a qualitative characteristic of doctrines, parties, and movements, where the central element is the opposition between elites and the masses, as well as the method and style of mobilizing mass support. This concept includes four key elements: the idealization of “the people” and popular sovereignty, anti-elitism and anti-institutionalism, the veneration of power (the state, the strong leader), and the opposition of “us” versus the hostile “other” (xenophobia, conspiracy theories).
When the opposition is excluded from the political process, the media are fully controlled by the state, and civil society is suppressed, populist rhetoric becomes the prerogative of autocratic leaders themselves. Duvanova refers to this phenomenon as “authoritarian pseudo-populism” or “ideological mimicry.” Examples include the use of nationalist and protectionist rhetoric by leaders such as Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin. However, according to the author, in the absence of pluralism and with the suppression of mass participation, such rhetoric lacks real political significance and serves merely as a façade for consolidating power.
In conclusion, Duvanova argues that the evolution of post-Soviet autocracies from economic liberalism and participatory authoritarianism toward statist and non-participatory political systems has undermined the populist project. Unlike in traditional democracies, where populism may contribute to institutional erosion, in post-Soviet states it has been suppressed and displaced as a real political force, since authoritarian regimes have deprived it of the essential conditions for existence—freedom of speech, political competition, and the possibility of mass mobilization.
2. The war between Russia and Ukraine has become such a significant factor in global politics that it is now not only the subject of articles, books, and reports but, as it turns out, also the focus of dedicated university programs.
Northwestern University, located in the suburbs of Chicago, offered such a program this spring: “Post-Soviet Politics: Russia, Ukraine, and the Road to War” under the direction of Professor Jordan Gans-Morse.
The Begin-Sadat Center, as part of Bar-Ilan University, could not overlook this academic innovation.
The course is structured more as political-historical than purely political science and is divided into four parts covering key stages in the development of the post-Soviet space.
The first part addresses the end of the Soviet era. Topics here include Marxism, Stalinism, totalitarianism, and the planned economy. The lectures examine Gorbachev’s reforms, the rise of nationalism and social movements, as well as the causes of the collapse of the Soviet system. Among the required readings recommended by the course author are excerpts from works by Mary McAuley, Archie Brown, and Daniel Treisman.
The second part of the course is titled “Triple Transitions” in Russia and Ukraine. This section analyzes attempts to build democratic institutions in Russia, including the constitutional crisis of 1993 and the presidential elections of 1996. It also examines the peaceful transfer of power in Ukraine and the so-called “Kuchma system.” Foreign policy during this period is explored through the lens of Russia’s and Ukraine’s search for a new identity, NATO expansion, and the Kosovo bombings. The economic aspect includes a study of “wild” capitalism with its oligarchs, mafia, and barter system.
The third part of the course is devoted to Putin’s rise to power and the centralization of authority, as well as the formation of the one-party system under United Russia. On the Ukrainian side, the Orange Revolution is analyzed as a “step toward democracy.” Foreign policy is viewed in the context of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Russia’s response to the “color revolutions,” and its invasion of Georgia. The economic component focuses on the role of oil in Russia’s economic revival and the emergence of “state capitalism.”
The fourth and final part covers the 2010s—Putinism, post-Maidan Ukraine, and the precursors to war. This section of the course focuses on the Maidan, the annexation of Crimea, and the armed conflict in Donbas. It also addresses the 2011–2012 protests in Russia, the rise of conservatism, nationalism, and authoritarianism in both countries. The course concludes with a discussion of the return of “industrial war” to Europe and the final divergence of Russia’s and Ukraine’s paths.
Although in our view the authors did not fully succeed in avoiding bias in their assessment of the role of various actors in the ongoing conflict, the very attempt to construct a comprehensive academic course on a still-unfolding “hot” military confrontation deserves high recognition.
3. The article by Nargiz Nagiyeva, “Post-Soviet Colonialism and Postcolonialism: A Contradictory Discourse”, published in Path of Science (Vol. 11, No. 3, 2025), caught our attention with its methodological approach. This brief study does not so much analyze as announce a deeper exploration of how postcolonial theory—which critiques unequal relations between a metropole and a colonized community—can be applied to the post-Soviet space.
As the researcher from Baku State University reminds us, traditional studies of colonialism focused on economic, political, and military aspects, whereas postcolonial theory has drawn attention to cultural and ideological dimensions.
The discussion of Russian colonialism, Nagiyeva notes, is characterized by contradictory perspectives. The author mentions Russian theorists whose views on this issue diverge: some categorically deny Russia’s colonial status, while others argue that Russia, from its very inception, occupied a colonialist position.
After the collapse of the USSR and the independence of its republics, Russia shifted to new forms of control over the post-Soviet space, which the author defines as postcolonial and neocolonial paradigms. These mechanisms aim to maintain political and economic influence.
In the context of economic dependence, the author cites the example of Armenia, whose economy, closely tied to the Soviet military-industrial complex, fell into deep crisis after gaining independence and continues to remain dependent on Russia. At the same time, Nargiz Nagiyeva points out that the economies of the former Soviet republics, in her view, were deliberately structured by the center in such a way as to prevent them from being self-sufficient.
Another important mechanism of what the author regards as neocolonial influence is the use of conflicts frozen during the Soviet period. After the weakening of central Soviet authority, these conflicts “thawed,” and the former republics became dependent on Moscow for military and political support. The article notes that Russia assumed the role of an “independent arbiter” in these conflicts, including those in Azerbaijan (the Karabakh conflict) and Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
The article also points out that Russia maintains political influence by keeping the former Soviet elite in power. The author cites a passage from Evstratov, who argued that after independence, dissidents and anti-Soviet figures were replaced by former Soviet cadres (in Georgia, Armenia, and even Azerbaijan). While the author agrees with this claim, she clarifies that these “anti-Soviet figures” were national heroes who fought for independence. The assertion that such politicians “easily find common ground with the Russian Federation” is not entirely accurate, since even they seek to distance themselves from direct subordination to Moscow.
Overall, this undoubtedly interesting article leaves a mixed impression. On the one hand, the very attempt to apply the methodological framework of postcolonial theory to the processes unfolding in the former USSR deserves high praise. On the other hand, Nagiyeva, in our view, shifts excessively into the realm of political commentary and clearly imposes her own conclusions on the reader, without providing sufficient textual support.
4. An increasing number of high-quality multidisciplinary studies are being published by scholars from universities in the Persian Gulf countries. This is a new phenomenon that we are witnessing right now.
Whereas five years ago researchers from the UAE or Saudi Arabia largely concentrated on regional topics, today their field of interest has expanded significantly. At the same time, the mechanisms for accessing these works are still imperfect.
The article by John Hardy and Ruxandra Oana Vlad, researchers at Rabdan Academy, United Arab Emirates, was published in the Journal of Regional Security six months ago, but only recently became available through full-text publication search on the internet, which is why we have included it in our monitoring.
The Rabdan Academy scholars present their analysis of the role of unrecognized states (para-states) as a Russian tool for containing NATO expansion. The authors argue that in the context of geopolitical competition with Western countries, Moscow uses these territories as a “political wedge” to create buffer zones and sustain regional frozen conflicts. The study offers a comparative analysis of three examples of Russian-supported para-states: Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.
As the methodological basis of their study, the authors employed comparative analysis using four key variables: rationale, enablers, mechanisms, and outcomes.
- Rationale: Defines Moscow’s explicit motives and justifications for supporting a given para-state.
- Enablers: Identifies historical, political, and socio-cultural factors that facilitate Russian influence.
- Mechanisms: Describes the material instruments of support, such as military presence, economic assistance, and infrastructure development.
- Outcomes: Assesses the positive and negative effects of support for Russia’s foreign policy interests.
The study draws on mixed data from primary sources (official reports, government publications) and secondary sources (academic literature, media), which, according to the authors, allows them to minimize bias.
The central idea advanced in the study is that Russia’s support for post-Soviet para-states constitutes a deliberate and pragmatic instrument of its foreign policy, aimed at achieving strategic objectives. The analysis shows that Russia’s motives in each of the three cases are primarily driven by its own interests, which take precedence over those of the para-states themselves.
In conclusion, the authors argue that the support of para-states is a key and effective instrument of Russian foreign policy. Moscow uses them to generate destabilizing flashpoints on its periphery, weakening host states and obstructing their rapprochement with NATO. These actions have enabled Russia to expand its military presence and geopolitical influence, reinforcing its position as the principal arbiter of regional security in the post-Soviet space. Thus, para-states are not merely the byproducts of post-Soviet chaos, but a consciously sustained element of Russia’s strategy to preserve its “imperial influence.”
5. As part of its research into the nature of conflicts in the post-Soviet space, the Begin-Sadat Center has published several materials examining the dynamics of Western policy toward the former Soviet republics. These texts highlighted how pressure from the economic elites of these new states—unwilling to abandon their business orientation toward the former metropole—shaped a trend of declining interest in integration with the West.
The report “Inflection Point in the Caucasus: Untying Georgia’s Knot”, authored by John DiPirro and Laura Linderman of the Transatlantic Research and Policy Center (American Foreign Policy Council), was published in July 2025 within the framework of the Central Asia–Caucasus Research Program. The study analyzes the evolution and effectiveness of Western policy toward Georgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly in light of recent crises linked to the growing authoritarian tendencies of the ruling party Georgian Dream (GD).
The authors conclude that the West’s decades-long approach—attempting to balance support for democratic values with pragmatic cooperation—has led to strategic mistakes that now confront Western policymakers with a dilemma: what is more important—a democratic Georgia, or a cooperative, friendly Georgia?
It is precisely this framing of the question that we found most compelling in the work of DiPirro and Linderman. In fact, this question could be applied to relations with any post-Soviet country—even the Baltic states, despite their integration into the EU.
In their detailed analysis of Georgia, the authors identify four key failures of Western policy that have shaped the current situation.
First, there is the inconsistency in balancing values and interests. During the presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili (2003–2012), Western support for Georgia’s strategic orientation often came at the expense of overlooking its democratic shortcomings, which undermined trust in the West and created a precedent for future governments.
Second, the West misinterpreted Georgia’s domestic political dynamics, failing to recognize the depth of public disillusionment with the United National Movement (UNM) and underestimating the influence of Bidzina Ivanishvili. This led to perceptions of Western bias and eroded its moral authority.
Third, there was an excessive emphasis on technical assistance. Billions invested in institutional development assumed that democratic norms would evolve organically. In practice, however, this enabled both the UNM and GD governments to become more effective in anti-democratic practices, fostering dependence without accountability or meaningful reform.
Finally, the fourth failure lies in the vulnerability of Western policy to shifts and reactive approaches. Changes in U.S. and EU priorities resulted in strategic neglect of Georgia, as well as delayed and inconsistent responses to democratic backsliding.
The authors conclude that the West has reached an “inflection point” in its relations with Georgia. A policy that once combined democratic principles with pragmatic cooperation is no longer viable. In the face of growing Russian and Chinese influence, as well as broader shifts in the international order, Western policymakers must rethink their approach, clearly define the type of relationship they seek with Georgia, and decide whether to correct past mistakes or opt for a more pragmatic course.
Alexander Shpunt is an Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics and resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he has served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999–2011 he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.