PSCRP-BESA Reports No 151 (September 9, 2025)
by Alexander Shpunt
1. RAND Europe’s publications always fall into the “must-read” category. Just like its American counterpart, the European branch has a fine-tuned ability to pick up signals from key political stakeholders. The report Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat, prepared by a team of authors from RAND Europe at the request of the UK Ministry of Defence, offers a comprehensive analysis of how Russian strategic assessment culture influences its nuclear doctrine—particularly its stance on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). The mutual withdrawal of Russia and the United States from the INF Treaty shifts this issue from the theoretical to the highly practical, making it a foundation for a new security architecture on the European continent.
The study seeks to reduce risks associated with potential nuclear escalation, especially in the context of the current conflict in Ukraine. The authors emphasize that Western analytical approaches often fail to account for the specific features of Russian strategic culture, which leads to misinterpretations of its motives and logic.
The report examines the cultural, historical, and ideological factors shaping Russia’s strategic thinking and security decisions. According to the authors, Russian strategic culture is primarily defined by four fundamental features.
First is the “fortress under siege” mentality, rooted in historical experiences such as the Mongol invasions and the Great Patriotic War, and reinforced by today’s perception of NATO enlargement as an existential threat. This fear of external intrusion—not only military, but also political, as Russia believes it experienced in the 1990s—drives the view of the nuclear arsenal as an “insurance policy.”
Second, Russia’s worldview is based on a “zero-sum game,” where any gain by the adversary is automatically perceived as a loss of its own. This mindset, combined with the drive to maintain great-power status (regarded as essential for survival), underpins actions that the West often interprets as aggressive. However, the authors note, within Russia these same actions are seen as “defensive”—a perception important both for the leadership and the public. Within this framework, Russia is determined not to allow the erosion of its influence in its near abroad—hence the relevance of this RAND study to our monitoring.
The third distinctive feature concerns Russia’s systemic approach to escalation dynamics. Unlike the Western “linear” view, Russian strategic thinking is horizontal and holistic, where conventional and nuclear means complement one another. Non-strategic nuclear forces—from intermediate-range missiles to nuclear artillery shells—are classified not by yield but by delivery system. From this perspective, nuclear forces are seen as a flexible instrument of coercion.
Another defining aspect of Russian doctrine is the “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, whereby the threat—or even limited use—of nuclear weapons can be employed to compel an adversary to end a conventional conflict. This introduces deliberate strategic ambiguity, which, in the authors’ view, is a central element of Russian deterrence.
In its concluding section, the report offers recommendations for NATO allies. The authors call for a deeper understanding of Russian strategic culture in order to better forecast its actions and develop more effective deterrence strategies. The report also notes that, despite Russia’s efforts to modernize its conventional forces, the conflict in southeastern Russia and Ukraine increases its reliance on nuclear deterrence.
As for the shortcomings, one must mention RAND’s characteristic tendency to blur the line between analysis and advocacy. A carefully executed narrative literature review of publications since 2014 is paired with a notably weak set of hypothetical scenarios for Russia’s use (!) of non-strategic nuclear weapons—an exercise that runs counter to the report’s main findings and, in some respects, contradicts them outright.
Moreover, the assertion that Russia enjoys a significant numerical advantage in this area—holding some 1,500 units compared to roughly 200 for the United States, about 100 of which are deployed in Europe—directly conflicts with the data of other authoritative sources, notably SIPRI. In all this, one can easily discern RAND’s intention to nudge European policymakers toward specific decisions, which undermines the otherwise valuable and timely nature of the study.
2. The Global Initiative, a well-known and respected independent civil society organization headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, has for many years specialized in the study of global crime and responses to it. Its August report Den of Thieves: Mapping Organized Crime in the South Caucasus is a comprehensive study of organized crime in the South Caucasus, covering Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The report examines the particularities of criminal structures, their interlinkages with political regimes, and the transnational dimensions of their activities.
Since Soviet times, the South Caucasus has been a hub of the shadow economy, which gave rise to the influential phenomenon of the “thieves-in-law”. By the end of the Soviet era, nearly two-thirds of the roughly 900 “thieves-in-law” hailed from this region.
The report underscores that organized crime in the South Caucasus develops under the influence of political structures. In Azerbaijan, described as an authoritarian regime, criminal elements are integrated into state institutions. In Georgia and Armenia—both hybrid democracies—organized crime is tolerated or informally co-opted into state structures.
In Armenia, despite the optimism that followed the 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” concerns remain about the resilience of criminal networks and their ties to the political elite. The country continues to face major problems such as commodity cartels, online gambling, illicit trade in legal goods (particularly counterfeit tobacco), and drug trafficking. Thieves-in-law remain influential figures, but their activities have shifted abroad, mainly to Russia and EU countries, where they operate through trusted associates and political alliances. Evidence suggests that Armenian criminal groups, bolstered by a vast diaspora, specialize in money laundering and human smuggling. The 2020 law criminalizing links to criminal subcultures forced many thieves-in-law to leave the country.
In Georgia, after substantial progress against corruption in the wake of the 2003 “Rose Revolution,” criminal subcultures have seen a revival, particularly within the prison system. At the same time, issues such as state capture, nepotism, and a lack of transparency persist. Conflict zones such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, once traditional hubs of illicit trade, lost much of their significance as smuggling channels following the 2008 war and tighter controls. Georgian criminal groups, wielding considerable influence across the post-Soviet space, focus on burglary, migrant smuggling, and document forgery in Europe. The report also notes Georgia’s role as a key transit corridor for drugs from Afghanistan to Europe, with its Black Sea ports serving as hubs for cocaine shipments from Latin America. Particular attention is given to the rapid growth of cybercrime, especially call centers targeting European citizens.
In Azerbaijan, organized crime is tightly interwoven with the state apparatus. In the 1990s, the political regime largely dismantled independent criminal networks, subordinating the remaining groups to state interests. The analysis shows that large-scale corruption and money laundering are the primary sources of illicit financial flows. Key sectors of the economy and government are controlled by powerful family networks tied to the ruling elite. Azerbaijani criminal groups specialize in drug trafficking (notably heroin and methamphetamines), caviar smuggling, and human trafficking.
The report also highlights the transnational character of Caucasian organized crime. Since the outbreak of the conflict in southeastern Russia and Ukraine, there has been a sharp increase in sanctions evasion and shadow trade in the South Caucasus. The region has become a strategically important corridor for criminal operations as illicit networks adapt to the shifting geopolitical landscape.
In conclusion, the report offers recommendations and assesses future trends. It notes that new trade corridors, such as the “Middle Corridor” and the “North-South Corridor,” may facilitate both legal and illicit trade.
3. The struggle over the interpretation of the past is also a struggle over the meaning of the present and the shaping of the future. The way a collective perceives its past affects its self-identity, its understanding of other groups, and its politics. This theme has profound social and political significance, since control over memory is itself a form of political power. It is precisely for this reason that the strictly phenomenological and theoretical work of Minna-Kerttu M. Kekki of the University of Helsinki has become relevant to the monitoring of today’s political conflicts.
In her article Our Past vs. Theirs: Collective Memory as an Emergent Collective Experience, published in Puncta: Journal of Critical Phenomenology, Kekki examines the phenomenology of collective memory. She argues that collective memory differs from individual memory and constitutes a distinct type of collective experience.
Kekki illustrates her point with the case of Estonia in the 2020s, where public debate has revolved around whether the Soviet period from the 1940s to the 1990s should be regarded as colonization. For most Estonians, this debate is a recounting of their own history, free from the occupier’s (the Soviet Union’s) perspective. For the Russian-speaking minority, however—whose families largely arrived during the occupation—the idea that Estonia was occupied or colonized may seem unfamiliar or inaccurate.
This example, Kekki notes, shows how different groups within the same society can hold different collective memories. She sees such debates as cases of collective remembering, which actively shape and transform collective memory.
Kekki distinguishes between collective memory, collective remembering, and history. Collective memory is essentially static knowledge of historical events shared by a group, though it can evolve. Collective remembering, by contrast, is a dynamic process that involves debating and reinterpreting how the past should be represented and remembered. While collective memory can exist without active remembering, remembering cannot exist without memory, since it is the act of activating and unfolding memory. The Estonian debate on colonization is an instance of collective remembering, whereas collective memory is the shared understanding of history itself.
Unlike memory and remembering, history seeks to provide as objective and accurate an account as possible of a complex past, including contradictory perspectives. Collective memory, by contrast, is evaluative and exists only from the standpoint of “us,” not independently of it. Studying collective memory is not about uncovering historical facts but about exploring how a particular community understands its past in the present.
Whereas history operates from a third-person perspective, collective memory speaks from the first-person plural—“we.” This means that events remembered collectively are perceived as relevant to “us.” Such a perspective implies that an individual reacts to an object (for example, a historical event) with an awareness of belonging to a larger group, speaking on its behalf rather than as an isolated individual. A subject may feel part of a group even if other members are unaware of their own belonging, and even across past or future generations.
Kekki argues that a society or a nation can act as a “higher-order person,” though not as a unified consciousness. Collective memory is not the sum of individual memories, nor can it be located in a single individual’s psyche. It is an emergent phenomenon—a social situation arising from the experiences of others who share a common view of the past. For individuals within a collective, collective memory is experienced as everyday knowledge of the world, existing independently of their own lives.
Participation in collective memory does not require members of the collective to be physically present together or even to know one another. This is particularly true of large groups, such as nations, which Benedict Anderson famously described as “imagined communities.” Members of such groups believe in their existence through public debate, education, and cultural narratives. This “we” can even include the dead, who are seen as part of the shared history.
Collective experience is formed by individuals, each engaging with it in their own way, from their own perspective, and sometimes even in disagreement about past events. The Finnish debate over “Finlandization,” for example, constitutes collective remembering, even in its conflictual form.
Kekki concludes that, for those within it, collective memory is experienced as part of social reality, not as subjective feelings or opinions. Thus, collective memory is a unique kind of experience that can exist even when one is alone. Historical events comprising collective memory appear real, objective, and independent of individual opinions, while at the same time carrying normative significance important to the group and to those who feel part of it.
Different groups may interpret the same historical events differently, even within a single nation. For instance, the Estonian majority and the Russian-speaking minority may hold divergent views of the decolonization debate. These differences in collective memory can lead to conflict. Attempts to convince someone that their collective memory is false are often futile, since the “truth” one grows up with—reinforced by emotional bonds and identity—feels more persuasive. Changing the content of collective memory requires reflexive collective remembering, which must arise from within the group itself. Recognizing these differences in collective memory is essential for fostering mutual respect and understanding between groups.
4. The highly practical, largely methodological report Codes of Ethics for NGOs, prepared by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) for non-governmental nonprofit organizations (NGOs) in Uzbekistan, is dedicated to the issue of self-regulation in the NGO sector, with a particular focus on mechanisms of ethical codes. Its primary aim is to assist Uzbek NGOs in deciding whether it is worthwhile to develop their own code of ethics, and, if so, in defining its content and the process for drafting it.
At the same time, this document clearly carries research value—above all because organizational codes of ethical conduct have come under global scrutiny in light of new revelations about the long-term activities of international democracy-promotion structures across the post-Soviet space.
The central thesis of the report is that the drafting and adoption of an ethical code must be an entirely voluntary initiative of the NGOs themselves. The state has no right to compel NGOs to adopt or implement such codes. Forced imposition of ethical standards may be perceived as interference in the freedom of association and may undermine the legitimacy of the document itself. The decision to adopt a code must be made independently by each NGO, and no single organization or coalition can impose this choice on the entire sector.
Ethical codes differ fundamentally from laws and regulations. While laws are binding for all NGOs, ethical codes are adopted on a voluntary basis. Legislation cannot dictate ethical norms, nor can it compel NGOs to adopt codes or establish penalties for their violation. Mechanisms to ensure compliance with codes are based on the internal commitment of the organization, not on coercive sanctions. The state can only encourage adoption—for example, through positive recognition, public support, or preferential grant opportunities.
Among the main goals of voluntary ethical codes, the authors highlight the strengthening of public trust. A code of ethics can serve as a tool to restore or enhance the reputation of the sector—not just of a single organization—especially in the wake of scandals involving misuse of funds or personal enrichment of NGO leaders. Adoption of a code signals to society and partners a willingness to embrace greater transparency and accountability.
Additionally, codes articulate the core principles of organizational work, ensuring a common understanding of values and norms for staff, members, and volunteers. This contributes to greater effectiveness and helps attract broader public and donor support.
In countries with liberal legislation, where strict reporting requirements are absent, ethical codes can mitigate external risks—such as the potential misuse of NGOs for terrorist financing. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommends such self-regulation mechanisms as risk-reduction measures. However, as the document notes, in Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, legislation already contains sufficient (and at times excessive) reporting and oversight requirements, which diminishes the necessity of additional self-regulatory mechanisms.
The report concludes with a list of useful resources on NGO ethical codes from international practice, which may be adapted to the national context.
5. We conclude our August review of the most notable studies and publications with the article The Dichotomy of Progress: Public Perception, Scientific Evidence, and the Future of Global Health Governance—Insights from Georgia which stood out for its rich sociological data. The author, Zurab Alkhanishvili, President of the Georgian Association for Public Health & Well-Being, offers a compelling exploration of the gap between scientific progress and public perception.
Progress in global health often goes unnoticed by the public, creating a dangerous disconnect between scientific achievement and popular understanding. This phenomenon—referred to as the “paradox of progress”—threatens the effectiveness of public health policy and undermines trust in it. The COVID-19 pandemic exemplified this tension, where scientific breakthroughs were met with skepticism and disinformation, diminishing the impact of public health measures.
The article draws on data from a nationwide representative survey conducted in Georgia between March 1 and May 30, 2023. A total of 1,876 adult citizens from 11 regions were interviewed anonymously using paper questionnaires in face-to-face interviews. To ensure representativeness, the study employed cluster sampling with primary stratification by region. Households were selected via a “random walk” method, and respondents within households were chosen based on the “last birthday” technique. The margin of error was 2.5% at a 95% confidence level.
The survey results revealed a striking gap between scientific data and public perceptions across several key indicators. For instance, 64% of respondents mistakenly believed that global population growth had either stalled or reversed, citing wars, pandemics, and environmental degradation as reasons. Only 36% correctly answered that the population has continued to rise. Similarly, 82% wrongly thought that average life expectancy had declined over the past century, attributing this to poorer food and air quality, along with popular myths about ancestors’ longevity.
Basic medical knowledge also proved alarmingly low: 88% of respondents erroneously believed antibiotics are effective against viral diseases, while only 12% knew they are not. This misconception is not unique to Georgia—similar patterns appear worldwide. The sole indicator where perception matched reality was child mortality: 98% correctly recognized that it has declined.
The knowledge gap showed no statistically significant differences across demographic variables such as age or urban/rural residence, underscoring its universal nature.
The researchers identify several contributing factors, the most important of which is political. In Georgia—a country with a transitional economy—low public trust in state institutions and the healthcare system creates fertile ground for disinformation.
The study concludes that scientific progress without public trust remains fragile. Addressing global health challenges in the 21st century requires aligning scientific achievements with public understanding and participation.
Alexander Shpunt is an Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics and resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he has served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999–2011 he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.