PSCRP-BESA Reports No 159 (October 17, 2025)
by Alexander Shpunt
David Aprasidze’s article “Civil society and anti-corruption reform in Georgia: revisiting the rose revolution”, published on September 18, 2025, in Frontiers in Political Science, offers a detailed re-evaluation of the 2003 Rose Revolution. The study highlights what the author views as the often underestimated role of civil society in driving anti-corruption reforms across three critical phases — before, during, and after the uprising.
Aprasidze’s analysis, based on secondary sources, media archives, and eight semi-structured interviews with key participants, demonstrates that civil society was not merely a catalyst for mass mobilization, but also an active agent shaping both the revolutionary process and the ensuing political outcomes. The research challenges the dominant paradigm of democratic transition, which portrays revolutions as elite-driven, top-down events. Aprasidze instead reveals the micro-level social dynamics and the influence of civil society organizations, activists, and experts.
The historical context presented by the author begins with post-Soviet Georgia’s difficulties, where the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the country grappling with an authoritarian legacy, internal conflicts, and economic decline — with GDP contraction in 1992–1994 reaching double digits. Recovery began in 1995 with the adoption of a new constitution, yet corruption remained systemic, affecting public administration, law enforcement, the judiciary, education, and healthcare. As a result, Georgia ranked 124th in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2003.
Public dissatisfaction, fueled by unmet social needs, prepared the ground for the Rose Revolution — often described as an “anti-corruption revolution.” The international environment, shaped by Western democracy assistance programs, contributed to Georgia’s “partly free” status (Freedom House, 2025), which, despite state weakness, fostered the growth of civil society.
Before the revolution, civil society in Georgia developed primarily through NGOs — a process known as “NGO-ization,” actively supported by international donors. These organizations, concentrated in Tbilisi and with limited regional reach, operated with relative freedom due to the state’s inability to regulate their activities. A 2003 survey showed that only 9% of the population in the regions were aware of NGO activities; however, well-known organizations such as the Liberty Institute (with a recognition rate of 55.6%) and the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (16.8%) were gaining public visibility.
By the late 1990s, NGOs had evolved to focus on exposing corruption and informing the public, which led them to align with emerging opposition parties such as the National Movement (NM) and the United Democrats (UD), led by Mikheil Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania. This shift coincided with the decline of public trust in President Eduard Shevardnadze’s Union of Citizens of Georgia (UCG) and the opposition’s victory in the 2002 municipal elections in Tbilisi.
During the revolution — triggered by the falsified parliamentary elections of November 2, 2003 — civil society played a crucial bridging role, which David Aprasidze identifies as an innovative interpretation of those events. The author shows how a coalition of around 200 organizations, including the Liberty Institute, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), and the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), cooperated with political parties to craft anti-corruption rhetoric and mobilize public support. This led to mass protests culminating in Shevardnadze’s resignation on November 23, marking a peaceful regime change.
The study emphasizes that the success of the revolution depended on these NGO–party alliances, which channeled public discontent into coordinated collective action.
After the revolution, the influence of civil society persisted through the transfer of experience and the integration of personnel into state institutions, which helped sustain public support and shape the political agenda. However, this institutionalization came at the cost of weakening the independence of oversight bodies — a trade-off for the rapid implementation of reforms.
David Aprasidze concludes that the phased influence of civil society played a pivotal role in shaping Georgia’s anti-corruption trajectory, offering a model for post-revolutionary contexts. The study’s findings highlight the potential of this sector as a driving force for change while simultaneously mitigating the risks of co-optation — an issue particularly relevant amid the current rollback of democratic principles and the introduction of restrictive laws targeting NGOs. This analysis calls for further research into civil society’s capacity to adapt to illiberal environments and provides valuable insights for scholars and policymakers monitoring post-Soviet conflict zones.
***
Laurie Georges of The Ohio State University, in her article “Knowledges that Cannot Be Known: Structuring Azerbaijani Attachment to Nagorno-Karabakh”, published by Cambridge University Press (2025, doi:10.1017/nps.2025.10079), offers a new theoretical framework for understanding territorial attachments in protracted, seemingly intractable conflicts.
Drawing on the example of Azerbaijani attachment to Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), Georges integrates social epistemology, ontological security, and theories of nation-building to argue that strong emotional and cognitive bonds to disputed territories emerge from “structural ignorance”—a mechanism that, according to her, filters out unsettling narratives about the artificiality of the nation and the oppression of non-dominant groups.
Her analysis is particularly relevant to post-Soviet conflicts, where nation-building processes often exacerbate ethnic tensions around territories such as Nagorno-Karabakh.
Laurie Georges poses two fundamental questions: How do people form deep cognitive and emotional attachments to state territories? And how do these place-based attachments become resistant to external influence?
She contends that territorial attachments are not merely products of positive in-group ties or the sacralization of sacred spaces; rather, they rely on structural ignorance—a concept borrowed from social epistemologists such as Linda Martín Alcoff (2007) and Charles Mills (1995, 2007).
Structural ignorance is defined as “the background knowledge and cognitive mechanisms that filter out discomforting narratives to preserve a dominant worldview.” In the context of nation-building, state authorities actively construct this ignorance among dominant groups (for example, Azerbaijanis) concerning the symbolic significance of territory and the erasure or oppression of non-dominant groups (such as ethnic Armenians in NK).
This process makes such attachments rigid, as any disruption to the established worldview threatens individuals’ ontological security—their stable sense of self and cognitive environment (Mitzen 2006).
The article focuses on Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), an enclave historically populated mainly by ethnic Armenians but assigned to Azerbaijan by Soviet authorities in 1921.
Laurie Georges notes, in particular, a discursive shift in Azerbaijan from “Nagorno-Karabakh”—a neutral international term derived from the Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO)—to “Karabakh,” a broader territorial concept encompassing areas where Azerbaijanis form a demographic majority. This semantic broadening, she argues, is part of the larger process of structuring ignorance that she investigates.
While acknowledging parallel Armenian nation-building efforts—such as the construction of symbolic meaning around NK after the 1915 Genocide and the erasure of Azerbaijani presence—Laurie Georges sidelines Armenia, in our view somewhat unjustifiably, to focus primarily on Azerbaijan.
According to Georges, by the late Soviet period, NK had become an object of “violent attachment.” For instance, following the 1988–1994 war, both the Azerbaijani government and society refused to consider concessions on NK’s status in exchange for the return of seven adjacent districts with Azerbaijani majorities, as reported by the International Crisis Group (2005). Georges argues that this rigidity stems from practices of structuring ignorance that produce abjection—the perception of the opponent (Armenians) as the “familiar stranger,” threatening and irrational (Kinnvall 2006, p. 52).
Drawing on George White (2000), Laurie Georges presents a comprehensive framework for territorial attachment based on three dimensions:
- Cognitive – the roles that places play in the nation’s self-conception;
- Affective – the emotions expressed toward those places;
- Behavioral – the actions taken to defend them, or the “persistence factor.”
She expands this framework using Philip Eidus’s (2020) concept of ontic spaces, in which states transform material environments into “spatial extensions of the collective self” through introjection (discursive linking to the narrative of the self) and projection (projecting the self onto the environment). Georges shifts the focus from states to populations, emphasizing how ignorance underlies these processes.
This connects to the notion of ontological security: maintaining ignorance preserves cognitive routines and prevents disruptions that threaten personal agency and the sense of self (Mitzen 2006). When non-dominant groups challenge sovereignty, attachments become rigid as individuals cling to these routines.
Georges then employs discourse analysis and practice tracing (Pouliot 2015) to track how territorially grounded practices structure ignorance, resulting in abjection and attachment. These practices include both physical and discursive forms:
- Physical practices – construction of roads and monuments, displacement or killing of non-dominant groups, and destruction of heritage (Garrity & Milonas 2024);
- Discursive practices – maps with altered place names, omission of minority heritage from inventories and censuses, rewriting of histories, and curating event sequences within “memory politics” (Anderson 1991; Moore 2016; Billig 1995).
These practices are disseminated through textbooks, museums, the press, media, and travel guides, reinforcing the structured ignorance that sustains territorial attachment.
In the concluding section of her extensive 23-page article, Laurie Georges argues that structural ignorance explains the “unexpected” attachments observed in conflicts. The deconstruction of ignorance, she notes, reveals important implications for intractable disputes: such conflicts persist not only over territory but also as a means of preserving the stability of the self.
This article advances the study of post-Soviet conflicts by linking epistemology to territorial dynamics and offering analytical tools applicable to similar cases such as Abkhazia or Transnistria. Although Georges’s decision to sideline Armenia limits the analytical symmetry, the theoretical value of her innovative approach is substantial and merits close attention from readers.
Laurie Georges’s work represents a theoretically rich contribution that encourages scholars to explore not only the cartography of political interests but also the cognitive and epistemological foundations of nation- and state-building.
***
The authors of the next article in our monitoring review, Young-Jin Ahn and Zuhriddin Juraev, are closely affiliated with the Department of Geography at the College of Social Sciences, Chonnam National University, Gwangju, South Korea. Their paper, “Beyond Borders: Conflict Mediation and Governance in Central Asia’s Fergana Valley”, published in the September 2025 issue of Connections: The Quarterly Journal, offers a timely and theoretically grounded analysis of border disputes and their resolution in the Fergana Valley — a volatile region situated at the crossroads of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
As an ancient civilizational heartland shared by several Central Asian states, the Fergana Valley serves as a critical testing ground for understanding post-Soviet conflicts, where territorial boundaries intersect with resource dependency, ethnic tensions, and geopolitical influence.
Drawing on political geography, mediation theory, and peacebuilding concepts, the authors argue that recent border agreements, while representing legal progress, do not eradicate deep-seated disputes. Instead, they restructure them through new mechanisms of exclusion, securitization, and power asymmetry.
Of particular note is the authors’ reconceptualization of borders in the context of long-standing regional conflicts. The article views borders not as static territorial perimeters but as dynamic instruments of power that regulate sovereignty, mobility, security, and isolation. The Fergana Valley is presented as a quintessential example of this duality — a historically unstable region whose centuries-old volatility has been exacerbated by Soviet-era ethno-territorial arrangements and contemporary geopolitical maneuvering.
Despite diplomatic milestones such as the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border demarcation in 2023 and the Kyrgyz-Tajik settlement in 2024, lingering tensions over water use, enclave management, ethnic coexistence, and cross-border trade underscore the limitations of legalistic solutions.
The central research question posed by the authors is: How do historical legacies, resource governance, and recent diplomatic agreements shape the dynamics of border securitization and conflict resolution in the Fergana Valley?
To address this question, the authors examine three key dimensions:
• The impact of historical territorial constructions on contemporary disputes.
• The role of water, energy, and economic interdependence in reinforcing border control and geopolitical linkages.
• How recent legal agreements reframe—rather than resolve—issues of sovereignty, exclusion, and security.
In their analysis, borders are treated as active relational spaces shaped by infrastructure, power asymmetry, and geopolitical competition. Drawing on Michael T. Klare’s (2001) idea that 21st-century conflicts are concentrated around resource corridors and infrastructural sovereignty, the authors demonstrate how water resources, energy systems, and labor migration perpetuate tensions even after agreements are signed. For instance, hydro-politics in the Syr Darya river basin—centered on upstream reservoirs and seasonal flows—serves as both a source of rivalry and cooperation. The recent escalation in enclaves such as Vorukh, along with unresolved disputes over water sharing, illustrates that conflict persists beyond treaty signing, manifesting in governance practices and social frictions.
The study emphasizes the post-imperial context of the Fergana Valley, drawing comparisons to regions such as Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Israel-Palestine, where formal agreements coexist with securitization and ethnic tension. The authors argue that achieving sustainable peace requires inter-systemic, multi-level approaches that account for infrastructural, ecological, and emotional realities rather than relying solely on technocratic boundary delineation.
Traditional conceptions of borders as fixed perimeters (e.g., Agnew, 2008; Reuber, 2000) are critiqued in favor of dynamic, constructivist approaches (e.g., Brambilla, Laine & Bocchi, 2016). In the Fergana Valley, Soviet-era boundaries divide communities, infrastructures, and symbolic geographies, turning enclaves, rivers, and checkpoints into sites of “infrastructural violence” and everyday contestation. Sovereignty is enacted through surveillance, control of water resources, and restrictions on mobility, while non-state actors generate alternative spatial imaginaries.
The authors argue that this reality demands a shift from “technical demarcation” to “spatial transformation.” However, it should be noted that the article conceptualizes “spatial transformation” rather insufficiently—an omission that somewhat weakens the analytical weight of an otherwise engaging and thought-provoking text.
As Young-Jin Ahn and Zuhriddin Juraev note, traditional diplomacy proves ineffective in contexts saturated with identity politics; “directive mediation” tends to shape outcomes around intangible claims such as ethnicity (Wiegand, 2014).
The authors propose the development of a new type of mediator—institutions capable of addressing material, symbolic, and infrastructural dimensions of conflict. This approach entails:
- multi-level, relationship-based mediation;
- the creation of cross-border, community-rooted platforms;
- equitable infrastructure design; and
- collaborative spatial governance instead of rigid territorial control.
This article stands out for its interdisciplinary synthesis, combining critical political geography with applied political science to challenge the assumption that legal demarcation equates to peace. By emphasizing post-settlement dynamics, the authors reveal how agreements can inadvertently generate new exclusions—through securitized mobility or unequal access to resources—thereby perpetuating cycles of tension. The case of Fergana exemplifies broader post-Soviet patterns in which historical traumas (Soviet ethno-territorialism) intersect with contemporary dependencies (water, energy), often exacerbated by external influences.
Among the study’s strengths is its detailed examination of 21st-century conflict factors, particularly resource geography as applied to specific sites in the valley, such as the Syr Darya River and the Vorukh enclave. A notable limitation is the absence of quantitative data—for instance, maps of contested zones or timelines of agreements—but this is offset by the article’s rich qualitative synthesis of empirical examples and theoretical insights.
The findings highlight the complexity of resource-related conflict resolution and underscore the need for integrative approaches to achieve sustainable outcomes. For scholars of post-Soviet conflicts, this study contributes meaningfully to debates on territorial governance and peacebuilding, offering models that transcend traditional frameworks (Megoran, 2023). It also provides practical reflections relevant to unstable regions, emphasizing that genuine settlement must reshape lived spaces—not merely redraw lines on maps.
***
In the dynamically evolving landscape of the post-Soviet space—where the historical legacies of division often intersect with modern geopolitical tensions—scholarly works that emphasize unifying factors are of great importance, even when their approaches appear somewhat idealistic or romantic.
One such study is the article “The significance of socio-political values of the peoples of Central Asia in the development of interstate integration relations” by Mukhammadjon Isomov, published in the Modern American Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (Vol. 01, Issue 06, September 2025, ISSN (E): 3067-8153, pp. 117–124).
A Candidate of Philosophical Sciences and Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences, Uzbek State University of World Languages, Mukhammadjon Isomov is not a political scientist or conflict analyst. From a policy-analysis perspective, his approach as a cultural scholar and social philosopher may seem somewhat simplified or even flawed.
Yet it is precisely such interdisciplinary research that provides a more multidimensional understanding of conflicts, helping to uncover new approaches where traditional political science frameworks may have already been exhausted.
Isomov draws on philosophical and socio-political analysis, arguing that shared values among the peoples of Central Asia function as a fundamental mechanism of “soft power” that fosters interstate integration—thus contributing to stability and mitigating potential conflicts in a region marked by disputes over water resources, border issues, and ethnic tensions.
At the outset of the article, Isomov identifies key socio-political values common to the peoples of Central Asia—such as social and political unity, interethnic harmony, religious tolerance, mutual respect between generations, cultural and linguistic proximity, and the historical unity of lifestyle and traditions—as stabilizing factors that strengthen socio-economic and cultural integration.
He posits that these values already operate as instruments of soft power, reinforcing regional solidarity and influencing economic, socio-political, and cultural ties through interstate relations at all levels—from everyday and interfamily interactions to official diplomacy. The article provides examples of how these shared values contribute to sustainable development through youth policy, intercultural dialogue, digital and public diplomacy, as well as cooperation with civil society institutions.
According to the author, these shared values facilitate natural integration among countries with common historical and cultural foundations. Solidarity and compromise help harmonize national interests, while hospitality manifests in diplomatic engagement. Mutual respect reinforces sovereignty and equality, paving the way for integration. Social stability enhances regional security, and religious tolerance acts as a counterbalance to extremism within multi-faith societies.
Mukhammadjon Isomov refers to the recent intensification of interstate cooperation among Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan in such areas as border management (discussed in detail in our earlier publications), transportation, logistics, water resource governance, education, and environmental initiatives. Youth policy, media projects, cultural festivals, and forums disseminate these values beyond elite circles to the broader public, forming a natural foundation for integration and strategic peace.
Delving into historical and cultural roots, the article traces the centuries-long shared history, traditions, value systems, and religious beliefs that shape regional interaction. Economic and cultural exchanges along the Great Silk Road, mutual travel, and shared traditions in science and craftsmanship established the basis for enduring friendship. Linguistic similarities—among Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, and Turkmen, which share Turkic and Persian origins—facilitate communication across social, diplomatic, and cultural contexts. In the religious sphere, adherence to the Hanafi school of Islam fosters harmony and tolerance grounded in shared moral principles.
With regard to social stability and regional security, the article underscores the growing role of transnational organizations uniting states that share this value model. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the author notes, focuses not only on economic cooperation but also on combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism through information exchange, confidence building, and military-technical collaboration. It rests on a common value framework that, in Isomov’s view, shapes a shared outlook on peace.
The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) draws on historical, cultural, and linguistic unity to promote cooperation in politics, economics, youth policy, education, culture, and information security. It advances these values among younger generations to prevent extremism and preserve cultural heritage.
This, arguably, is the main practical outcome of Mukhammadjon Isomov’s work from the standpoint of applied conflict studies. Although the author does not state it explicitly, the entire paper is structured around the idea that any international associations involving countries with a different value framework—implicitly referring here to “Western liberal democracies”—will be less effective or even entirely ineffective.
In this context, Mukhammadjon Isomov implies potential conflict drivers such as extremism, separatism, border disputes, and resource management (for example, water), positioning shared values as preventive instruments.
For researchers of post-Soviet conflicts, this work highlights how cultural and civilizational commonality can help ease tensions, offering a new set of policy tools for regions such as Central Asia. Isomov’s study reminds us that unity through shared values can be as powerful as diplomacy in resolving conflicts where conventional political instruments have already been exhausted—but incorporating value-based tools requires political will.
***
In the context of the transformation of post-Soviet conflicts, religion extends beyond a cultural phenomenon to become a powerful instrument of state power. The analytical article by Oleksii Bykon, “The Russian Orthodox Church and the Ideological Foundations of the ‘Russian World’: Religion as Statecraft and Hybrid Power”, offers a profound examination of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a hybrid actor combining theology, diplomacy, and propaganda.
Oleksii Bykon, a U.S. Army chaplain with over 17 years of service, draws on his knowledge of Ukrainian, Russian, and English to provide a comprehensive perspective on the subject. The paper analyzes the ROC’s role in legitimizing Russian state power through the ideology of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) and its impact on international security and U.S. foreign policy.
The study is structured around four key questions:
- How does the ROC shape the ideology of the “Russian World”? The article argues that the ROC constructs this ideology by positioning Russia as the spiritual center of Orthodoxy, thereby justifying its territorial and political ambitions.
- What mechanisms link the ROC’s narratives with Russia’s national identity and state legitimacy? Bykon explores how ecclesiastical doctrines and institutional ties to the Kremlin reinforce state authority, particularly in the post-Soviet period.
- In what ways does the ROC serve as an instrument of hybrid warfare and diplomatic influence? The analysis covers the Church’s quasi-diplomatic functions, including lobbying, shaping public opinion within the diaspora, and legitimizing military operations.
- What are the potential political implications for the strategic interests of the United States and its allies? The article assesses how underestimating the ROC’s influence could weaken efforts to counter Russian soft power and disinformation.
These questions establish an interdisciplinary research framework that bridges religious studies, political science, and security analysis.
It is important to note that the author does not present a static picture but rather examines the evolving dynamics of the topic. Oleksii Bykon emphasizes the transformation of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) into an instrument of state power in post-Soviet Russia. The key points include:
• Symbiosis of church and state: the ROC provides legitimacy to the Russian leadership, institutionalized through Patriarch Kirill’s public statements and formal agreements between church and state. This reinforces Moscow’s influence over international narratives.
• Concepts of hybrid warfare: drawing on the works of Peter Pomerantsev and Mark Galeotti, Bykon highlights Russia’s integration of military, political, and informational strategies. However, the religious dimension of this strategy remains underexplored.
• Research gaps: while there are studies on the “Russian World” programs (diaspora, education, media), few combine insider knowledge of ecclesiastical structures with geopolitical analysis. Bykon seeks to fill this gap.
The research methodology is notably rigorous, combining primary sources, personal experience, and comparative analysis. Patriarchal encyclicals, materials from the ROC’s Department for External Church Relations, publications of the Russkiy Mir Foundation, and official church–state agreements form the empirical basis. The author’s personal experience within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) provides unique insight into ecclesiastical hierarchies, processes, and priorities unavailable to external researchers.
The study’s value is further enhanced by its comparison of the ROC with other Orthodox institutions, such as the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, with particular attention to their political influence—highlighting Moscow’s distinctive hybrid role.
The article concludes with targeted recommendations for U.S. policymakers:
- Monitoring and analysis: establish a dedicated unit to track the ROC’s transnational activities.
- Engagement with communities: support independent Orthodox networks that counter Kremlin-aligned narratives.
- Counter-propaganda: fund educational and interfaith initiatives that expose the ROC’s propagandistic functions.
- Integration of expertise: appoint consultants with direct experience in the ROC/UOC and create fellowships linking religion, security, and diplomacy.
The study stands out for its insider credibility, filling a critical gap in understanding the use of religion within post-Soviet conflicts. Despite its preliminary nature, its substantive findings—such as the ROC’s role in the war in Ukraine (2014–2025) and its influence in the Balkans—offer empirical depth supported by doctrinal and institutional analysis.
Alexander Shpunt is an Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics and resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he has served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999–2011 he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.