PSCRP-BESA Reports No 168 (November 29, 2025)
By Alexander Shpunt
The watchword of our October monitoring issue is “Method.” This edition brings together unusual, at times even exotic, yet strictly academic materials. It so happened that in October several works were released in open access that, specifically in terms of research methodology on conflicts, look like breakthroughs toward new horizons. We invite the reader simply to enjoy this reading – as we did ourselves.
The article by Andrei Khrennikov (Center for Mathematical Modeling in Physics and Cognitive Sciences, Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden) presents a new and provocative concept of mass social mobilization, protests, and ideological shifts – the Social Laser Theory (SLT).
In the paper “Social Laser Theory as a Natural Extension of Quantum-Like Modeling”, published on Cornell University’s arXiv platform, Khrennikov applies the mathematical apparatus of quantum theory (including quantum field theory) to the modeling of collective human behavior.
In his view, traditional analytical tools based on classical probability theory (sociology, media statistics, content analysis, etc.) are insufficient to explain “sudden large-scale social shifts.” SLT proposes to treat society as a “gain medium” composed of “social atoms” (individuals): under the influence of informational stimuli (mass media, mobilizing rhetoric), the medium can reach a state of “population inversion,” when a critical mass becomes “excited.” At that moment, a single trigger launches a cascade of “stimulated emissions” – coordinated large-scale collective action.
Khrennikov deliberately relies on the terminology of quantum optics (lasers). The BESA Center PSCRP, which studies conflicts and stability in the post-Soviet space, finds value in transferring a mature mathematical apparatus from one field of knowledge to another. The author applies SLT to the modeling of “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as to the analysis of media mobilization surrounding the 2022 conflict in Ukraine. The theory provides a formal mechanism for understanding how information, mass media, and social networks can provoke and amplify “social explosions.”
Khrennikov uses quantum-like modeling (QM): the theory does not claim that society literally obeys quantum physics and distances itself from the pseudoscience of “quantum consciousness.” The mathematics of quantum theory (Hilbert spaces, superposition, non-commutativity) is used as a more flexible tool for modeling complex social systems.
The author carefully builds an analogy between the components of a physical laser and a social system. The key is resonance: not all information can trigger a cascade. He introduces the notion of a “cognitive marker” – a semantically charged element (word, symbol, headline) that bypasses rational reflection and elicits automatic reactive interpretations and emotions. Examples include “corruption,” “war,” “vaccination,” “democracy,” “Trump,” “Putin.” Under conditions of information overload, people shift to “popcorn thinking,” reacting to labels rather than content, which makes them particularly susceptible to coherent stimulation.
The role of the optical resonator is played by social media and “echo chambers,” defined as social resonators. They
— repeatedly recirculate and amplify resonant information, increasing the level of social excitation;
— filter messages, strengthening “their own” discourses and behavioral patterns and cutting off alternatives, thereby ensuring the coherence of collective action.
The Social Laser Theory offers a formal, “mathematically grounded” paradigm for interpreting rapid social transformations, going beyond metaphors and introducing measurable quantities and predictive parameters.
For analysts this provides:
— A diagnostic model: instead of merely monitoring discontent, it proposes tracking “pumping” (the emotional intensity of the media field) and the state of “social resonators” (coherence and filtering in key networks) to assess proximity to the threshold of “population inversion.”
— A model of modern information conflict: information overload, echo chambers, and “popcorn thinking” are considered elements of a “laser” system that explain the generation of “social explosions” and “coherent social energy” – both spontaneous and deliberately engineered.
At the Department of Political Science of Umeå University (Sweden), under the supervision of Niklas Eklund, director of the European CBRNE Center, a doctoral dissertation was defended: “Tracing the diffusion of Russian ideas in European politics: An Ideational study on the diffusion of Russian norms and ideas in the European media and political spheres”. Its author, Nikita Porokhovoy, proposes a model for understanding how Russian ideological constructs spread and find resonance in European politics, especially among the far right.
The starting point: Russian ideological narratives are increasingly visible in the rhetoric of the European far right. These echoes are often indirect, but they testify to the symbolic circulation of ideas beyond formal alliances and propaganda. Most studies of Russian influence are fragmented: domestic ideological constructs, foreign policy, disinformation, or the rise of the far right are typically examined separately. Porokhovoy attempts to close this gap by tracing the “life cycle” of ideas: their construction, dissemination, reception, and transformation.
He poses three questions: how the ideological system of contemporary Russia is structured and which of its elements are easily transferable abroad; through which actors, instruments, and discourses Russian ideas circulate in Europe (especially in far-right movements); and how they influence discourse and contribute to the normalization of illiberal worldviews.
In analyzing the Russian ideological system, he identifies key authors and concepts adapted in the 2000s–2020s:
— Ivan Ilyin (“sacred violence” and national destiny) – a source of civilizational narrative and an intellectual resource of contemporary Russian thought.
— Lev Gumilev – the mythology of Eurasian civilization and the theory of ethnogenesis with the concept of passionarity.
— Carl Schmitt – the illiberal logic of sovereignty, reinforced in Russian ideology.
— Alexander Dugin – a “collector” and translator who hybridizes Western and Russian traditions for a transnational agenda.
The central analytical tool is the concept of “carrier ideas”: emotionally charged, symbolically saturated ideas that serve both as the framework of an ideology and as channels of its diffusion. They are easily adapted to new contexts and make it possible to trace continuity between Russian ideological production and its appropriation in Europe.
Key “carrier ideas” include:
— civilizational rhetoric (“the struggle of incompatible value systems”);
— spiritual and moral sovereignty/superiority (against liberal universalism);
— anti-Western narratives (criticism of NATO and global institutions);
— “Western decadence” (homosexuality, loss of religious morality, globalization/mondeisation);
— Russian exceptionalism;
— defense of a “threatened civilization.”
Methodologically, ideological diffusion is understood not as linear replication or coercion, but as a symbolic dynamic of alignment. An idea spreads when it resonates with pre-existing anxieties and emotions in the receiving context, allowing it to be absorbed without coordination. In the process of movement, ideas are transformed and selectively reconfigured.
Drawing on the theory of Laclau and Mouffe, the author shows how such vague terms as “sovereignty,” “decline,” and “tradition” are used in Russian and European far-right discourse without clear definition, which provides a strategic advantage: different groups appropriate a common language and fill it with their own grievances and meanings.
The concept of “symbolic power” is used to analyze how Russian narratives shift the boundaries of the permissible in European public discourse – not dictating what to think, but expanding or displacing the boundaries of what can be said and normalized.
Particular attention is paid to “slow erosion” – the long-term spread of Russian ideas, values, and symbolic patterns that imperceptibly shift normative boundaries and make illiberal ideas acceptable. A failure to understand these mechanisms weakens collective readiness to resist.
The general conclusion: Russian ideological influence is realized primarily through symbolic compatibility, not direct control. European right-wing actors do not copy narratives; they selectively borrow fragments (civilizational rhetoric, criticism of liberalism, the cult of sovereignty) and embed them into their own context. Influence depends on resonance, not persuasion.
The dissertation offers a structured framework for analyzing symbolic influence and new tools for understanding how ideological power circulates and takes root, emphasizing the importance of the discursive dimension of politics.
At first glance, the article “Similar but… The Trend of Xenophobia in Hungary and Poland”, published online on 31 October 2025 in the Central and Eastern European Migration Review , appears to concern Hungary and Poland rather than post-Soviet conflicts. However, upon closer examination, the theme of post-Soviet conflicts becomes central.
Hungarian researchers Ráchel Suryányi (Eötvös Loránd University) and Endre Sik (Institute of Sociology, HUN-REN CSS) compare the dynamics of xenophobia in Hungary and Poland in 2020–2023, focusing on the period before, during, and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The study is based on Ipsos data from surveys in 28 countries (around 500 respondents aged 16–74 in each). The authors note the difficulty of defining “xenophobia”: government rhetoric blurs the lines between “refugees,” “migrants,” and “asylum seekers,” favoring the term “migrant” with its negative connotations. Their aim is a descriptive comparison of trends and the social base of xenophobia.
The main hypotheses: the level of xenophobia in Hungary has traditionally been higher than in other EU countries, including Poland, which is linked to a long government propaganda campaign against migrants and refugees and repeated pressing of the “moral panic button” (MPB) – narratives such as “We must close the borders” or “Refugees are not genuine.”
A second important conclusion is the “splitting” of xenophobia in Hungary: the introduction of a refugee law created a positive attitude toward Ukrainian refugees (as “decent,” white, Christian, European) and a negative one toward refugees from other countries (“indecent,” non-white, Muslim). In Poland, no such large-scale xenophobic campaign took place, although the topic appeared in the electoral agendas of 2015 and 2023.
Although both countries opposed EU migration policy in 2015, fear of immigration in Poland remained consistently below the EU average until 2022, whereas in Hungary it stayed slightly above average until 2018. In 2023, fear of immigration rose again in both countries. European data confirm higher levels of xenophobia on the eastern and southern periphery of the EU compared to the “core” of the Union.
A shared post-Soviet and historical legacy shapes a common “us” and “them” narrative for Poland and Hungary; “Brussels” is often portrayed as a new “Moscow.” The 2015 migration crisis amplified fears of losing national identity and security, giving rise to the phenomena of “Islamophobia without Muslims” and “antisemitism without Jews” (especially in Poland). Hungary, however, took a harder line, including building border fences.
The authors’ expectations regarding the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were:
— in Poland, xenophobia should noticeably decrease (Russia is the enemy, Ukrainians are “real” refugees and a historically close people);
— in Hungary, the decrease was expected to be smaller due to mild rhetoric toward Russia and the emphasis on conflict with the EU. It was assumed that Hungary’s high, propaganda-fueled level of xenophobia would drop less and rise earlier than in Poland.
Ipsos data broadly confirm these hypotheses. In 2022 a temporary “tolerant turn” was observed: the share of those supporting the thesis “We must completely close the borders to refugees” declined in both Hungary and Poland, corresponding to a general trend across the EU. By 2023 this turn partially reversed, with a return to less positive attitudes.
In Poland in 2023, the statement “refugees are fake” regained popularity, but the thesis “We must close the borders” was supported significantly less – the old narrative of “fake refugees” (2015, 2021, the crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border) was restored.
The assumption of similar dynamics across all social groups was not confirmed.
In Hungary in 2020–2021, the most xenophobic group was those with secondary education; from 2022 onwards xenophobia declines as education level rises.
In Poland, people with secondary education also showed the most consistent suspicion toward migration, with hostility in general decreasing from low- to highly-educated groups.
The main conclusion: the “moral panic button” activated by the Hungarian government has generated a persistently higher baseline level of xenophobia and greater resistance to the temporary “wave of tolerance” in 2022 compared with Poland. As a result, despite similar overall trends in the EU, the amplitude and inertia of public attitudes differ even between these two post-communist conservative states.
The Rogun Dam Dispute: A Paradigm Shift from Conflict to Cooperation in Central Asian Hydropolitics
In this issue we consider a new work on transboundary water conflicts in the post-Soviet space. The article “The Rogun Dam Dispute: A Paradigm Shift from Conflict to Cooperation in Central Asian Hydropolitics” was published in Frontiers in Water on 14 October 2025. The authors are Kazimierz A. Salevich (MP Industries, Vienna) and Mikiyasu Nakayama (Global Infrastructure Facility, Tokyo).
Their key thesis: the settlement of the dispute over the Rogun Dam, which had brought Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the brink of military conflict, was driven primarily by domestic political changes rather than international diplomacy and institutions.
The authors show that the change of leadership in Uzbekistan in 2016 became a turning point: the new leadership bet on economic integration and mutual benefit instead of a “zero-sum game” logic. This radically transformed bilateral relations and regional hydropolitics. Domestic political dynamics thus prove to be a factor no less important than external frameworks.
The study employs a qualitative case-study approach, tracing the evolution of the dispute from the Soviet period to the present. Under the Soviet Union there was a system of water–energy exchange: upstream states (Tajikistan) accumulated water in winter and released it in summer for irrigation in downstream countries (Uzbekistan), receiving coal, gas, or oil in return.
The collapse of the USSR destroyed this system and unleashed conflicting national interests. Construction of the Rogun Dam stopped in 1991; attempts to resume the project through deals with Russia (1994) and RUSAL (2004) failed. The dam became a source of regional tension: Uzbekistan, located downstream, saw it as a threat to water security and a tool of pressure.
The sharpest phase came under Islam Karimov’s rule. In 2012 he publicly warned that water disputes could escalate into war. Tajikistan under Emomali Rahmon regarded the dam both as a national symbol and as a strategic priority, relying on partnership with Russia to deter possible escalation.
The turning point came after Karimov’s death in 2016 and the rise to power of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The new president launched a pivot toward regional dialogue and integration, abandoning confrontational opposition to the Rogun Dam.
This policy shift was implemented through a “small steps” principle: mutually beneficial projects (for example, a hydropower plant on the Zarafshan River), resumption of electricity trade, and the reconnection of Tajikistan to the Central Asian power grid without strong objections from Uzbekistan.
Comparison with other water conflicts highlights the specifics of the post-Soviet context. In the Nile basin, changes of government did not lead to a comparable shift in positions over GERD between Ethiopia and Egypt; on the Mekong, long-term efforts by the Commission did not prevent unilateral dam construction. In Central Asia, by contrast, the presence of shared Soviet institutional memory of joint resource management and domestic political transformation produced a more significant effect.
The authors propose a new analytical framework for post-Soviet transboundary water disputes: diplomacy and institutions matter, but the key to shifting from conflict to cooperation lies in catalytic changes in the domestic politics of the countries involved.
At the same time, the article leaves a sense of incompleteness. Reducing the complex process of seeking compromise on Rogun to the figure of Karimov appears overly simplistic and raises questions. There is no detailed analysis of domestic political dynamics not only in Uzbekistan but also in Tajikistan, although the evolution of Rahmon’s position was also important.
The work would have been stronger had it relied not on a personalized “trigger,” but on an analysis of intra-elite processes in both countries. Nevertheless, Salevich and Nakayama’s very emphasis on prioritizing domestic political analysis, to which institutional, diplomatic, and economic factors are only added, seems methodologically productive.
This month, in our review of conflict processes and social dynamics in the post-Soviet space, we also draw attention to an important study in the anniversary issue of the Journal of International Women’s Studies (vol. 27, no. 4, October 2025). We congratulate our colleagues at Bridgewater State University on the journal’s 25th anniversary.
The article “Evaluating Gender Policy in Kazakhstan: A Dual Perspective on Politics and Economics” was prepared by three Kazakhstani researchers – Elmira Kagazbayeva (Abylai Khan Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages), Ulzhan Kazybekova (KIMEP University), and Madina Ahakalova (Kazakh National Women’s Teacher Training University).
The authors offer a critical, data-driven analysis of persistent gender inequality in Kazakhstan, identifying structural and cultural reasons why the political and economic spheres remain deeply unbalanced despite many years of state initiatives.
At the center of their analysis is the “Kazakhstan paradox.” On the one hand, the country is a regional leader: the gender gap in education has closed, and a number of other successes have been achieved. On the other, progress has stalled and even regressed: in the global gender gap index Kazakhstan has fallen from 32nd place (2006) to 62nd (2023).
The main conclusion: there is an “implementation gap” between a well-developed legal framework for gender equality and actual practice. Gender imbalance persists in the economy, especially in the labor market. In 2023 the gender pay gap amounted to 21.7%; in 2022 women on average earned 25% less than men. At the same time, women are often better educated (in 2009, 21.6% of women had higher education compared to 17.8% of men).
The authors link this to rigid occupational segregation:
Horizontal segregation: men dominate in high-paying sectors (mining, banking, senior positions in the civil service), while women are concentrated in lower-paying and budget-funded areas (education, healthcare, culture, small services). This leads to the “feminization of poverty.”
Vertical segregation: even in “female” sectors, men occupy leadership positions. In higher education, women make up 66% of teaching staff, but men occupy 79% of leadership roles. Education in itself does not provide equal career opportunities.
Economic inequality has long-term consequences, especially for older women. Under a funded pension system and with a lower retirement age for women, their pensions are significantly lower than men’s, increasing the risk of poverty against the backdrop of higher life expectancy.
The political dimension reinforces these imbalances. The authors identify three stages of gender policy – from the early post-Soviet period to current modernization efforts, including the “Concept of Family and Gender Policy until 2030.” However, real progress is limited, and in several areas regression is recorded.
The most telling failure is in combating domestic violence. Despite the Concept-2030, in 2017 responsibility was effectively softened: the articles “Intentional infliction of minor bodily harm” and “Battery” were moved from the criminal to the administrative code. The result: more than 115,000 reports of domestic violence in 2022 and 869 deaths over the past four and a half years. In January 2024 a bill was introduced to restore criminal liability, but the authors argue that the country still lacks a systemic (legal, financial, institutional) approach to the problem.
In politics, a sharp gap remains between declared equality and the actual presence of women in power. In 2020 a 30% quota for women and youth in party lists was introduced, which raised the share of women in maslikhats to 30.7%. But in real decision-making centers women are still almost absent: they account for 9% of political civil servants and 12.8% of leaders in central government bodies.
At the highest levels the imbalance is even more obvious: since 2010 the number of women ambassadors has never exceeded four (compared to 44–63 men), and ministerial posts are consistently held predominantly by men (1–3 women versus 16–19 men). Underrepresentation of women hinders the inclusion of gender perspectives in the policy agenda (domestic violence, children’s rights, reproductive health, etc.).
The regional dimension completes the picture. In Almaty and Astana, feminist values are more widely accepted, while in the southern and western regions (Turkistan and Mangystau oblasts) traditional views dominate: more than half of respondents believe a woman’s place is at home.
The economic consequences of regional differences are particularly evident in oil and gas areas (Atyrau, West Kazakhstan, and Mangystau oblasts), where the gender pay gap exceeds 30%. In Atyrau oblast it reaches 46%.
The authors conclude that there is a deep rift between “formally neutral” legislation and real equality of rights. Patriarchal stereotypes and institutional barriers continue to restrain women’s participation.
Their final recommendation is a shift from purely institutional reforms to discursive changes: transforming the dominant ideas, values, and rhetoric that reproduce inequality.
For the BESA Center, this study provides an important, data-based yet fresh perspective on contemporary Kazakhstani society. Gender imbalance appears not as a secondary social issue, but as a key structural problem that hinders democratic transformation, economic development, and institutional resilience. The state’s “formal” approach has shown its limitations, and without profound behavioral change the gap between law and reality is likely to grow even wider.
Alexander Shpunt is an Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics and resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he has served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999–2011 he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.