PSCRP-BESA Reports No 140 (July 6, 2025)
On June 27th the FSB (Russian Federal Security Service) and police forces conducted simultaneous raids in Yekaterinburg, targeting dozens of ethnic Azerbaijanis. This city is one of the centers of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, which numbers between 2 and 3 million people (not all of them are Azerbaijani citizens). The targets of the raid were portrayed as part of an “ethnic criminal group” involved in unsolved murders dating as far as 2001 and 2011. The operation resulted in the deaths of two brothers, Huseyn Safarov (59) and Ziyaddin Safarov (54), both Russian citizens of Azerbaijani descent, who owned the “Caspian” cafe in the city.
Russian authorities claimed that Ziyaddin died of “heart failure” and provided no cause of death for Huseyn. However, Azerbaijan’s forensic examination revealed extensive evidence of fatal, cruel beatings and torture. The autopsy found broken ribs, deformed chests, internal bleeding, and injuries to the genital areas of both men. Azerbaijan’s chief medical examiner concluded they died from “post-traumatic shock” caused by severe bodily trauma, directly contradicting Russian explanations.
Multiple witnesses and family members reported systematic torture during the raids. Survivors described being “thrown to the floor in separate rooms and beaten with various objects,” with some subjected to electric shocks. One detainee, Vugar Safarov, told journalists that he and his brother were “forced to eat dirt” during transport to the police station and beaten when they refused. Their father, who suffers from a heart condition, was reportedly shocked with an electric taser multiple times.
The Russian independent media outlet Meduza documented that at least one suspect showed visible signs of severe beatings during court appearances, while lawyers confirmed broken ribs for detainees. Video evidence showed security personnel smashing car windows with hammers and forcibly dragging diaspora leader Shahin Shikhlinsky from his vehicle. He was detained but released later as a “witness”.
The death of two detainees and the outright racist brutality of the law enforcement triggered the worst ever crisis in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. It is noteworthy that the relations have already went sour following the shooting down of the Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 in December 2024. The Russian behavior highlights not only the Kremlin’s pathological proclivity to exacerbate the existing problems instead of resolving them, but also the existence of geopolitical stakes. In both cases, the Kremlin has outright refused to admit guilt, thereby aggravating the crisis.
Russian state media and officials consistently framed the events as legitimate criminal investigations targeting Russian citizens involved in decades-old murderswhich were cold cases for a very long time. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized detainees were “Russian citizens of Azerbaijani origin” and characterized Azerbaijan’s response as an “absolutely inspired campaign… organized, well-planned against our country.” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov blamed Ukraine for trying to “add fuel to the fire” and insisted Russia “has never threatened, and does not threaten Azerbaijan.”
Azerbaijan’s reaction
The Azerbaijani reaction followed the pattern of the reaction to the previous incident with Russia, meaning that Baku was attempting to avoid a full-scale crisis with Moscow to the extent possible. Baku raised the stakes only following the total absence of Russian reciprocity.
Azerbaijani media and commentators have lambasted the Russian policy of “chauvinism and ethnic discrimination.” They said that the violence against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia was the continuation of tensions between Moscow and Baku caused by the shooting of an Azerbaijani passenger jet by Russian air defenses.
Azertag news agency compared Moscow’s behavior to the policy of Nazi Germany and said that Russia was looking for a “new enemy” and new conflicts to deal with growing public discontent with the prolonged war against Ukraine. According to Azartac, Moscow still views former Soviet republics as its colonies; it cannot stand Baku’s independent foreign policy, which is why it is trying to put pressure on Azerbaijan through “a hunt for migrants”.
Similarly, the Caliber Telegram channel said that the “massive campaign of pressure” on religious and ethnic minorities was part of the Putin administration’s policy and was aimed at diverting public discontent away from the Russian authorities. Some other Azerbaijani media even compared Putin to Stalin.
The Azerbaijani Ministry of Culture on 29 June called off all cultural events in the country involving the Russian state and private entities. On 30 June, Azerbaijan detained three Russian state media employees—two managers from the Sputnik news agency’s Azerbaijani service in Baku and an employee of the Ruptly news agency. Sputnik news agency is an official Russian propaganda outlet, and its workers are very often intelligence officers under the cover of journalists.
On June 30, the Zakharova, i.e., the Kremlin, blamed Azerbaijan for “unfriendly acts.” The translation of the wording by the Kremlin mouthpiece means Russia may consider further responses.
What is behind the scenes?
Russian arrogance and racism
One should not always look for deeper or hidden reasons; sometimes bad things just happen. The attitude of the Russian authorities towards non-Russian immigrants is very often derogatory and racist. It is very often arbitrarily cruel. Russian law enforcement is perceived on a popular level as criminal as the criminals themselves are. They can beat to death anyone because they can, without having an obvious goal, be it a malicious one. The claim of Azerbaijani media that the Russians see Central Asia and the Caucasus as their former colony is right: Russian authorities got accustomed to the reaction of fear and obedience following their bullying. The fact that Azerbaijan is not ready to play by the rules Russia sets makes the Kremlin even more aggressive.
The growing tensions between Baku and Moscow are of concern for former Soviet Central Asian nations. Numerous immigrants from those post-Soviet republics live in Russia, and they fear becoming victims of the same arbitrary rule of lawlessness. This is why many Uzbek commentators and authors praised Azerbaijan’s stance, suggested emulating Azerbaijan’s behavior towards Russia, and even dared to criticize Putin—which has been unheard of hitherto.
Russia’s weakening region-wide
Yet, it seems that in addition to the criminal behavior that has long been normalized, the atrocities committed by the FSB may have more defined geopolitical objectives. Russia is weakening in the Caucasus, whereas Azerbaijan is getting stronger. Finally, personal Putin motives add fuel to the fire of the “aim’ tensions.
The removal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh in June 2024 marked a breaking moment; it was the first time such an event happened before their mandate expired. This followed Azerbaijan’s complete military victory over the Armenian occupying forces in the Azerbaijani territory. The resolution of the Karabakh conflict removed a key tool of Russian influence—the ability to manipulate frozen conflicts to maintain regional control.
The broader geopolitical context includes Russia’s military forces being stretched thin because of the Ukraine war, creating opportunities for assertive behavior by traditionally subordinate allies. Azerbaijan’s strategic location on the Middle Corridor transport route and its energy wealth provide significant leverage in dealing with great powers, while Turkey’s reliable support offers an alternative to Russian security guarantees.
Economic factors also play a crucial role, with historical disputes over oil pricing through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline and Azerbaijan’s position as an indispensable partner for Russia’s sanction-busting activities through Iranian and southern routes.
President Putin believes that Ilham Aliyev delivered a personal slight by refusing to attend the May 9th Victory Day parade. Both Valentina Matvienko and Patriarch Kirill invited Aliyev on Putin’s behalf. Putin does not forgive personal insults.
All of this is built against the backdrop of the Kremlin’s dissatisfaction with Baku’s excessive independence and the formation of a Turkey-Azerbaijan axis in the South Caucasus. The Kremlin may believe that Aliyev is deliberately raising the stakes, taking advantage of the current tensions in relations with Pashinyan. In the meantime, the Kremlin considers Armenia’s Pashniyan an agent of influence of the West.
Thus, brutal attacks on the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia are the only means the Kremlin has at its disposal to “counter” Azerbaijan’s independence.
How do the others see that?
Turkey
Turkish analysts and media likewise see in growing Azerbaijan’s moving out from Russia’s orbit the major reason for the ongoing tensions. The process started following the solution of the Karabakh issue to the detriment of Russia. Prominent Hurriyet writer Abdulkadir Selvi said that Russia’s concern is that Turkey could transport energy resources from Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries to Europe, thus threatening Russian interests, and hinted at a possible solution to the Zangezur corridor problem. Journalist Kemal Ozturk suggests that the root cause of recent Moscow-Baku tensions is that Russia still perceives Azerbaijan as a country under its control, praising Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s “extremely determined stance against Russia.”
Iran
Iran likewise thoroughly watches the recent developments with hardly concealed sympathy for Russia. Most Iranian official media relate the events starting with the mass arrests of Azerbaijanis by Russian law enforcement. However, it is impossible to understand from their description who handles the current deterioration. Such IRGC-affiliated media as Tasnim overtly tend to prefer the Russian version. In contrast to that, unofficial Iranian analysts draw a clearer picture.
The Caucasus and Russia expert Ehsan Movahedyan, well known for his antisemitic rhetoric, adopts an overt anti-Azerbaijan and pro-Russian stance, expressing full support for the Russian moves. Movahedian quotes an Armenian international relations expert, Benyamin Matusian. The latter dubbed the raid on the Azerbaijanis as “hitting the Azerbaijani brain.” Matusian levels racist accusations against the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, claiming that they seek expansion and refuse to integrate into Russian society. He foresees Russian support for keeping the Karabakh issue alive to the detriment of Pashinian.
Finally, the Armenian commentator blames Azerbaijan for supporting Ukraine, justifying the Russian crackdown. On July 5, Movahedyan posted and translated on his Telegram channel a post by a Russian expert of international relations, Dimitri Suslov, pointing out a joint intrigue against Russia by the respective leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Movahedyan has circulated unconfirmed rumors regarding Putin’s dissatisfaction with the visit of Iran’s president, Pezeshkiyan, to Baku.
Ukraine’s involvement added another geopolitical dimension, with President Volodymyr Zelensky directly supporting Azerbaijan and telling President Aliyev that Ukraine stands with Baku “in a situation where Russia is bullying Azerbaijani citizens.” This episode represents a significant expansion of the Ukraine conflict’s impact on regional alignments.
The crisis signals the potential end of the post-Soviet period of Russian hegemony in the South Caucasus. Armenia’s simultaneous pivot toward the West, including EU border monitors and expanded cooperation with France and the United States, leaves Russia with diminished influence across the entire region. However, it is noteworthy that Pashinyan faces serious challenges both in Armenia and among the Armenian diaspora. Most opposition to Pashiniyan is overtly pro-Russian and pro-Iranian. Turkey’s growing role as a security guarantor and economic partner provides former Soviet states with viable alternatives to Russian dominance.
Conclusion
The events of June 27, in Yekaterinburg signify not just a mishandled law enforcement operation —they mark a potential turning point in post-Soviet regional order. The deaths of two ethnic Azerbaijani brothers during Russian police raids have exposed the limits of Moscow’s traditional tools of influence and highlighted the growing assertiveness of its former allies.
The broader implications extend beyond bilateral relations to encompass the transformation of the South Caucasus from a Russian sphere of influence into a more complex, multipolar region. Azerbaijan’s pivot toward Turkey, its alliance with Israel, and potential Western cooperation, combined with Armenia’s simultaneous Western alignment, suggest a fundamental reshuffling of regional power dynamics that may prove irreversible. As Russia’s military and diplomatic resources remain focused on Ukraine, its ability to maintain traditional dominance over former Soviet territories continues to erode. The Yekaterinburg crisis may be remembered as when Russia’s imperial overreach finally caught up with its regional ambitions, forcing a new generation of post-Soviet leaders to choose between subordination and sovereignty.
One must not forget that Russia has no moral qualms whatsoever about resorting to the most cynical pressure for want of better options. Azerbaijan’s neighbors have similar concerns regarding future Russian moves. Russia may lose its influence, yet it is still dangerous for its former colonies. So none of the Central Asian nations, and Azerbaijan, are Russian pawns or Putin’s supporters. Their proximity to Russia requires these nations to exercise caution. Azerbaijan, likewise, is not interested in further deterioration but only in protecting its vital interests vis-à-vis the Kremlin. By its current policies emphasizing moderation and independence, the Caucasian nation proves its indispensability for ensuring the region’s stability between two problematic neighbors: Iran and Russia.