PSCRP-BESA Reports No 116 (March 1, 2025)
A year and a half ago, in the summer of 2023, a forum titled “Yakutia and the Provinces of China: Sister-City Relations for Strengthening Russian-Chinese Relations” was held in Yakutsk, the capital of the Russian Republic of Sakha. Given that China is Yakutia’s most important foreign trade partner and considering Russia’s increased dependence on China after launching its full-scale aggression against Ukraine, this event was not surprising. However, in the lead-up to this international gathering, several publications appeared on the semi-official Chinese blog platform Sohu.com, seemingly intended for a domestic audience, promoting certain narratives that could not fail to alarm Russians:
- Yakutia is a region fighting for independence, but this struggle is doomed to fail because Russia will never allow it.
- Yakutia is the second-largest territory in the world (after China) populated by representatives of the “yellow race.” Historically, it has strong ties to China.
- Yakutia is extremely rich in natural resources, but harsh natural conditions and a dire economic situation are causing mass emigration. In the foreseeable future, it faces depopulation.
- Chinese-Yakut ties must be developed as widely as possible. Beyond mutually beneficial economic cooperation, this will grant Yakutia a certain degree of autonomy.
Against this backdrop—perhaps in response to the media activism of Yakut independence supporters and not without the involvement of Russian security services—an open letter by a group of Yakut intellectuals began circulating online. Its main argument was: “For the Yakut people, the disintegration of Russia would be a catastrophe. In that case, Yakutia would become part of the Chinese state.”
However, Russia chose not to respond openly to this Chinese propaganda move. The forum in Yakutsk proceeded successfully, and ties between China and the Republic of Sakha continue to strengthen. In May 2024, the head of the republic, Aisen Nikolaev, stated in an interview with China’s Xinhua News Agency that “China is Yakutia’s largest trading partner. More than 45% of the region’s foreign trade is with China, and its volume continues to grow year after year”.
The authors of the aforementioned publications on Sohu.com among other things expressed shock at Yakutia’s extremely harsh climate: winter lasts from October to April, with temperatures dropping below -50°C and in some areas reaching -70°C. Because of this, the settlement of Yakutia by Chinese people or its takeover by the People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) seems highly unlikely. However, according to the PLA’s “strategic boundaries and living space” doctrine—stating that “population growth and limited resources naturally create the need for expansion beyond internationally recognized borders”—the Republic of Sakha, whether remaining within the Russian Federation or gaining nominal independence, could easily fall within China’s “living space” without being formally annexed.
Besides Yakutia’s immense natural resources, it is also strategically important for China due to its access to the Arctic Ocean—an increasingly critical factor amid global warming and the ongoing geopolitical struggle for the Arctic.
It is also worth noting that directly south of Yakutia are Russian regions to which China has almost openly laid claim, as they were once part of the Qing Empire. These include the Amur Oblast, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, most of Khabarovsk Krai (excluding the Tuguro-Chumikansky, Ayano-Maysky, and Okhotsky districts), and Primorsky Krai. Nominally, territorial disputes between Russia and China were resolved when Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a border demarcation agreement on October 14, 2004. Under this agreement, Russia ceded several border areas totaling 337 square kilometers to China. However, from the Chinese perspective, Russia still occupies much larger Chinese territories, meaning historical justice has not been restored.
It is no coincidence that Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te publicly rebuked the Chinese government, accusing it of hypocrisy: “If China truly cares about territorial integrity, why not reclaim the lands occupied by Russia under the Treaty of Aigun? Russia is currently very weak, isn’t it? They could demand these territories back, but they don’t. Clearly, Beijing’s true goal in seeking control over Taiwan is not about territory but about dominance in the western Pacific region.”
According to the Treaty of Aigun (1858) and the Convention of Peking (1860), signed between the Russian Empire and the Qing Dynasty—then weakened by the Second Opium War with Britain, France, and the U.S.—China was forced to cede vast lands along the left and right banks of the Amur River. The Chinese consider these treaties unfair and patiently await the restoration of historical justice. Notably, they continue to use their own names for cities and geographical features in these territories, much to the Russians’ frustration.
The territories annexed by Russia from the Qing Empire were never ethnically Chinese. Before Russian colonization, they were primarily inhabited by indigenous Tungusic-Manchu peoples (Evenks, Nanai, Udege, and others), who were closely related to the Manchus—the rulers of China in the 17th century and the founders of the Qing Empire. In 1911, the Chinese overthrew the Manchu dynasty, but this has not stopped them from considering these former Manchu territories as inherently their own, following their own historical logic. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Chinese have appropriated Manchu history.
Before Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the author had visited Siberia and the Russian Far East multiple times. The most striking observations were the low standard of living among the vast majority of the population, widespread anti-Moscow sentiments due to the federal government’s ruthless exploitation of the region’s resources, and the low population density. Chinese presence was noticeable, especially in the extensive illegal logging carried out by Chinese companies in these areas. However, in all four federal subjects of this region, the Russian and Russian-speaking population clearly dominates.
In Amur Oblast, according to the 2010 census, ethnic Russians made up 94.74% of the population, Ukrainians 2.02%, Belarusians 0.51%, and officially recorded Chinese only 0.08%. Indigenous Siberian and Far Eastern peoples of Mongoloid descent—Koreans, Evenks, Yakuts, Buryats, and Tuvans—accounted for a total of 0.53%. The population density of the oblast, which had a population of 750,000 in 2024 according to the Russian Federal Statistics Service (a quarter less than in 1989), is only 2.07 people per km².
In the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the 2010 census recorded 92.33% Russians, 2.82% Ukrainians, 0.94% Jews, 0.42% Belarusians, and only 0.05% Chinese. Indigenous Mongoloid peoples—Koreans, Yakuts, Nanai, Buryats, Evenks, Nivkhs, Ulchs, Udege, and Evens—together accounted for 0.43%. The population density is 4.02 people per km². As of 2024, the region’s population, according to the Russian Federal Statistics Service, is 146,000, having continuously declined since 1992, when it stood at 220,000.
In Khabarovsk Krai, according to the 2010 census, 92.86% of residents were Russians, 0.64% Ukrainians, 0.12% Belarusians, and officially 0.06% Chinese. Indigenous Mongoloid peoples—Nanai, Koreans, Evenks, Ulchs, Nivkhs, Buryats, Evens, Yakuts, Udege, Negidals, Orochs, and Tuvans—collectively accounted for 2.42%. The population density is 1.62 people per km² (though it is particularly low in the three northern districts of the krai, which China does not claim). According to the 2024 Russian Federal Statistics, the population is 1,278,000, down from 1,625,000 in 1991.
In Primorsky Krai, the 2010 census recorded 92.52% Russians, 2.76% Ukrainians, 0.33% Belarusians, and 0.16% Chinese. Indigenous Mongoloid peoples—Koreans, Buryats, Udege, Yakuts, Tuvans, Nanai, Taz, Nivkhs, Orochs, Ulchs, and Oroks—accounted for 1.23%. The population density is significantly higher than in the three other mentioned federal subjects, reaching 10.97 people per km². According to 2024 Russian Federal Statistics, its population is 1,806,000, having declined from 2,315,000 in 1992.
For comparison, the population of Heilongjiang Province, China, according to the 2020 census, was 31,850,000, several times larger than the combined population of all four bordering Russian regions. The population density in Heilongjiang is 70 people per km². Thus, if the Chinese authorities decide to act, Chinese settlers could quickly become, if not the majority, then a significant part of the population in these four Russian federal subjects. Moreover, official statistics regarding the number of ethnic Chinese in Russia (19,644 people according to the 2021 census) are clearly understated. Unofficial estimates suggest that the real number of Chinese in Russia—particularly in Siberia and the Far East—is many times higher.
It is possible that China may pursue a return to the borders established by the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) if the Russian central government significantly weakens. Depending on circumstances, Beijing could either openly annex these territories or temporarily support the revival of the Far Eastern Republic, which existed from 1920 to 1922. This idea was actively discussed in the early 1990s and, as I personally know, still has its supporters today. One way or another, China intends to include these lands within its “living space.” Notably, Koreans, Evenks, and Nanai are among the 54 officially recognized ethnic minorities in China—as are Russians.