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For a significant period, Russian policy in Central Asia has differed from its approach toward Ukrainian or Georgian issues. It was characterized by fewer elements of ideology and greater pragmatism. Pragmatic elements that "softened" Russian foreign policy in the Central Asian direction persisted until 2021, owing to various factors. Russian officials, to some extent, recognized the multi-vector foreign policies of Central Asian countries, leading to a more accommodating stance toward the region. Central Asia was perceived as having limited prospects for NATO and EU expansion, partly due to the presence of authoritarian regimes and its geographical distance from Europe. This made Moscow's influence appear less threatened compared to regions like Ukraine. Global strategic considerations compelled Putin to acquiesce both Chinese and Turkish influences in Central Asia. Putin's personal limited interest in Central Asian affairs and the influence of regional leaders on Russian decision-makers sometimes fostered an atmosphere of pluralism. Russia shared a common enemy in the form of radical Islam with both the West and secular regimes in Muslim countries.
The Gulf states will closely monitor the way Russia and China handle the perceived security vacuum in the wake of the US withdrawal and abandonment, for all practical purposes, of Central Asia. They wish to determine to what degree those countries might be viable alternatives for a no longer reliable US security umbrella in the Middle East. They are also likely to push to strengthen regional alliances, especially with Israel.
Following the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan, Washington is allegedly trying to reestablish a military presence in Central Asia, similar to what it did in the early 2000s. Though some level of cooperation is possible with Russia within the framework of great power relations (and much still depends on Moscow’s goodwill), China opposes any American military or security expansion near its restive Xinjiang province.
The Kremlin's fixation on competing with the West might cost Russia dearly, as its clout in Central Asia is under strain from a rising China. Moscow will try to mitigate the tilting balance of power by applying methods of the post-liberal world order to the region. China and Russia might reach a condominium in which issues of economy and security are subdivided between them.
What Moscow is after with its renewed military pressure on Kyiv is unclear, but the long-term ramifications are discernible. With each passing year, it becomes more and more costly for Russia to undermine Ukraine’s efforts to build more effective military forces and a stronger economy.
During simultaneous crises in Armenia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan, Moscow faced challenges that contained opportunities to reap geopolitical benefits. Moscow’s handling of these crises demonstrates that its policy toward its neighbors has evolved away from direct intervention and toward careful maneuvering, which is both face-saving and more geopolitically rewarding.
The massive protests staged in Russia by supporters of opposition leader Alexei Navalny pose a serious threat to the country’s political elite. The Kremlin has a problem on its hands no matter what it does. Whether Navalny is kept in prison or released, his movement will be strengthened, and it has the potential to fuse to broader public dissent over Russia’s long-term economic performance and government ineffectiveness.

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