Power in Syria: Its Present, Future, and Israeli Interests
Summer 2026
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Post-Assad Syria remains caught between promising state consolidation and persistent structural instability. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Syrian Transitional Government (STG) has achieved notable diplomatic successes—including improved relations with Washington, Moscow, and the Gulf, sanctions relief, and resistance to renewed Iranian influence—but its domestic authority remains undermined by sectarian tensions, weak institutions, incomplete military integration, and the potential resurgence of ISIS. The Druze, Kurds, and Alawites continue to resist full centralization, while Turkey seeks to expand its influence and prevent Kurdish autonomy, creating a strategic challenge for Israel. Syria could therefore evolve toward consolidation, prolonged fragmentation, or renewed civil conflict, each requiring a different Israeli approach. Israel should preserve freedom of action against Iranian and jihadist threats, protect its border and the Druze community, limit excessive Turkish influence, and maintain cautious channels with Damascus, while avoiding commitments that could reduce its strategic flexibility should Syria’s fragile political order deteriorate.
In December 2024, the Islamist opposition militia Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) stormed out of their home territory of Idlib and conquered Syria in a matter of days. Decades of brutal Assad rule had ended, but the victory of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s group did not come with immediate peace and stability. As Assad institutions were dismantled and new bodies were built under the Syrian Transitional Government (STG), many of the sectarian tensions, non-state militias, and issues of mass civil armament from the Civil War persisted. Syria spent the past year and a half trying to consolidate its diverse country by bringing its factions under a single, unified government and military while rebuilding its foreign relations and economy. This analysis will present the many groups active in Syria and their motivations, assess the current state of the country, and posit three ways it might develop, advising what Israeli policy could look like for each.
To properly understand Syria’s situation, one must understand the variety of actors at play and their specific interests.
- Syria’s government, the STG, and its head, Ahmed al-Sharaa, are the central actors. Initially formed as Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al-Qaeda linked Islamist movement that vowed battle against the infidels of the Assad government and other minorities in Syria, al-Sharaa reworked the group into HTS. After their takeover, they morphed into the military of the STG, a 5-year temporary government tasked with running the country while a proper constitution is drafted. While still Islamist at its core, al-Sharaa has taken a very open and conciliatory tone, which is reflected in much of the new government’s structure and statements. Some worry that it is just nefarious optics to conceal a former Al-Qaeda fighter’s true intentions, though most public statements and many government actions imply that al-Sharaa’s ultimate goal is the complete reunification and rebuilding of his country, with special emphasis on creating strong diplomatic ties with most major powers.
- The other notable domestic groups are the ethnic and religious minority factions. The Druze in Sweida, Alawites in the coastal and mountainous regions, and Kurds along the Turkish border each have concerns and interests that contrast with full consolidation under the STG. All three fear violence by Sunni forces of the former HTS, with Alawites especially fearful of revenge violence since they were the main domestic group that supported Assad. These fears are not without warrant, as skirmishes in the past year by government forces and vigilantes have left each group with hundreds of dead civilians. As such, they each seek more autonomy, advocating for a more federal system if they are to remain part of the Syrian state.
- Turkey remains the most important external actor. A longtime supporter of HTS, Turkey might attempt to make something of a vassal state out of Syria, a major step towards Erdogan’s stated aims of regional hegemony. There are also more specific interests, like ensuring Syrian Kurds do not get significant autonomy so as not to inspire any movement by Turkish Kurds, and securing greater control over Eurasian energy distribution via pipelines and corridors through Syrian territory.
- Israel is the other major neighbor competing for influence in Syria. Its priorities include protecting its borders and the Syrian Druze population, preventing anti-Israel jihadist rhetoric from actualizing into real security threats, and stopping Syria from becoming a Turkish proxy.
- The US has positioned itself as a major mediator in Syria, trying to prevent the country from becoming something akin to an Israeli-Turkish battleground. Its primary goal appears to be stability, and Trump has given al-Sharaa his backing to this end. This could be for humanitarian reasons, to prevent Iran from regaining a foothold, and/or to lay the groundwork for the Four Seas energy initiative (the same one Turkey has expressed interest in).
- Despite their support of Assad, Russia retains cordial relations, and even leverage, in Syria. Their primary goal is to keep the Hmeimim air base and the Tartus naval base, which serve as Russia’s only easy access points to the Mediterranean. They also provide Syria with around 49% of its oil, and those revenues are a help in Russia’s sanction-burdened economy. While their leverage in the Middle East has drastically fallen since Assad’s ouster, Syrian dependence on Russian oil, wheat, spare parts, and technical expertise gives Russia something of a foothold in the country.
- Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf states are also invested in Syrian stability. Their primary interests are limiting the extent of Turkey’s rise and ensuring that Iran cannot regain power in Syria.
Most reports on the current situation in Syria agree that while there is an optimistic surface of progress, especially as foreign policy is concerned, there remains a soft underbelly of sectarian division and insufficient institutions. On the positive side, the general language and structure of the STG can be a cause for optimism. Rhetoric by al-Sharaa and other government figures points towards a desire for a diverse, representative government, and local elections throughout most of the country, the appointment of representative people (including women) to government positions, and attempts to integrate sectarian militias into the state military are all good signs, as is the first convening of the new parliament on July 12th, 2026. Until recent months, rhetoric around Israel has been pointing towards a degree of rapprochement, and the government has taken staunch stances against Iranian interference, even going so far as to block Hezbollah supply networks.
Syria’s foreign policy has widely been considered a major success. Seeking to balance relations among various powers, al-Sharaa has secured the diplomatic backing of both Washington and Moscow (both of which he has visited), had much of its debt to the World Bank covered by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and had most EU and many US sanctions lifted. Syria is of major interest to international investors, so securing the hundreds of billions of dollars needed to rebuild will be less difficult (though it is still no small task). Perhaps most impressively, Syria was able to isolate itself from the war in Iran. The neutral position it has carved out keeps the country from becoming too bogged down in regional instability, allowing it to focus on internal consolidation and reconstruction.
Beneath the positive veneer, though, there remain deep issues in Syria’s society that could jeopardize long-term stability. Its most destructive problem is the sectarian fault lines. As previously discussed, various ethnic groups have faced violence, often described as massacres, by the military, and seek greater autonomy, rather than full integration. Sweida has yet to come under STG control, with elections still not having taken place there, and Kurdish integration into the state structure was agreed only after bureaucrats confirmed they would maintain their positions. Alawites are often singled out for their previous loyalty to Assad and have faced violence and revenge killings. Ultimately, the same ethnic and religious divides of the civil war remain, and in a country with high civilian gun ownership, this risks violence and a potential return to major conflict.
The sectarian issues have only been compounded by weak institutions. Within the newly unified military, soldiers often take their orders from and report to their former sectarian leaders rather than the official chain of command; trust has not yet developed among different groups within the same organization. In the government, the most important positions are filled by al-Sharaa’s Sharia allies, and the excessive power of al-Sharaa within the STG framework (including his appointment of a third of the parliament) worries many that the government will not be as diverse and representative as it ought to be. A lack of transparency also limits trust in the government. DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) of Assad security forces has been uneven, with a lack of intelligence limiting its effectiveness and no clear methodology for who gets immunity. There is also no real reintegration program in place for the many soldiers and employees of the since-dissolved Assad institutions, which risks that population turning to violent movements. Also deeply problematic is the potential resurgence of ISIS. Many former fighters and their families were able to escape from containment camps in the Kurdish-controlled north during conflict with the STG in early 2026. They have since carried out attacks throughout the country, and are rebuilding networks in areas with security vacuums.
Most assessments consider normalization with Israel impossible for the foreseeable future. Israeli strikes during skirmishes with the Druze and on Turkish military targets have only fueled the anti-Israel feeling already long present among the Salafi HTS and the religious leaders who carry power over much of the population’s opinions. In 2026, even government rhetoric became more hostile, with media referring to Israel as ‘The Zionist Entity’, and trade strictly forbidden. While temporary and informal agreements are possible, full recognition and major direct deals cannot be reached in the current Syrian political climate.
Given the current situation, there are three plausible paths that Syria could take over the next few decades: state consolidation, continued fragmentation, or full collapse and renewed conflict. Each possibility would favor different parties and warrant a tailored Israeli response.
Should the STG’s success in foreign policy and initial optics be paired with the development of strong institutions and DDR mechanisms that build trust among sectarian factions, then state consolidation would be a likely outcome. Whether or not the promises of a diverse and representative government are actualized, most parties would consider such a consolidated scenario good for their interests. Turkey would be happy with a close ally firmly in control; the US and Arab states would favor guarantees against Iranian influence and the potential for new land-based energy corridors; and Russia and Israel would not have to factor the state’s collapse as strongly while building relations with its government.
Under such consolidation, Israel’s Syria policy ought to have long-term coexistence in mind. While proper normalization would still be impossible, the INSS proposal of a limited disengagement agreement with internationally mediated intentions to build better relations in the future is not out of the cards. As trust slowly develops, energy deals (such as Israeli gas indirectly reaching Syria via Jordan) can be formalized, and other small arrangements can be signed. Eventually, the diplomatic winds could shift to a place where recognition and proper security agreements are possible. Throughout this process, Israel can maintain red lines on its security and respond to violations as needed without necessarily jeopardizing a long-term peace process, especially with US mediation.
If Syria stays on its current course, with many paper victories sitting atop a sectarian society with weak institutions, continued fragmentation seems most inevitable. In the long term, it could lead either to renewed conflict, moves towards a more federal system, or perhaps a crackdown of a forcefully strong government to keep things under relative control. In the short- to medium-term, this path is risky for Syria, as investors may be scared away and important foreign policy gains could be reversed. For example, the US might reintroduce sanctions and condition their lifting on a cessation of sectarian violence. Within the country, violent clashes would likely continue to increase in frequency and scale unless changes are made to the way the country will be governed. Security vacuums could expand as institutions like the military remain weak due to sectarian in-fighting, giving ISIS more ground to rebuild, and opening the risk of Iranian-linked actors returning to Syrian territory. Tensions might also lead to anti-Russian sentiment and force closure of their bases. Generally, this option would be unpopular with most foreign powers, as it runs counter to their key interests.
Interestingly, this path could be Israel’s preferred option. Sectarianism provides an automatic counterbalance to Turkish influence, and Kurdish success could see Turkey face renewed internal struggles that would delay its power from extending too far outward. Ultimately, Israel’s strategy might remain similar to what it is now: defending its borders and the Druze by force and establishing buffer zones, and subtly assisting the Kurds in their struggle for more autonomy, all the while retaining cautious under-the-table dialogue with the STG to ensure it does not become kinetically hostile. Strikes could also be conducted against Iranian-linked targets to prevent a resurgence of Hezbollah supply chains.
Should the sectarian violence reach a point that the STG loses the will or ability to contain it, Syria could again spiral into a period of civil war-type conflict. Which Syrian groups will have what success is impossible to predict. But the instability will doubtless open the doors to potential ISIS resurgence, Iran again getting involved, and possibly drawing in other powers like the US and Saudi Arabia. Turkey would likely provide military and intelligence support to al-Sharaa, and should the US pick a different group to back, a fracture among NATO allies could appear. Any conflict scenario would of course be devastating for Syrians, and the chaos goes against the interests of just about every actor save for Iran and ISIS-type terror groups.
Against this backdrop, Israel might be advised to take a position like during the civil war, protecting its borders and the Druze, striking hostile and Iran-linked targets, but generally remaining on the sidelines and adapting its policy when potential victors become more apparent. The less Israel commits itself during unpredictability, the more room it will have to maneuver the eventual outcome.
As a complex variety of actors hold interest in a post-Assad Syria, the country remains in a precarious position. Despite positive language and actions by the STG, as well as its foreign relations successes, there remains an undercurrent of sectarian divisions, inadequate DDR institutions, and power vacuums allowing for ISIS resurgence. How al-Sharaa’s government adjusts (or does not) could lead the country towards consolidation, continued status quo, or outright collapse. To each scenario, Israel ought to tailor its Syria-facing policy so as to best protect against Turkish influence at its border or Islamist military threat.
Benjamin Kaufman is an undergraduate at Trinity College, Dublin, and a Summer 2026 intern at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.