PSCRP-BESA Reports No 75 (August 16, 2024)
The first major war in Europe since 1945 (with the exception of much smaller Yugoslav Wars), which began with the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army on February 24, 2022, has been going on for almost 30 months with hardly an end in sight. Militarily, the conflict is reaching a stalemate; fatigue and a desire to return to the pre-war status quo are building up in both warring countries, and with them the desire of both elites and peoples to move to negotiations that can end this war, of course, on acceptable terms.
There is a feeling that the negotiation process — or preparations for it — is already underway, but so far it is rather limited to general ideas and cautious contacts, and both sides have so far denied this fact. Even the location where such real negotiations could take place — if, of course, it comes to them — has not yet been agreed upon. We are talking, we must assume, about a mediator who is experienced in such matters, but who is in no way involved in this conflict on either side.
Previously, it was thought that this could be a country like Turkey or Israel, but today it is likely to be a post-Soviet country that is neutral and to some extent a partner for both sides. For example, Azerbaijan, which is already beginning to gain credibility as an engaged but relatively impartial negotiator. But there might be other options here.
What is attainable and what is desirable
First of all, it is important to understand on what terms Kyiv and Moscow are ready to stop hostilities in principle, given all the declarations that both have managed to voice over the two and a half years of war. Ukraine wants withdrawal of Russian troops and restoration of the country’s sovereignty in its “1991 borders.” Russia demands to legalize the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and four more Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia) in 2022 — within their administrative boundaries, that is, including those parts that Russian troops failed to seize. It is not difficult to assume that neither Kyiv nor Moscow is ready to accept the enemy’s demands, recognizing it as the winner.
Judging by the results of the latest sociological polls of Russian and Ukrainian citizens, on the one hand, there is a request in both countries for the end of the “hot phase” of the military conflict. Thus, according to the results of the Levada Center poll, only about a third of respondents in Russia supported military action this July (the minimum values for the entire time of measurement), while more than half are in favor of a transition to peace talks. In Ukraine, according to the results of a May poll commissioned by the Carnegie Endowment/Rating Group, the share of those agreeing with the need for negotiations with Russia to achieve peace amounted to 43%.. However, even among the 54% who opposed the idea, only slightly more than a third thought it should not be done “under any circumstances,” while the rest would still agree to negotiate under certain conditions.
On the other hand, three quarters of Russians surveyed in May 2024 believed that Russia should not make concessions to Ukraine for the sake of ending the so-called Special Military Operation (SMO or “SVO”, the euphemism used by the Russian propaganda to address the war) and signing a peace agreement. Only 17% shared the opposite view, a ratio that has remained virtually unchanged since February 2023. Another poll in 2024 showed that three quarters of respondents believe that the return of the LDNR to Ukraine is unacceptable, and the same number of respondents believe that the return of Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions is unacceptable. In their turn, among Ukrainians that were interviewed in May 2024, more than a half believed that Ukraine should fight until it liberates all territory to the 1991 borders; 12% — until it liberates all territory to the February 2022; and 26% seek a compromise to end the war through negotiations [now].
It is indicative that a fifth of the Ukrainians surveyed warned that if the terms of the agreed settlement do not meet expectations, they will demand an immediate change of government; more than half are ready in this case to postpone re-elections to a more appropriate time, and another fifth are ready to accept the situation as it is. In Russia, if President Vladimir Putin decided to end hostilities “this week,” a majority (71%) in April this year would support his decision. However, this share dropped to 30% if the condition for ending the conflict was the return of “new” territories. It is clear that, unlike in Ukraine, it is much easier for the Russian authorities to convince the majority of Russians, who for many years have been under the powerful hypnosis of official Russian propaganda, of the need for a sharp change of course. But ending the war with the return of territories to Ukraine will not look like an unambiguous victory, and this could be a heavy blow to the regime’s image.
That is, unless the talk of an ongoing diplomatic process is a complete bluff, in practice only two options can really be discussed: either the line of demarcation becomes the state at the time of the ceasefire, or the parties return to the state of February 23, 2022. Both options mean that the border between the two countries is temporary, not recognized by anyone (and primarily by Kyiv itself), but no less real until a new round of escalation.
The Kursk mishap
Another factor that may influenced the tentative diplomatic outcome is the raid by Ukrainian troops on the territory of the Russian Federation’s border region of Kursk, which began on August 6 and continues to this day. According to the released information, about 1,000 square kilometers and 44 settlements of the Kursk region of the Russian Federation were under Ukrainian control by the middle of this month. The Kremlin also fears that Ukrainian troops will attack Russian forces in the Bryansk Oblast (northwest of the Kursk Oblast).
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the formal reason for the AFU’s operation in Kursk region “the liberation of the border region from the Russian army, which regularly shells Ukraine” and the fact that “Russia has brought war to others, now it is coming back [to their] home”. However, this is clearly not the end of the matter. Apparently, the point of the Ukrainian armed forces’ operation is to try to divert Russian forces away from Donetsk region and prevent the Ukrainian defenses there from breaking through.
The invasion of the Kursk Oblast of the Russian Federation may also become a signal to both the population of Ukraine and its allies that the AFU is capable of reversing the “defensive” trend, intercepting the strategic initiative, and thus raising the motivation of both. Including overcoming the draft crisis in the country , and in relations with NATO countries — resolving the problems of supplying Ukraine with ammunition and mobile weapons by lifting restrictions on their use on the territory of the Russian Federation.
Thirdly, the Ukrainian troops’ raid — and most importantly, the speed and ease with which Russian outposts were defeated (the offensive is progressing deep into Russia’s border regions, with thousands of local residents forced to evacuate) — puts the Kremlin and the army command in an extremely uncomfortable position in the eyes of its citizens. There is a feeling that the army is unable to protect them, and the political leadership is losing control of the situation. All of this could become an important domestic political factor that could possibly push Moscow to start negotiations with Kyiv “without preliminary conditions”.
Finally, the parts of Kursk Oblast and possibly some adjacent Russian regions seized and held for some considerable time (according to Forbes, “stabilization of the front line—and a long-term Ukrainian occupation of part of Kursk—is on the table”) could become a powerful bargaining chip in possible peace talks. That is, to take off the agenda the recognition of annexation of part or all of the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia after February 22, 2024.
The position of the West
Another important question is what Ukraine’s Western allies are interested in. Are they interested in curtailing hostilities (and if so, on what terms) in order to get a more or less marketable “picture” of Western victory and Moscow’s geopolitical defeat as soon as possible? Or, on the contrary, are the U.S. and Europe determined to protract the conflict with the Russian Federation in the Cold War style of the Western and Communist blocs of 1947–1987? We are talking about a hybrid conflict involving economic, psychological, technological and other pressures on the enemy, efforts to ideologically decompose the regime and localized military clashes between “limited contingents” of NATO and the USSR with the support and extensive use of forces, resources and territory of local “proxies” of Washington and Moscow.
If the second is true, the goal is to exhaust Russia economically, militarily and morally as much as possible, which, despite the superiority of Russian capabilities over Ukrainian ones, is possible in the medium or long term. In doing so, they will continue to support Ukraine through diplomacy, rhetoric, and budget injections, while arms and other related services will continue to be supplied on a “you can’t win, but we won’t let you die” basis. All of this could involve temporary strategic truces in the style of the “détente” of the 1970s, but without formally ending the conflict and with continual escalation.
If the U.S. and NATO strategy is to weaken Russia, not destroy it, so that it ceases to pose a strategic threat and so that Moscow, whoever and however it is governed, can be cooperated with in the future, then the negotiation process, from the Western perspective, is more about clarifying interests and the depth of concessions each side can make, rather than a way to end the war as soon as possible.
Today, it seems that no breakthrough on the negotiation track can be expected until both sides exhaust their capacities.
Prof. Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin is the Head of the BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program (PSCRP) and teaches Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University