PSCRP-BESA Reports No 56 (May 07, 2024)
Two models of African engagement
Throughout 2023, many Western and Russian media outlets converged on one topic – Russia’s “return” to Africa. The difference lay in the tone: what was welcomed by supporters of Putin, seemed like a nightmare to his opponents. These speculations aroused due to such developments as activities of the private-military corporation (PMC) “Wagner”, two intergovernmental summits (“Russia-Africa” in St. Petersburg and BRICS in South Africa), and the ongoing erosion of Françafrique (“French Africa”). However, from a broader perspective, the situation is rather the opposite: by the end of the 2010-s, Russia indeed managed to strengthen its position on the continent, but nowadays its subsequent risky power strategy, on the contrary, threatened national interests.
After Soviet profound involvement in Africa, the gradual return of Russia to the continent began in the mid-1990-s, as the Russian economy recovered, and the government pursued a more balanced foreign policy. During these approximately twenty-five years period, three pillars of economic relations were following: arms exports, the promotion of major raw material companies, and debts owed by African countries, which persisted from Soviet times. In the second half of the 2010-s, a fourth foundation emerged – the export of agricultural products (primarily wheat). The state sought to act as a mediator in complex deals, where written-off debts and/or supplied weapons were exchanged for access for Russian businesses (state-owned or patronized) to raw resources such as oil and gas deposits, precious stones, bauxite, manganese, and others. Debt write-offs totaling more than $140 billion also became a soft-power image-creating strategy, both on the continent and in the West as a whole, formally presented as fulfilling obligations after joining the Paris Club in 1997. Throughout this period, Russia attempted to position itself politically as a responsible international player, advocating for multilateral cooperation in Africa and against American unilateralism if it violated national sovereignty. However, from the 2000-s to the 2010-s, Russia increasingly acted as a public defender of odious authoritarian regimes (Zimbabwe and Uganda).
If we consider that Africa was peripheral to Russian foreign policy, the chosen strategy appeared to be effective. The dynamics of bilateral trade indicated growing economic interdependencies through market mechanisms, rather than supply of subsidized goods as during the Soviet era. By the end of the 2010-s, Russia became the largest supplier of weapons to the continent, reclaiming the positions of the Soviet Union. The closest economic relations were formed with countries in the north of the continent (Algeria, Egypt, partly Libya and Morocco) and with South Africa.
A profound reorganization Russian policy in Africa took place at the turn of the 2010-s–2020-s when the model of “large-scale business under state patronage” was added by another – “military-political entrepreneurship.” It became the most noticeable part of the general foreign policy strategy built on the idea that enhancing military potential, not shying away from confrontation, and more actively participating in certain conflicts would lead to increased foreign policy influence and strengthening negotiation positions on issues significant to Russia.
By 2017, in alliance with Iran, Russia had saved the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, thereby becoming one of the “power brokers” in the Middle East and gaining the opportunity to move further south. The increased significance of this direction in foreign policy is also linked to Russia’s adherence to the Vienna Agreement of OPEC countries (OPEC+ format) at the end of 2016: coordinated actions to reduce oil production ensured subsequent oil price growth and, consequently, the stability of the Russian economy. Further movement into Africa was influenced by the political context. In particular, U.S. President D. Trump (2017–2021) focused on the “Chinese threat”, believing that Russia’s activation in Africa would not seriously harm American interests.
Russia has pragmatically exploited several African trends. Firstly, there is a low level of political stability and an increased number of military coups lately.
The second trend is that after the defeat of the Islamic State in the Middle East in the mid-2010-s, the center of radical Islamism shifted there: the greatest tension is in the Sahel region and Eastern Africa. Moreover, by 2018, it became evident the crisis of Francafrique and France’s inability to decisively defeat Islamism in West Africa, which contributed to the growth of anti-French sentiments.
Russia turned to informal mechanisms of power projection. The central role belonged to the oligarch close to Vladimir Putin, Evgeny Prigozhin. His main asset – the private military corporation Wagner Group – emerged in 2014 during the fighting in Donbas (Ukraine), and then fought alongside Russian troops in Syria. Primarily, the Wagner Group offered military experience to African military leaders and dictators in exchange for access to natural resources.
The relatively small number of mercenaries (from several hundred to approximately a thousand) took advantage over local forces for well-training and high-quality weaponry. Propaganda and political technology services were another ‘export commodity’ of the company.
The Wagner Group’s success is linked to the countries of North and Central Africa, namely Libya, Sudan, and the Central African Republic (since late 2017), followed by Mali (2021) and Burkina Faso (2022).
In each case, internal conflicts or increasing instability served as entry points for the Wagner Group. Russia offered local military leaders or dictators a package of military and propaganda services, as well as weapons supplies (except Sudan) in exchange for access to the exploitation of natural resources (primarily gold and diamonds, as well as oil). While Sudan had been a key client of the Russian military-industrial complex for over 15 years, in the case of Libya, Mali, and Burkina Faso, Wagner’s penetration preceded the first contracts in this sphere. In each case, the arrival of the Wagner Group was justified by rhetoric about strengthening national sovereignty and combating Islamism.
Although the actions of the Wagner Group, for various reasons, are described as a successful example, in reality, this is not entirely true. East Africa (Madagascar in 2018 and Mozambique in 2019) was its main failure. In Libya, Russia became part of the international coalition to support the army of General Haftar, but by the end of 2020, the civil confrontation in the country had reached a standstill. Moreover, in 2019, the Wagner Group was unable to save pro-Russian President Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, although it retained its position after the military came to power (it retained control over one of the gold deposits). The only relative success was achieved in the CAR in ensuring presidential stability and reducing terrorist activity, but this happened with the presence of UN peacekeepers and the active participation of the Rwandan Expeditionary Force. The arrival of the Wagner Group in Mali took place in 2021 against the backdrop of an ongoing 10-year civil war (with Tuareg separatists and Islamist movements that spread to Burkina Faso and partly to Niger). The leader of the military coup, A. Goita, decided to stop relying on French help and turn to Russia. However, by the beginning of 2022, the Wagner group had only managed to engage in isolated clashes.
2022–2024: African Strategy Influenced by the War in Ukraine
African political indifference. The prolonged war against Ukraine and the crisis in relations with the West forced Russia to search for alternative economic and political partners. The rhetoric of “fighting colonialism,” which partially targets African countries, shaped the radical restructuring of economic and political relations.
“Authenticity against neocolonialism” – this is how some Russian experts evaluate Moscow’s ideological strategy in Africa, failing to define the first concept. Africa was presented by state propaganda as a success story to prove that Russians are not a global outcast.
Analysis of political contacts and public opinion polls equally disappoint both Putin supporters and his staunch opponents: African countries, with some exceptions, cannot be counted as supporters of Russian foreign policy. However, a significant portion seeks to take a non-antagonistic position and benefit from cooperation with Moscow. Four resolutions of the UN General Assembly, adopted in the first year of the war, can to the overall attitude of the leadership of the 54 African countries towards the Russo-Ukrainian war. Overall, the voting shows that Russia-Ukraine conflict is not significant for African leaders. The three key resolutions for Ukraine and its Western supporters received just over 50% of the African votes in favor (28–30 countries).
Reformatting the Military-Political Presence Model. The protracted war with Ukraine objectively restrains the possibilities of increasing military-political presence, which, however, has not been curtailed. On the contrary, progress in Africa is presented to Russian citizens as successes on the “southern front” against the West, while the growing positions are seen as a mechanism of pressure and strengthening negotiation positions in the context of future agreements to end the war in Ukraine. According to the monitoring center for armed conflicts ACLED, despite the redeployment of the Wagner Group to Ukraine, the number of combat episodes involving them increased in Mali, and in CAR (at the turn of 2022–2023). However, if until 2022 Russia could hope that the West would accept its role as a “power broker”, now such a status is unacceptable. Moreover, the failed coup d’état by the Wagner Group in June 2023 and the subsequent death of Prigozhin deprived Russia in Africa of one of its leaders. This did not lead to a collapse of positions, but the former Wagner fighters began to operate under the name of the Russian Expeditionary Corps, subordinate to the Ministry of Defense.
Sudan has become a demonstrative example of how risky it is to rely on military leaders. Although by early 2023 Russia managed to defend the prospects of creating a naval base in the Red Sea, in April the country slid into a civil war, caused by al-Burhan’s attempt to bring the RSF under his control. Russia took a neutral position, although close contacts between M. Daglo (leader of the RSF) and the Wagner Group led to rumors of the latter’s involvement in the conflict. In September 2023, rumors of the participation of Ukrainian special forces on al-Burhan’s side were discussed in Western media, and by February 2024 additional evidence of their presence appeared. Nowadays, the civil war is far from the end, therefore the future of Russian interests in the country remains in question.
In the CAR, Russia has focused on consolidating previous successes. Thus, it expanded military cooperation: in mid-2022, it handed over the first military training aircraft for the future creation of its own aviation forces in the CAR, and in May-June 2023, eight L-39 fighters were delivered. CAR government and the Wagner Group continued to fight against the Coalition of Patriots for Change and the People’s Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic.
The alliance of the CAR with Russia led to the World Bank temporarily freezing its budget support to the CAR in May 2022. Assistance from France and the EU also ceased. Since 50% of the state budget consisted of Western aid, the government was forced to suspend all payments in December 2022. The country was plunged into an economic crisis, and over the next few months, prices for some products soared by 20–30%. In turn, this provided CAR government opportunities to expand its cooperation with Rwanda in the fields of gold, petroleum products, and diamonds. Early 2023 saw signals coming from the United States about readiness to provide significant economic assistance in exchange for the expulsion of Russia. But CAR President F.-A. Touadéra did not accept this proposal. Moreover, with the help of Russian advisors, he conducted a referendum in the summer, amending the constitution to secure his re-election for a third term. Russia’s military support was crucial. Moscow limited its economic assistance to some significant but restricted gestures.
Russian actions in West Africa were more successful. In April 2022, Mali received some types of fighters, combat helicopters, and transports. After ECOWAS appointed Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé as its mediator in resolving the political crisis in Mali, economic and financial sanctions were lifted in the summer of 2022, and Goita agreed to hold elections in 2024, thereby ending the transitional period.
Failures in the fight against Islamists led to the downfall of civilian authorities in Burkina Faso. Captain Ibrahim Traoré organized another military coup on September 30, 2022. He then announced the withdrawal of French troops from the country and shifted towards cooperation with Russia and the Wagner group.
From 2022 to 2023, the Wagner group increased its involvement in the fight against Islamists in Mali. According to ACLED estimates, from December 2021 to June 2023, it participated in 298 combat episodes, primarily in the central region of the country, but from the second half of 2022, it shifted to the north. In 2022, Mali withdrew French troops, and in the summer of 2023, President A. Goïta demanded the withdrawal of MINUSMA peacekeepers, fully shifting focus towards cooperation with Russia. Later that same year, a military coup occurred in Niger. Though it stemmed from an intra-elite conflict rather than the state’s inability to combat Islamists, mass demonstrations in the capital took on an anti-French character. France was subsequently demanded to withdraw troops. This signaled a further reduction in its African presence, which is now limited to bases in Chad and Djibouti, as well as three more bases in Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal, being transformed into training centers.
In August 2023, the Malian army, supported by the Wagner group, launched an offensive against Islamist forces. Against this backdrop, on September 17, 2023, the heads of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger established the Sahel States Alliance (SSA), announcing cooperation in the military sphere to jointly combat terrorist organizations. The emergence of SSA, not without the mediation of Russian diplomacy, was accompanied by successes in local battles. In early February 2024, there were reports that Wagner fighters had taken control of the largest gold mine in Intahar, previously controlled by the Tuaregs. In December 2023, Russia opened an embassy in Burkina Faso, and a month later, the deployment of the first few hundred soldiers of the Russian African Corps began. Military equipment continued to be supplied to the Malian army.
The battle against Islamists in Mali and Burkina Faso is far from over, but Russia desires to continue it.
Success or trap?
In 2000–2010-s, Russian strategy in Africa was undoubtedly successful. These achievements may be viewed as profound due to the low starting point of Russia and media distortions: today, pro-Russian outlets portray any failures of the West in Africa as Moscow’s success, while Western outlets see them as evidence of the West’s decline and erosion of the world order.
The significant restructuring of the Russian-African relations achieved by the late 2000-s was underestimated: from ideologically defined investments with unclear returns in Soviet times to a more pragmatic calculation of costs and benefits. Thus, by the beginning of the 2020-s, the African vector proved to be effective even politically, if effectiveness is understood outside ideological or idealist contexts (global leadership or development assistance), focusing solely on investments and their subsequent returns. Despite anti-colonial rhetoric, African countries are viewed by Russia as markets for its goods and technologies. Unlike the US, EU, China, and India, Russia is not highly interested in African exports. Russian large-scale businesses sought opportunities to expand their resource base for participation in the global market.
The “military-political model” allowed Russia to become one of the “power brokers” in the Middle East (through its presence in Syria), then in Libya (through support for Haftar), and now in West Africa (through Mali). However, in none of these cases does it hold a dominant position, and extracting specific benefits will require diplomatic skill.
Receding on some fronts, the West seems to invite Russia to strain its forces and make mistakes. African leaders, however, are pragmatic: they are no worse than Moscow at calculating benefits and costs, and therefore will not refrain from turning proximity to Russia into a bargaining chip with Western partners. The war in Ukraine and sanctions are limiting Russian resources, making business difficult for Russian companies worldwide. Without investments, development aid, and purchases of local goods, it is difficult to imagine real leadership on the continent. Hence, one might agree with the assessments of the editors of the special issue of the “South African Journal of International Affairs” on Russian-African relations: “Russia appears as a neo-colonial force in the guise of anti-colonialism”.
See also: Arming Ukraine: How Russia Forces US and EU to Foot the African Kingdom’s Bill