PSCRP-BESA Reports No 145 (August 10, 2025)
By Alexander Shpunt
Buddhism, with its deep historical roots in Russia and as part of the country’s religious foundation, is undergoing a process of transformation and adaptation to contemporary socio-political realities. Alongside the revival of interest, new challenges are emerging in the form of various types of conflicts. These conflicts affect both relations within Russian Buddhism itself and the interaction of Buddhist communities with state institutions and other religious groups.
This article is an attempt to analyze the key aspects of conflicts related to Buddhism in Russia, their causes, consequences, and potential strategies for resolution.
Confessional Disputes and the Struggle for Influence
In recent months, the confessional structure of Russian Buddhism has undergone significant changes. Having passed through a period of fragmentation, the Buddhist sangha of Russia now shows a tendency toward consolidation around two main poles of influence, indicating the emergence of a clearly defined and hierarchically organized system.
In 1997, a split occurred within the leadership of the Central Spiritual Administration of Buddhists of Russia, resulting in the creation of two nationwide Buddhist organizations. The first, the “Traditional Buddhist Sangha of Russia,” united nearly all Buryat datsans and was headed by Damba Ayusheev. The second, the “Central Spiritual Administration of Buddhists of Russia,” included, in addition to several Buryat Buddhist communities, several dozen Buddhist organizations from various regions of the country. It was headed by Lama Nimazhap Ilyukhin.
The Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia (BTSR) is the legal successor of the Central Spiritual Administration of Buddhists (CSAB), established in the Soviet Union in 1946. In 1997, under the leadership of Damba Ayusheev, head of the CSAB, a reorganization was carried out, as a result of which the organization received its new name — BTSR. The charter and founding documents were also updated, and in accordance with these changes, the Buddhist communities of the Republic of Tuva and the Republic of Kalmykia were excluded from the BTSR. This change led to the emergence of not only a religious but also a political (regional) division within Russia’s Buddhist community.
A second significant factor contributing to the split was the difference in approaches to the strictness of clerical service. Leaders of the new generation, unlike the majority of traditional Buryat lamas, are lay clergy who have not taken monastic vows and lead family lives, with spouses and children.
In addition to the subjective factors behind the internal clerical confrontation, there are also objective reasons for the fragmentation of Buddhists in Russia.
Today, more than two hundred Buddhist communities are registered in the Russian Federation, representing various schools and traditions of the Dharma. In addition to the Tibetan Buddhism traditionally practiced in Russia, other Buddhist traditions are also spreading actively. Notably, two Theravada communities are registered in St. Petersburg, indicating an expansion of the country’s religious landscape.
Furthermore, Russia has a significant number of both officially registered and unregistered groups following Chinese, Vietnamese, and Japanese Zen traditions, as well as Japan’s Lotus Sutra Order.
In recent years, there has been growing interest in the once highly esoteric Tibetan tradition of “Great Perfection” (Dzogchen), which is also an important aspect of the transformation of Russia’s religious space.
Moreover, some Buddhist communities have already united into their own centralized organizations. Around 20 of Russia’s “new” Buddhist communities are part of the All-Russian Center for Far Eastern Mahayana Buddhism. More than 20 communities of the Tibetan Kagyu tradition, founded by Danish preacher Ole Nydahl, are united in the International Association of Buddhists of the Karma Kagyu School. Up until recent events, this structure encompassed several communities from Ukraine.
Thus, it can be stated that the religious situation in the country is characterized not only by the quantitative growth of Buddhist communities but also by the qualitative diversity of the traditions represented.
Interaction Between Russian Buddhists and the Authorities of Moscow and the Regions
The leadership of Russian Buddhists—like that of other traditional faiths, which the authorities classify as Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism—is deeply involved in the political games unfolding at both the federal and regional levels. Buddhists serve simultaneously as active players in these processes (at the level of community leadership) and as the playing field itself (at the level of two million parishioners).
The Kremlin has traditionally pursued a “two centers of power” policy in managing religious affairs in Russia, encouraging the formation of two structures of comparable influence, each seeking support and resources from the authorities.
In Russian Islam, this rivalry takes the form of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation and the Council of Muftis of Russia, headed by Ravil Gainutdin, on one side, and the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia, headed by Supreme Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin, on the other.
In Judaism, it is the rivalry between the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR), led by Chief Rabbi of Russia Berel Lazar, and the Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Associations in Russia, headed by Chief Rabbi of Russia Adolf Shayevich.
In Buddhism, as we have shown, this rivalry is between the CSAB and the BTSR, headed by Khambo Lama Damba Ayusheev. However, unlike in Russian Islam, Moscow’s policy has shown a significant bias in favor of Ayusheev’s structure, while the CSAB has been regarded as a reserve organization meant to restrain the BTSR’s ambitions.
The only traditional religion in which the authorities do not foster a convenient rivalry between two associations is the Russian Orthodox Church. The reason is simple—the Church’s influence is so great, and the resources available to it so effective, that a split in the ROC would have a destructive impact on the authorities themselves.
As for Russian Buddhism, the situation began to change only recently, when in early 2024 the organization was headed by a charismatic 35-year-old monk from Kalmykia, Geshe Yonten (secular name — Sergey Kirishov).
Later in 2024, shortly after this event, the CSAB launched a project to unite Buddhist communities of various traditions. The establishment of a religious center with both a spiritual and administrative core at the “Tubden Shedubling” temple in Moscow allowed Buddhism to move beyond the regional boundaries of Buryatia, Tuva, and Kalmykia.
Geshe Yonten (Sergey Kirishov), the organization’s leader, began pursuing a policy of expanding the CSAB as an “umbrella” structure for all branches of Buddhism, in contrast to Ayusheev, who emphasized the “purity” of the Gelug school. Communities of the Nyingma, Kagyu, and Zen schools from various regions, including even Buryatia, began coming under the influence of the CSAB.
As mentioned earlier, for more than three decades, Damba Ayusheev had monopolized the representation of Russian Buddhists in dealings with the authorities. However, the Kremlin was dissatisfied with Ayusheev’s intolerance toward other schools and traditions of Buddhism and his narrow focus on the single Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism. Such a policy excludes large segments of Russia’s Buddhist population from the Kremlin’s sphere of influence—something the authorities naturally cannot accept.
Geshe Yonten promised the Kremlin exactly what it wanted—a channel of influence over all Buddhists in Russia. Having secured support at the highest levels of Russian political power, the CSAB set a course for uniting the country’s diverse and scattered Buddhist communities.
With his experience managing the main Kalmyk khurul and his excellent spiritual education obtained in India, Geshe Yonten is steadily pushing Damba Ayusheev to the periphery of the Kremlin’s communication channels.
“We want all traditional Buddhist schools in Russia to develop and prosper harmoniously, creating conditions for spiritual practice for all Buddhists,” Geshe Yonten stated. The diplomacy and sociability of the new CSAB leader stand in stark contrast to the isolation and intolerance of the aging Ayusheev.
The relocation of the CSAB headquarters to Moscow also gives it a serious advantage over the BTSR, whose residence is in distant Ulan-Ude. Proximity to the federal decision-making center and to the country’s largest media outlets allows the CSAB to lobby for Buddhist interests more effectively, attract resources, and receive informational support.
Naturally, the Kremlin will not abandon its policy of “checks and balances” toward Russia’s Buddhists. Moreover, Ayusheev’s position remains formally strong—Khambo Lama Ayusheev is still the only Buddhist among the members of the Presidential Interreligious Council of Russia, and thus can, when necessary, be regarded by the authorities as the representative of all the country’s Buddhists.
It should be noted that Muslims are represented in the Council by three figures, including two leaders of rival organizations, Ravil Gainutdin and Talgat Tadzhuddin. The Jewish communities are likewise represented in the Council’s Presidium by both Chief Rabbi of Russia Berel Lazar and Chief Rabbi of Russia Adolf Shayevich.
By contrast, in recent times Buddhist representation has been delegated by Ayusheev to a second-tier figure—the BTSR’s representative in Moscow, Did Khambo Lama Dashinima Sodnomdorzhiev.
At the regional level, Buryatia is the one region of Russia where the processes weakening the BTSR elsewhere have not manifested. As of 2023, the BTSR included 52 Buddhist communities in Buryatia and only 14 communities in other regions of Russia.
Buryatia is also home to the only Buddhist university in Russia, “Dashi Choynkhorlin,” founded in 1991 at the Ivolginsky Datsan. Initially, it was a college offering a two-year basic Buddhist program, with 96 students enrolled. Today, it is a state-licensed university with a five-year program. Graduates receive the qualification of “lama-theologian.”
Another state educational institution under the BTSR’s authority is the Aginsky Buddhist Academy, located at the Aginsky Datsan. Founded in 1993 as a School of Tibetan Medicine, it soon expanded to include faculties of Buddhist philosophy and religious calligraphy. Unlike the “Dashi Choynkhorlin” Institute at the Ivolginsky Datsan, which admits only men, the Aginsky Buddhist Academy accepts both men and women.
Based on the above, it is reasonable to predict the behavior of all participants in the systemic confrontation within Russian Buddhism.
Geshe Yonten and the CSAB will continue to expand their influence, drawing an increasing number of Buddhist structures of various branches and traditions into their orbit, thereby offering the Kremlin control over a growing number of believers in an ever-wider range of regions.
Khambo Lama Ayusheev and the BTSR will seek to maintain their monopoly in the key Russian region of Buryatia. The BTSR’s second line of influence—the monopoly on the training of clergy—is another asset Ayusheev will strive to preserve.
The Kremlin will cautiously guide and strengthen the position of the convenient Geshe Yonten—perhaps by introducing him into the Presidential Council—while at the same time maintaining control over Ayusheev’s BTSR and preventing the CSAB’s expansion into Buryatia. This will create for the Kremlin its familiar “checks and balances” model, ensuring that no single participant in the religious life of Russian Buddhists gains independence.
Alexander Shpunt is Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics, resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics.” From 1999 to 2011, he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation,” the largest think-tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011, he founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.