PSCRP-BESA Reports No 132 (May 17, 2025)
Russia officially became a nationalist state in the summer of 2020, when the constitution was amended[1] to declare Russian the state language as “the language of the state-forming people,” among other changes. That same summer saw the birth of the “Russian Community”, which only became a significant player after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It has since grown into the most numerous and influential nationalist and “protectionist” movement, displacing both the neo-Nazis[2] — who had been weakened by the repression of the 2010s — and, for example, the Cossacks.
The southern regions of the country[3] — with their diverse ethnic makeup, proximity to the still-untamed Caucasus, and large numbers of migrant workers — provide a useful model for examining how ethnic conflicts emerge and are managed in a country engaged in aggressive warfare, with a simultaneous intensification of Islamist terrorism.
Non-Russians in the “Russian world”
The largest among the national minorities of the South are Armenians, who began migrating to southern Russia as early as the 18th century. Since the late 1980s, the Armenian diaspora has grown further due to refugees and migrants from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In total, more than half a million Armenians live in the Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov regions — about half the size of the entire Armenian diaspora in Russia. The highest concentration of Armenians is found in the Myasnikovsky District of the Rostov Oblast, where they make up more than half the population, and in Tuapse and Sochi (about 20%) and Pyatigorsk (15%).
Somewhat unexpectedly, the second-largest indigenous diaspora is Kazakh: in Astrakhan Oblast, their population exceeds 140,000 — about 15% of the region’s total. In Volodarsky District, Kazakhs make up more than two-thirds of the population; in four other districts, their share exceeds one-quarter. An additional 40,000 Kazakhs live in Volgograd Oblast, mainly in Pallasovsky District. In other southern regions, the Kazakh population is insignificant. Notably, no recent ethnic conflicts involving Kazakhs have been reported.
The Roma people (“Gypsies”) remain a special case. Even their exact numbers are unclear. According to official census data — likely underreported — the Roma population of the South ranges from 0.15% in Volgograd Oblast to 1.3% in Stavropol Krai. In absolute numbers, this equates to about 38,000 people in Stavropol Krai, 14,000 in Rostov Oblast, 11,000 in Krasnodar Krai, 8,000 in Volgograd Oblast, 4,000 in Astrakhan Oblast, and 3,000 in the small republic of Adygea.
Other notable groups include the Tatar and Nogai diasporas in Astrakhan Oblast (accounting for 5% and 1.15% of the population, respectively), Turkmens living in a compact settlement in Stavropol’s Turkmensky District, Greeks in Stavropol and the Black Sea coast of Kuban, among others.
North Caucasus peoples residing in the southern regions are partly migrants and partly indigenous. For example, in Stavropol Krai, their combined share is about 5% of the population, while in Adygea, the Adygs and Circassians — who are the “titular nation” — make up about 23% of the republic’s population, with a total[4] of approximately 115,000 people.
It is difficult to estimate the total number of labor migrants in southern Russia. According to official media, 58,000 migrants were registered in Krasnodar Krai a year ago[5]. Of these, about half were citizens of Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) countries (primarily Armenia and Kyrgyzstan), who do not require additional work permits. The other half — mostly from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan — worked based on employment licenses (“patents”). Authorities have steadily expanded restrictions on sectors where patent holders may work, and beginning July 1 this year, their employment in the region will be completely banned. Meanwhile, police conduct regular raids. In 2024, as a result of these raids, 2,217 people classified as illegal migrants were expelled from Russia, compared to only 900 the year before.
This trend is evident not only in other southern regions but across the country: bans on certain industries for migrants, frequent raids and deportations, revocation of citizenship even for minor infractions — such as missing a military registration deadline by three days — and pressure to enlist for the war against Ukraine.
The tightening of controls began after the terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall near Moscow, carried out by citizens of Tajikistan, and against the background of the resulting surge in xenophobic sentiment. But two factors cast doubt on the rationale behind these policies. First, while the restrictions concerning the sojourn of foreigners in Russia are various and rigid, no limits have been introduced — or even planned — on their entry. Second, all of this is happening against the backdrop of a severe labor shortage across sectors. In essence, these measures are fostering a growing “army” of illegal migrants who are completely disenfranchised even in comparison with the previous years. Predictably, this will lead not only to rising crime among migrants but also to religious radicalization — meaning the authorities are effectively fueling the very threats they claim to be combating. However, they also gain additional manpower for war mobilization, access to slave labor (including in military production), and a scapegoat for channeling public discontent.
Brawls and politics
Conflicts with ethnic overtones in the southern regions almost always begin as domestics, but their escalation or media attention inevitably leads to their “ideologization”. Here are a few examples.
Last July, the media reported that in the Kuban town of Korenovsk, members of the Kurdish diaspora beat up activists of the Russian Community and another nationalist movement, Northern Man, in a mass brawl following an argument over loud music. The next evening, several dozen local residents marched in Korenovsk with slogans such as “Russians, forward” and “Glory to Russia”. The police did not intervene in the unauthorized rally. Later, it emerged that only one young man of Kurdish descent was involved in the incident (a criminal case was opened against him) and while he did behave aggressively, he was not the instigator of the conflict.
In August, in the Volgograd town of Ilovlya, a member of the Roma community had a fight with a neighbor and attacked him — the victim turned out to be a coordinator of the Russian Community. The attacker was detained, but a few days later, local residents held a public gathering, where they accused the authorities of handing out land for the construction of “Roma houses” and demanded an end to the “impunity” of the Roma. The head of the Russian Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, then instructed authorities to report on the investigation into what he described as an attack by a “group of men” (in fact, there was only one attacker). Two days later, the heads of local Roma families recorded a video message in which they apologized. In October, a new conflict occurred: three Roma men assaulted a police officer, and a criminal case was opened. In November, a local initiative group from Ilovlinsky District demanded the resignation of the head of the district administration, who is currently on trial in a case unrelated to the conflict with Roma.
In September, a mass brawl took place in the Kuban village of Afipsky. The incident began as an argument over a girl, but according to local residents, the underlying reason was “the behavior of migrants”, who were said to “harass everyone and create debauchery.” Media reports identified the people involved as Cheches working at the Afipsky oil refinery. 54 participants in the brawl were detained, including, according to unconfirmed reports, the ataman of the local Cossack community who is also a member of the Russian Community. Twelve individuals — one local resident and eleven migrants — were sentenced to administrative arrest, and a criminal case was opened against one ethnic Chechen.
Around the same time, another brawl broke out in Anapa, also reportedly involving Chechens and also triggered by a dispute over a girl. Three locals — two young men and a woman — were severely beaten outside a local night club. Five Chechens, including a “volunteer” assisting war efforts in Ukraine, were detained on charges of hooliganism However, a week later, Apti Alaudinov, commander of the Chechen military unit “Akhmat”, stepped in to publicly defend them, blaming the victims for provoking the conflict and accusing law enforcement of “deliberate persecution on ethnic grounds” and showing “signs of working for the enemy”. Soon after, one of the victims declared that he had no complaints against the detainees, and eventually the criminal case ended with a “reconciliation of the parties”.
These and similar incidents — of which there are dozens — make it possible to identify the main institutional actors involved in most of them.
Actors
The “Russian Community” is a network of pro-government nationalist groups operating throughout the country. It rose to prominence only after the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine. Despite its broad reach — about 140 local branches as of last summer, more than 1.2 million YouTube subscribers, and around 650,000 Telegram followers — and that’s not counting regional and local public pages — it is unclear whether the Russian Community has a centralized structure and leadership or functions more like a franchise, with relatively autonomous activist groups operating under a shared recognizable brand and with support from Moscow. There is also no reliable information about the scale or sources of its funding. One thing is certain: the organization cannot operate without the full control and approval of the security services and works closely with siloviki (security forces).
The Russian Community is absolutely and demonstratively loyal to the authorities, fully and actively supporting the war in Ukraine and its participants. It distances itself from the image of the neo-Nazis and skinheads of the 2000s and 2010s; instead of nods to Nazi Germany, it emphasizes the “Russian world,” official Orthodoxy, and “traditional values”. Until recently, the group had refrained[6] from open violence — such as attacks, beatings, or killings — but it takes part in raids against migrants and forces alleged “wrongdoers” to record video apologies, on very questionable grounds. Its activities are not confined to nationalist issues: the Russian Community also actively targets those whom it — along with the regime — considers “internal enemies” and part of the “fifth column.” It also operates as a social network and club through local public pages and a mobile app.
Notably, in the sphere of ethnic conflict, the Russian Community has largely displaced other similar actors, including — somewhat surprisingly — the Cossacks, who are numerous in the southern regions and very generously funded. Human rights activists believe that the group has become “a kind of aggregator of vigilante services provided to the police, only with a strong flavor of nationalism.”
In recent years, the Russian Investigative Committee and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, have effectively turned into a “ministry of xenophobia.” The department intervenes in even the smallest conflict involving migrants or simply “non-Russians,” issuing orders to probe or initiate criminal proceedings not only against those directly involved but even, in some cases, against police officers who detained activists of the Russian Community at unauthorized rallies, for example, in the town of Bataysk in Rostov Oblast. In public remarks, Bastrykin often cites inaccurate statistics on migrant crime, calls for banning the niqab, and reacts swiftly to reports from the Russian Community.
Only the Chechen authorities openly express disapproval of actions taken by security forces and nationalist groups — to the point that in October, the head of the republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, publicly defended migrants. Kadyrov also sharply criticized Bastrykin over a criminal case involving a Chechen teenager in Moscow and even engaged in a public dispute with him about niqabs.
That same month, Chechen ombudsman Mansur Soltayev released a video message asking prosecutors and law enforcement to investigate the activities of the Russian Community. This followed the publication of a video allegedly recorded in Volgograd Oblast, in which vigilantes were seen stopping a driver from Kabardino-Balkaria for inspection. A few days later, Chechen military commander Apti Alaudinov commented on Soltayev’s statement, expressing hope, that supervisors from the FSB and Kremlin would “gradually bring [the Russian Community] into proper order.”
This carefully measured recalcitrance by Chechen leaders is undoubtedly caused both by their claim to leadership among Muslims and, in a separate move, by what can be described as a claim of “proprietary rights” over all Chechens, wherever they may live. According to Kadyrov and his cronies, all matters involving Chechens must be decided in Chechnya.
The Russian regime deliberately fosters nationalist and especially anti-migrant sentiments among the population — the very logic of the “Russian world” ideology demands it. Moreover, doing so is easier and cheaper than actually addressing ethnic crime and — especially — dismantling Islamist terrorist cells, as well as conducting meaningful social work among migrants and marginalized national minorities, particularly the Roma. The Kremlin seems confident in its ability to keep vigilante groups such like the Russian Community under control and, if needed, to use them for suppressing protests — unlikely now but possible in the future if economic problems worsen. So far, this confidence appears justified, but the policy of “controlled destabilization” carries serious risks if overall control is lost.
[1] The vote for these amendments — widely referred to as the “tree-stump vote” — was deemed illegal by experts, and the results are considered to have been rigged.
[2] However, in recent months, xenophobia researchers have also noted the activization of the neo-Nazi groups.
[3] In this text, “southern regions” refer to Krasnodar Krai, Rostov, Volgograd and Astrakhan Oblasts, as well as Adygea, given that ethnic Russians constitute the majority of the republic’s population. Stavropol Krai is also included, despite being administratively part of the North Caucasus Federal District. We will also disregard the Ukrainian origin of a significant portion of the indigenous population of Kuban, as this self-identification was effectively erased through the Russification policies implemented by the Russian Empire and later by the Soviet Union.
[4] Adygs, Circassians, Shapsugs and Kabardins consider themselves to be one nation, artificially divided by the Soviet authorities. “Circassians” is an exo-ethnonym widely used internationally, while “Adyge” is an endo-ethnonym.
[5] This is a very small number for such a vast region with a population of 5.8 million. The actual figure is likely grossly underestimated.
[6] That line was crossed in early May in the town of Vsevolozhsk in the Leningrad Oblast, where an attack resulted in a man’s death.
PSCRP team