PSCRP-BESA Reports No 95 (Oct 31, 2024)
For the past two decades, the European Union has actively pursued influence in the post-Soviet region. France, attempting to align countries like Georgia with Western political and economic frameworks, plays a prominent role in this trend.
Since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Tbilisi has sought closer ties with the EU and NATO. This period represented a critical opportunity for France, among some other the EU members, to consolidate its influence, especially as Georgia had publicly expressed aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration. However, the EU’s response has been marked by indecision and limited support, often stopping short of the robust backing necessary to strengthen Georgia’s position vis-à-vis Russia. Instead, Georgia was kept at arm’s length, while had been offered rather symbolic support, lacking the decisive action that could have solidified Georgia’s path towards European integration. Even recent moves towards Georgia’s membership have been overshadowed by critiques from European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron, regarding Georgia’s legislative direction, signaling ambivalence rather than solidarity.
The internal political dynamics in Georgia further illustrate the challenges of Western intervention. The recent parliamentary elections, where the ruling “Georgian Dream” party of Bidzina Ivanishvili—a businessman with obvious and open ties to Russia—won a majority (however, challenged by the opposition, which accused GD of stealing elections), highlighted a political struggle between pro-European and pro-Russian camps. Ivanishvili, former Georgian Prime-Minister widely viewed as a Kremlin-friendly figure, capitalized on a key issue for Georgians: the threat of a destructive confrontation with Russia. Macron’s public encouragement for Georgia to “return to the European path” ahead of the elections was perceived by official Tbilisi and the GD supporters as undue interference, alienating Georgian voters who prioritized peace over escalating tensions with Russia. For many Georgians, Macron’s remarks suggested a provocation rather than genuine support, ultimately casting the West as a destabilizing influence rather than a reliable ally.
This critique was also focused on the opponent of Ivanishvili and informal opposition leader, the Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili. She was born in France, and kept its citizenship till 2018 when she had to renounce it due to Georgian law that requires a president to hold only Georgian citizenship, and since the 1970s had been working in the French Foreign Ministry for 30 years.
Three weeks before the election day, the French President met with Salome Zurabishvili. Following their meeting at the Élysée Palace, the French diplomatic service issued a statement noting that Macron expressed regret over the adoption of certain laws in Georgia that had moved the country away from the European path. This referred to the “foreign agents” law in Georgia. Passed in 2023, the law required that all organizations receiving more than 20% of their funding from abroad register as “foreign agents” and disclose detailed reports on their activities. President Zourabichvili vetoed the bill (influenced by the mass protests in Georgia against “Russian law”), but Parliament subsequently overrode her decision with a further vote. The Speaker of the Georgian Parliament signed the bill into law on June 3, 2024, and it took effect in early August. The EU expressed concern, stating that the legislation conflicts with core EU principles and values and would “negatively impact Georgia’s EU path.” At the European Council meeting in June 2024, EU leaders indicated that Georgia’s candidacy for EU membership was on hold unless the government adjusted its approach. EU military assistance to Georgia has been suspended, and broader EU financial support is under review. Additionally, Germany and France have announced the suspension of their bilateral aid to the country.
In a strategic move to address voter sentiment just days before the election, Bidzina Ivanishvili, leader of the ruling Georgian Dream party, gave an interview to the popular Georgian broadcaster Imedi In this interview, Ivanishvili made a striking claim: he stated that a leader from a Western nation had previously suggested to former Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili (who served from 2021 to 2024) that Georgia should engage in a military conflict with Russia. In recounting the interaction, Ivanishvili explained that Garibashvili asked the Western official how long Georgia could realistically withstand a renewed war with Russia, recalling the 2008 conflict in which Georgia had relied heavily on anticipated Western support. The Western leader allegedly estimated Georgia could hold out for “three to four days.” When Garibashvili questioned whether a brief confrontation justified such potential devastation, the response, as conveyed by Ivanishvili, was blunt: “You are three million; they can’t kill all of you in three to four days. Then you could move to guerrilla warfare in the forests, and we will support you”.
Although Ivanishvili refrained from naming the Western official or their country, many Georgians inferred that the description fit the style of French diplomacy under President Emmanuel Macron. Ivanishvili’s narrative, whether it was correct or not, thus resonated deeply with a few of the Georgian voters, framing the opposition’s pro-Western stance as perilously naïve. This message underscored Ivanishvili’s broader campaign theme: a vote for Georgian Dream was a “vote for stability and peace”, while the opposition’s alignment with certain Western influences, “advocating confrontation and threatened national security“.
Ivanishvili secured victory by framing the election as a stark choice: either support his Georgian Dream party or risk a war with Russia. Throughout the campaign, Georgian Dream repeatedly accused Paris, Washington, and Brussels—referred to as the “Party of Global War”—of pushing for a “second front” against Russia at Georgia’s expense. According to this logic (in fact, accepted by not few of Georgian citizens), the West, especially NATO and the EU, seems inclined to leverage regional disputes as a means to counterbalance Russian influence, even at the risk of intensifying local conflicts.
Georgia has faced implicit expectations from Western powers to adopt a confrontational stance towards Russia, despite its limited military capacity compared to the Kremlin. Ivanishvili’s remarks on Western proposals to provoke conflict with Russia underscore the lack of strategic depth in these policies. Rather than offering substantial support, the West’s encouragement of a more adversarial approach appears reckless and disconnected from the realities of Georgia’s military limitations and the immense human costs involved.
In this context, it is crucial to note that France’s policy in the South Caucasus appears to rely on destabilization to assert influence. Macron’s approach in the region extends beyond Georgia and reflects a consistent pattern that has fueled tensions. French support for Armenia, which often aligns with domestic and diaspora-driven interests, has led to strained relations with Azerbaijan, a secular, Muslim-majority nation essential to Europe’s energy security. Macron’s public statements, alongside symbolic gestures that challenge Azerbaijan’s sovereignty—particularly by supporting Armenian revanchist sentiments regarding the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region—have demonstrated a focus on short-term political gains rather than fostering stable, mutually beneficial alliances.
One contributing factor to the rising tensions in the region is the extensive arms shipments from France to Armenia, even as Armenia and Azerbaijan near the final stages of a peace agreement. This military support risks intensifying regional friction and complicating efforts for a lasting peace, as it could embolden Armenian hardliners to pursue confrontational goals rather than diplomatic solutions. This approach highlights France’s prioritization of geopolitical influence over stability in the South Caucasus, adding layers of complexity to the peace process between Yerevan and Baku.
Following a recent meeting at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have taken notable steps towards a peace agreement, directing their foreign ministers to expedite negotiations on an “Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations.” Central to these discussions is the issue of border delimitation, as both Armenia and Azerbaijan retain control over territories each claims. The complexities surrounding these territorial disputes continue to impede progress, and talks on opening regional transportation links have reportedly been postponed. Nevertheless, Pashinyan indicated that around 90 percent of the peace terms have been agreed upon, marking substantial progress despite ongoing challenges.
In Kazan, Pashinyan urged Azerbaijan to finalize and sign the current version of the agreement, suggesting that any unresolved points could be addressed post-signature. This pragmatic approach aims to secure an immediate foundation for peace, enabling both countries to shift focus toward economic and political stabilization while working out lingering issues later. However, with both nations wary of territorial compromises and regional interests at play, the pressure on Baku and Yerevan to adopt a long-term, stable framework remains significant. The outcomes of these accelerated negotiations will be pivotal for South Caucasus stability, given the broader regional dynamics involving key players such as Russia and the European Union.
It is crucial to highlight that last week, the Speaker of the Armenian National Assembly, Alen Simonyan, acknowledged from the parliamentary podium that “the fact remains: the territory of Karabakh, which we are discussing, has been and is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.” Simonyan emphasized that Azerbaijan conducted its operation in Karabakh with “at least three to four UN Security Council resolutions” supporting its actions. This statement underscores a significant shift in Armenia’s official stance, acknowledging the international framework that recognizes Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory.
At the same time, the topic of Karabakh remains one of the key issues in France’s regional rhetoric. So, it is a question, whether reconciliation between Yerevan and Baku still is a part of Paris’s plans.
PSCRP team