PSCRP-BESA Reports No 133 (May 23, 2025)
by Anna Ayvazyan
The overall situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan has undergone substantial changes in recent years. Both are engaged in peace negotiations that involve numerous difficult decisions on both sides – from border demarcation to the future of regional infrastructure projects such as the Zangezur Corridor. In 2024, Nagorno-Karabakh (unrecognized Armenian enclave on Azerbaijani territory) underwent significant geopolitical shifts following the 2020 war and the exodus of the Armenian population from this territory. In September 2023, after a brief military operation by Azerbaijan, the de facto separatist authorities in Stepanakert capitulated. In the days that followed, over 100,000 Armenians—virtually the entire population—fled to Armenia, citing security concerns, fears of ethnic persecution, and the absence of guarantees for their rights and identity under reinstated Azerbaijani control. On January 1, 2024, the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh officially dissolved, leading to the full integration of Karabakh back into Azerbaijan.
On April 19, 2024, Armenia agreed to return four abandoned border villages—Baganis Ayrum, Asagi Askipara, Xeyrimli, and Qizilhacili—to Azerbaijan as an initial step in border delimitation. This decision was reached during the eighth round of talks between Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigorian and Azerbaijani counterpart Shahin Mustafayev. The agreement aims to align borders with those established during the Soviet Union’s dissolution (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia 2024). While Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian supports the move for sovereignty and independence, opposition groups criticize it as a unilateral concession that may jeopardize Armenia’s security.
The “Tavush for the Homeland” movement emerged soon after the Armenian Prime Minister announced the decision, initiated by residents of Armenia’s Tavush region who oppose the government’s move to unilaterally cede border territories to Azerbaijan. Led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, the movement argues that such territorial changes violate Armenia’s constitution, which requires any alterations to be approved through a national referendum. They contend that the ongoing border demarcation lacks legal standing and was agreed upon under coercion from Azerbaijan.
Subsequently, in June 2024, Russian peacekeeping forces, stationed in the region since the 2020 ceasefire, completed their withdrawal from Karabakh. Throughout the year, Azerbaijan launched massive infrastructure projects in the region, including renewable energy developments such as solar parks and wind farms. These initiatives were highlighted during the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), hosted by Azerbaijan in November.
By the end of 2024, Armenia and Azerbaijan have made alleged progress toward a peace agreement. This included discussions on constitutional amendments in Armenia to address Azerbaijani concerns and the potential establishment of new transportation corridors to enhance regional connectivity. On 18 March 2024, the EU welcomed the successful conclusion of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the full text of the draft Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relation (European Parliament 2025). Nevertheless, the extent to which the agreements reached truly constitute progress in the negotiations—remains largely unclear.
In recent years, there have been growing assertions in the academic literature about “the end of the near abroad” for Russia—suggesting that the notion of Russia holding a special status in much of the post-Soviet space has come to an end. In his 2024 article “The End of the Near Abroad”, de Waal argues that Russia’s war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the post-Soviet region. The concept of the “near abroad”—which implied Russia’s privileged influence over its neighbors—has significantly eroded. Indeed, in recent years, we have seen several clear signs of this shift. Most often, this refers to the signals that political leaders send outward, indicating their disagreement with Russia’s policies toward their countries.
On 24 October 2023, Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Sergey Kopyrkin to deliver a formal note of protest. The protest concerned a television program aired on Russia’s First Channel on 23 October, which, according to the Armenian side, contained offensive and entirely unacceptable remarks directed at senior officials of the Republic of Armenia. The broadcast featured harsh criticism of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, accusing him of pursuing an “anti-Russian” foreign policy, and portrayed Pashinyan, along with several government officials and civil society activists, as “puppets of George Soros.” The program, titled “Nikol Pashinyan: Harbinger of Trouble,” opened with the host claiming that Pashinyan “has gone too far” and “has steamrolled his country under the United States’ agenda and surrendered the country into the EU’s grip”). In the discussion, the invited speakers spoke about Pashinyan’s alleged attempts to stage a Maidan-style uprising in Armenia and his consultations with the U.S. Embassy, drawing direct parallels with the political developments in Ukraine. At the same time, the broadcast did not portray a conflict between Armenians and Russians; it emphasized that Armenians are not opposed to the Russian people. Rather, it is Pashinyan who holds power, and he is described as being controlled by the West. The narrative, on the one hand, leaves room for the restoration of relations between Armenia and Russia, and on the other hand, provides Russia with a justification for possible political or even military interference.
In November 2024, Pashinyan declined to participate in the CSTO summit held in Astana, Kazakhstan. His press secretary, Nazeli Baghdasaryan, stated that Armenia’s decision to freeze its participation in CSTO activities remained unchanged. The Armenian government’s dissatisfaction with the CSTO stems from perceived inaction during conflicts involving Armenia. In February 2024, Pashinyan announced that Armenia had effectively frozen its participation in the CSTO, stating that the organization posed a threat to Armenia’s national security. At the same time, Armenia remains a member of the CSTO, and no viable alternative security arrangement currently exists in the event of a military attack on its territory. This effectively leaves Armenia in a highly disadvantaged position, constantly balancing between major powers.
External actors consistently signal to the countries of the region that their choices imply a certain irreversibility, and that security cannot be ensured independently. Nevertheless, the current state of affairs is unique in its own way, as the traditional lever of influence—Karabakh—has been lost, with its status effectively determined by one side of the conflict through military force. We can observe that both the Armenian leadership—and to an even greater extent, the Azerbaijani leadership—tend to be critical of third-party involvement and are pursuing a path shaped primarily by internal political dynamics.
In Armenia’s case, the desire to reduce dependence on Russia has led to the search for alternative partners. On March 26, 2025, the Armenian National Assembly adopted a bill to launch the country’s EU accession process. The legislation received 64 votes in favor and 7 against. This decision followed a public petition that garnered over 50,000 signatures, reflecting substantial domestic support for EU integration. In March 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution confirming that Armenia meets the criteria outlined in Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty, thereby affirming Armenia’s eligibility to apply for EU membership. The resolution also highlighted the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) as a foundation for deeper integration and potential future association with the EU.
The European Parliament’s resolution outlines several factors considered in relation to Armenia’s potential candidacy. These include Armenia’s decision to freeze its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), its efforts to reduce security dependence on the Russian Federation, and its attempts to diversify security partnerships—such as through increased military cooperation with France, Greece, and other EU Member States. The resolution also notes that Russia’s purported security guarantees to Armenia have proven to be unreliable. Additionally, Armenia has become a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The resolution further describes the events of 2024 in Karabakh as ones that “may amount to ethnic cleansing.” A portion of the resolution thus is directly based on the premise that Armenia’s application is being considered as a result of the confrontation between two larger players—the EU and Russia.
The decline in relations with Russia is not unique to Armenia. In December 2024, Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243, en route from Baku to Grozny, crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, resulting in 38 fatalities out of 67 passengers and crew. Initial reports indicated the aircraft was damaged by “external objects” before impact, leading to speculation about the cause (Trend News Agency 2025). Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev criticized Russia for attempting to “hush up” the incident and demanded accountability. In early February 2025, the Azerbaijani government issued an official notification to Russia, demanding the cessation of activities of the Russian cultural center, known as the “Russian House” (Русский дом), in Baku. Its main activities included promoting Russian culture, science, and education; strengthening the position of the Russian language; supporting compatriots; organizing youth projects; facilitating international development; and engaging in historical and memorial activities. By doing so, Azerbaijan demonstrated to Russia that it is not part of the so-called “Russian world” and seeks to be recognized as an independent player.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has consistently criticized both the OSCE Minsk Group and Russia for what he views as ineffective involvement in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. He argues that international mediation efforts—especially those led by actors he considers biased—undermine the realities on the ground. As a result, Azerbaijan had to solve the conflict itself, as none of the third parties involved could suggest any viable solution.
The current situation is notable because past Western and Russian diplomatic engagement focused largely on Karabakh, preventing direct bilateral dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia’s waning influence has opened the door for other regional actors, particularly Iran and Turkey, each pursuing their own strategic interests. Tehran is especially alarmed by Ankara’s support for the proposed Zangezur Corridor, which would bypass Iran and create a direct link between Turkey and Central Asia via Armenia and Azerbaijan. This project threatens to undermine two key Iranian geopolitical advantages: its exclusive role in facilitating access between Nakhchivan and Baku, and its direct land connection to Armenia.
The circumstances described have raised concerns within the research community about potential Russian efforts to reassert its influence in the region—whether through political, economic, or military means. Regardless of whether regional countries distance themselves from one major power or another, they remain engaged in a delicate balancing act that will ultimately shape their trajectory. However, rising tensions among global powers increase the risk of this balance being disrupted.
Anna Ayvazyan holds PhD degree in Political Sciences, her area of expertise is the EU foreign policy in the South Caucasus region, Eastern Partnership program, democracy and conflict resolution. She is currently based in Yerevan, Armenia