The U.S.-Israel Alliance is Stronger than Ever and More Divided than Ever
Summer 2026
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The U.S.-Israel alliance remains exceptionally strong militarily but is becoming increasingly contested politically. Recent conflicts with Iran have produced unprecedented operational integration, including direct U.S. participation, missile defense support, intelligence sharing, and deeper coordination through CENTCOM, reinforcing Israel’s central role in U.S. regional defense policy. At the same time, strategic disagreements between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu over Iran and Lebanon show that strong security support does not guarantee policy alignment. This divergence is increasingly reflected in American politics, where public opinion has grown more critical of Israel, Democratic lawmakers are more willing to challenge arms sales and military assistance, and even traditionally pro-Israel Democrats are distinguishing support for Israel from support for Netanyahu’s policies. Republicans, by contrast, remain broadly supportive, and no major legislation has fundamentally altered the alliance. Overall, the relationship is not collapsing but evolving, militarily more integrated than ever, yet increasingly divided over strategy, public legitimacy, and the political conditions surrounding continued U.S. support.
The U.S.-Israel relationship is often called one of the closest alliances in the world. In many ways, that remains true. The recent war with Iran demonstrated a level of military coordination between the two countries that far exceeded previous levels. Yet tensions between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu, shifting public opinion, and growing debate in Congress show the relationship is both highly integrated and increasingly contested. The central question is whether these tensions have weakened American support for Israel in a meaningful political way. The answer is mixed. Militarily, the relationship is more integrated than ever. At the presidential level, Trump and Netanyahu have clashed over Iran and Lebanon, and public opinion has grown more critical of Israel. In Congress, Democratic support for Israel has waned, while Republican support has largely remained steady.
The U.S.-Israel defense relationship has long rested on Israel maintaining a “Qualitative Military Edge,” or QME, which under U.S. law ensures Israel’s ability to “counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat” while sustaining minimal casualties and possessing superior military capabilities. QME matters because it shows that support for Israel is built into the structure of U.S. defense policy, not just political rhetoric. In 2021, when Israel moved from the U.S. military’s European Command to the Central Command (CENTCOM), following the Abraham Accords, this placed Israel inside the American regional military framework alongside Arab states in the Middle East. This created an opportunity for coordination on shared threats such as Iran and its proxies, later enabling integration during the war with Iran.
The clearest sign of deeper military integration came during the recent conflict with Iran. Previously, U.S. security support for Israel rested on arms sales, missile defense funding, and intelligence sharing. During the 2026 war, it rose to a new level. Operation Midnight Hammer in June of 2025 and CENTCOM’S launch of Operation Epic Fury in February of 2026 marked even deeper involvement. In Epic Fury’s joint military operation, Iranian targets, including command facilities, air defenses, and missile launch sites, were struck. No longer on the outside, American forces were now directly involved with Israel in the campaign against Iran. A June Wall Street Journal report describes how the coordination involved Israeli military personnel sitting in U.S. operations rooms, U.S. tankers positioned at Israeli sites, and frequent U.S. Air Force refueling of Israeli fighter jets. A May Washington Post report found the U.S. fired more than 200 THAAD interceptors and more than 100 SM-3 and SM-6 naval interceptors to defend Israel from Iranian strikes, but Israel reportedly used fewer of its own Arrow and David’s Sling defense systems.
For Israel, this level of coordination and support is a major advantage, especially in a direct conflict with Iran. However, cooperation can also create tension. Another Washington Post report noted that heavy U.S. support for Israel’s defense could affect American readiness elsewhere, especially in Asia. The war also carries major budget costs. The Associated Press reported that the White House requested $87.6 billion from Congress, primarily to replenish costs incurred during the war, making the war’s costs now part of American budget politics.
The 2015 Iran nuclear deal and the clash between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu set an important precedent. In March 2015, Netanyahu addressed Congress against the Obama administration’s impending nuclear agreement with Iran, warning that it would “pave Iran’s path to the bomb.” This speech was highly controversial. Many Democrats viewed it as an effort to undermine President Obama’s foreign policy, causing a highly visible rift between Netanyahu and Obama. Clearly, U.S.-Israeli tension over Iran is not new. However, the military relationship has become stronger even as the American political environment has grown less comfortable with Israel.
The clearest example of this tension is the Trump-Netanyahu relationship. Though President Trump has supported Israel during his two terms, recent friction over diplomacy with Iran and Lebanon shows how a pro-Israel president may still restrain Israel when its actions conflict with American goals. The Wall Street Journal reported that Netanyahu encouraged Trump to restart attacks on Iran rather than rush into a deal, but Trump chose diplomacy instead, growing tired of repeated Israeli pushes for additional military action. He even asked the Prime Minister in a phone call, “Why are you blowing up buildings?” This captures the strategic divide: Israel organizes its core security threats around the Iranian nuclear issue, Iranian proxies, and Iran’s long-range missiles. For the United States, Iran is one issue on a global scale that includes China, Russia, energy markets, and domestic pressure to avoid another prolonged war. This view is reflected in the 2026 National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on items such as “homeland defense” and “deterring China in the Indo-Pacific.”
These differing priorities create considerable tension over Israeli strikes in Beirut. Following an Israeli strike on June 14, Trump angrily said that Netanyahu had “no f**king judgment,” and that the IDF should not be operating in Lebanon while the U.S. negotiated with Iran. Trump reaffirmed his belief in Israel’s “right to defend itself against threats” but criticized Israel for acting at a moment when the U.S. was attempting to reach an agreement. The Lebanon issue has only become more central since. On June 24, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said troops would not withdraw from southern Lebanon, “even if there is an American demand,” underscoring how Lebanon had become part of the Washington-Jerusalem strategic disagreement.
Trump has made it clear he views diplomacy with Iran as a unilateral American decision. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said Netanyahu “won’t have any choice” but to accept whatever agreement Washington would reach with Iran, adding “I call the shots.” That statement captures the broader tension in the relationship: even strong U.S. support for Israel comes with an expectation that Israeli policy will align with American strategic priorities.
Comments from Vice President J.D. Vance reveal that this tension is not limited to Trump and Netanyahu personally. Vance criticized an Israeli “freakout” over the Iran deal, pushed back against Israeli ministers who urged Netanyahu to disregard it, and warned that Israel cannot “just kill your way out of every national security problem.” He reminded Israeli officials that two-thirds of the weapons used to defend Israel during the war were “built by American hands and paid for by American tax dollars.” His comments, though harsh, reflected a broader administration message: Washington remains committed to Israel’s security but will not let Israeli policy derail American strategy.
American public opinion adds another layer of complexity to the relationship. While the two governments have become more aligned militarily, the American public is increasingly divided over Israel. In June 2026, the Pew Research Center found that 60% of Americans had an unfavorable view of Israel, which was up seven points since 2025, and as high as 83% among those on the ideological left. A February 2026 Gallup poll found that 41% of Americans sympathized more with Palestinians versus 36% who sympathized more with Israelis, the first time in Gallup’s 25 years of polling that Israel was not favored. Many Americans also question whether continued military coordination with Israel serves U.S. interests, particularly amid the war with Iran. A June 2026 Quinnipiac poll found that 60% of voters thought military action against Iran was not worth it, and nearly half thought the U.S. was too supportive of Israel, a figure Quinnipiac described as a “new high.” For many Americans, skepticism expands beyond the war to a broader questioning of the alliance with Israel. An Institute for Global Affairs report found that 45% of Americans say the relationship hurts U.S. interests more than it helps. These polls show a widening gap between official policy and public opinion. As military coordination reaches new levels, public support is deteriorating.
In Congress, a clear example of shifting political support comes from the Democratic Party when in April 2026, when Senator Bernie Sanders introduced resolutions to block the sale of bulldozers and weapons to Israel. Though the resolutions failed, the vote totals were striking. 40 out of 47 Democratic Senators voted for at least one resolution to block a $295 million bulldozer sale, while 36 Democrats backed another resolution to block a $152 million sale of bombs. Sanders called this evidence that “more than 80% of the Democratic caucus stood with American people and voted to block U.S. military aid to Netanyahu and his horrific, illegal wars.” The importance of the vote was not just the number of Democrats who supported the resolutions, it was that votes came from senators who have generally presented themselves as supporters of Israel. Adam Schiff and Alex Padilla, for example, said that they “strongly support Israel’s right to defend itself,” but argued that being a “stalwart friend of Israel” does not require agreeing with every Netanyahu policy. Similarly, Elissa Slotkin, a moderate Jewish Democrat from Michigan, called herself a strong supporter of a “Jewish and democratic State of Israel,” but that being pro-Israel does not mean supporting Netanyahu’s “agenda.” These statements illustrate how the shift among Democrats is not limited to the progressive left, like Sanders, but now includes moderate, traditionally pro-Israel lawmakers.
The shift is also seen in the debate over the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The 2027 House Version of the NDAA included a United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation provision that would “expand and accelerate bilateral defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration, and industrial cooperation.” It was introduced by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, a Republican, and Ranking Member Adam Smith, a moderate and largely pro-Israel Democrat. Though Smith initially defended the provision, he later reversed his decision and opposed it due to Israel’s conduct, showing how Democratic discomfort with Israel has reached even the party’s top defense-policy leadership.
Among Republicans, support for Israel has generally remained more stable. Some did vote against Trump on the Iran War Powers Resolution. In the House, four Republicans, Thomas Massie, Brian Fitzpatrick, Tom Barrett, and Warren Davidson joined Democrats in backing a resolution to remove U.S. forces from hostilities with Iran. In the Senate, four Republicans, Rand Paul, Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, and Bill Cassidy, backed a similar resolution. Though meaningful, these votes were not all driven by opposition to Israel. Some lawmakers represent swing districts and want to distance themselves from Trump, while others, like Rand Paul and Warren Davidson, have long been skeptical of foreign military involvement. Additionally, certain votes were influenced by personal quarrels with President Trump, such as those of Bill Cassidy, who has tensions with the president due to Trump’s backing of his primary challenger.
While most Republicans remain strongly supportive of Israel, Thomas Massie is the clearest exception. Unlike other Republicans who opposed the war with Iran, he has an openly anti-Israel basis. He was the only Republican to vote against a 2023 House resolution affirming Israel’s right to exist and has faced repeated antisemitism accusations. In May 2026, Massie lost his primary to Ed Gallrein, a Trump-backed candidate who received support from pro-Israel groups. Massie’s defeat reinforces the Republican Party’s Israel stance. While there are anti-Israel voices on the right, the majority pro-Israel structure of the party remains strong enough to push them out. Congress reflects both change and continuity. Among Democrats, there is a measurable weakening of support for Israel, especially regarding military aid. Among Republicans, support remains largely steady, despite lawmakers who oppose American foreign involvement. Still, no major anti-Israel legislation has passed, and Congress continues to support U.S.-Israel cooperation, but that support is not as automatic as it once was.
The U.S.-Israel relationship is not simply weakening; it is evolving into a more complex environment. Militarily, it may be more integrated than ever, as the war with Iran showed. At the leadership level, Trump’s disputes with Netanyahu show that support for Israel can coexist with strong disagreements over strategy. Among the American public, support has become more divided than ever. In Congress, Democrats are increasingly willing to challenge arms sales and military support, while Republicans remain largely supportive. That is the reality of the relationship today. Israel and the United States remain close allies, but they do not always define priorities the same way. While the alliance remains strong in military terms, it has become more politically contested and difficult to manage. Congress shows this most clearly, as the pro-Israel consensus has not collapsed, but it is changing, especially within the Democratic Party.
Andrew J. Lefkowitz is an undergraduate at the University of Maryland and a Summer 2026 intern at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.