PSCRP-BESA Reports No 242 (October 23, 2026)
The government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in exile was established in 2007, after Doku Umarov, the last president of Ichkeria and a supporter of Wahhabism, announced the dissolution of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the establishment of the Caucasus Emirate in its place, with Chechnya designated as the “Vilayat Nokhchicho.” This followed the final defeat of Chechen armed formations by the Russian Army. Akhmed Zakayev, who at the time served as foreign minister of the unrecognized republic, emerged as the leader of Chechen politicians who opposed this decision. The history of the Tatarstan government in exile, currently headed by Rafis Kashapov, began somewhat later, in 2008, when a congress of the Milli Mejlis public organization was held in Naberezhnye Chelny. The congress adopted a new declaration of Tatarstan’s independence and appealed to the United Nations to recognize it immediately and facilitate Tatarstan’s secession from Russia. In both cases, these were political structures associated with separatist movements with long histories. Now, in 2026, an attempt is being made to establish a similar structure advocating the secession of Udmurtia from the Russian Federation.
Unlike Chechnya and Tatarstan, Udmurtia is a republic in which the titular ethnic group constitutes a minority (28% according to the 2010 census), while ethnic Russians form the majority (62.22%). This demographic situation has shaped the activities of Udmurt separatists, turning their efforts into a kind of political experiment whose results could have considerable significance for other movements seeking the secession of nominally autonomous federal subjects from the Russian Federation, particularly those with predominantly Russian populations and Finno-Ugric titular ethnic groups: Komi, Karelia, Mordovia, and Mari El.
Udmurtia is a relatively small federal subject, covering an area of 42,000 square kilometers and having a population of just over 1.4 million. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the republic is effectively a donor region that makes an important contribution to Russia’s federal budget. In addition to agriculture and extractive industries (oil, peat, and iron ore), Udmurtia has a well-developed manufacturing sector, particularly heavy industry and defense production. It is precisely this latter factor that explains the repeated Ukrainian Armed Forces attacks on Udmurtia in recent months.
The conquest of Udmurtia by the Tsardom of Muscovy was completed in 1557. The earliest recorded instance of the forced baptism of the Udmurts, who had previously practiced their traditional ethnic religion, also dates to that year. However, an aggressive campaign of mass forced Christianization did not begin until the 1720s. In the middle of the same century, industrial development in the Udmurt region led to a marked increase in Russian migration. As a result of immigration and the Russification of the Udmurts, encouraged by Christianization, the first Soviet census in 1926 recorded Udmurts as accounting for only 53.5% of the population of the Udmurt Autonomous Oblast, compared with 43.3% ethnic Russians. Over the following decades, during both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, the same factors continued to reduce the proportion of the titular ethnic group in Udmurtia’s population and restrict the use of the Udmurt language, despite efforts undertaken in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s to halt this process.
In the early twenty-first century, the Udmurt Republic effectively lost the political agency it had briefly acquired during the 1990s. Udmurt ethnocultural organizations, particularly Udmurt Kenesh, came under the complete control of the authorities. In 2010, the Udmurt Vös (“Udmurt Prayer”) community, established in 1994 with the aim of reviving the traditional Udmurt religion, ceased its legal activities. The number of Udmurts has continued to decline from one census to the next, primarily as a result of assimilation. According to the 2010 census, 552,000 Udmurts lived in the Russian Federation, including 410,000 in the Udmurt Republic. The 2021 census recorded only 386,500 Udmurts throughout the Russian Federation, of whom just 256,000 spoke the Udmurt language.
On September 20, 2023, a group of exiled activists led by Sergei Antonov announced the establishment of the Free Udmurtia movement, openly declaring its objective to be the struggle for an independent state. Sergei Antonov (born in 1978), a lawyer and political strategist, is a former United Russia deputy in the State Council of Udmurtia (2005–2007) and a former candidate for the position of head of the Udmurt Republic in 2022. He publicly condemned Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, was forced to withdraw his candidacy, and emigrated to Spain. Nikolai Suvorov (born in 1967), the former chairman of the Khokhryaki Municipal Council in Udmurtia’s Zavyalovsky District (2008–2016), became co-chairman of the Free Udmurtia movement. Previously a member of the A Just Russia party, he actively supported Alexei Navalny and participated in the Bolotnaya Square protests. In 2016, Suvorov emigrated to the United States. Another leader of the movement is Artyom Medvedev, an Udmurt businessman and ethnic activist who has lived in Miami since 2020 and participated in the discussion platform known as the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum. The Russian authorities soon designated Free Udmurtia first as an “undesirable” organization and subsequently as a “terrorist” organization. Its leaders were labeled “foreign agents,” and criminal proceedings were initiated against them.
The Free Udmurtia movement has articulated the reasons that prompted its founders to begin their struggle for independence in a clear and concise statement published on its official website, which, apart from an Udmurt greeting, is entirely in Russian:
“Our republic has everything it needs to prosper: abundant natural resources, a strong industrial base, fertile land, and a distinctive culture. Yet instead of development, what we see in our republic is the disappearance of villages, poverty, the deterioration of healthcare, and a mass exodus of young people. Seventy-eight percent of all taxes collected in Udmurtia go to the federal budget. The republic is governed by officials appointed by Moscow who are not accountable to its residents. Increasingly, we see the consequences of this policy: crumbling roads, leaking pipes, closed hospitals, and the deaths of our fellow citizens in a war of aggression. But things could be different. Independence would give the people of Udmurtia genuine power over their own land, restore the republic’s stolen property, and provide control over its natural resources. Above all, it would give them the right to live with dignity and develop, rather than subsidize Moscow and obey the orders of a deranged dictator.”
As the legal basis for Udmurtia’s right to independence, the movement cites the Declaration of Sovereignty adopted by the Supreme Council of the Udmurt Republic on September 20, 1990. According to the movement’s activists, this declaration constituted an exercise of the Udmurt people’s right to self-determination. However, “Moscow brutally trampled upon the adopted document, depriving our people of the right to determine their own destiny. Udmurtia found itself in the position of a colony governed from outside.”
Given the predominance of the non-Udmurt population in Udmurtia, the movement’s messaging emphasizes economic rather than ethnic factors as the principal justification for its struggle for independence. Ethnolinguistic issues receive only secondary, if not tertiary, attention. At the same time, the Udmurt language and culture serve as defining symbols distinguishing Udmurtia from Russia. Significantly, when listing the ethnic groups living in Udmurtia, the movement’s official website places the Udmurts first and the Russians only second, even though ethnic Russians currently outnumber Udmurts in the republic. In a 40-minute video published on the website, titled “We Have Oil, but We Live in Poverty,” Sergei Antonov provides a detailed analysis, in Russian, of the situation in which Moscow systematically extracts financial and human resources from Udmurtia, a republic governed by Moscow-appointed officials. Meanwhile, the brief speeches by Nikolai Suvorov and Artyom Medvedev are delivered predominantly in Udmurt, with Russian subtitles.
Thus, the Free Udmurtia movement fully appropriates the Udmurt ethnic narrative while avoiding even the slightest suggestion of interethnic conflict within Udmurtia itself. Moscow is identified as the adversary against which the struggle must be directed. The fact that Udmurtia possesses not only a regional identity but also a distinct ethnic identity is used to substantiate its claim to political agency. At the same time, the movement presents Estonia, a country ethnically related to the Udmurts and comparable in population size, as a model for Udmurtia’s residents. Having freed itself from Moscow’s rule, Estonia became a successful European state.
The underlying logic of this argument is as follows: Estonians are ethnically related to Udmurts; Udmurtia can become like Estonia; and Udmurt ethnicity, currently perceived as an unprestigious, “rural” identity, could become a gateway to Europe, with its corresponding standards of living and civil liberties. Without the Udmurts and the Udmurt language, Udmurtia would be little more than another provincial region of Russia. Given that a substantial proportion of Udmurtia’s residents who identified themselves as Russians in population censuses have Udmurt ethnic roots, this approach may ultimately prove effective.
As early as December 2023, the Free Udmurtia movement established the Albert Razin National Prize. Its declared objectives included “supporting and enhancing the prestige of significant public and professional initiatives aimed at preserving the Udmurt language and culture by recognizing best practices and their authors,” as well as “supporting measures, methods, and individuals engaged in promoting and popularizing Udmurt culture, customs, traditions, music, video content, and literature among Udmurtia’s Russian-speaking population.”
Dr. Albert Razin, an activist in the Udmurt national and neopagan movements, set himself on fire outside the State Council building of the Udmurt Republic on September 10, 2019, in protest against the adoption of legislation making the study of minority national languages voluntary, a measure that encouraged a decline in the number of Udmurt speakers. He held a placard bearing the words of the Avar poet Rasul Gamzatov: “And if my language disappears tomorrow, I am ready to die today!”
In December 2025, the Free Udmurtia movement signed a cooperation agreement with the government of Tatarstan in exile. This development is significant because Udmurtia shares a direct border with Tatarstan, Tatars constitute the third-largest ethnic group in Udmurtia after Russians and Udmurts, and Udmurts are the fourth-largest ethnic group in Tatarstan, after Tatars, Russians, and Chuvash.
In the movement’s publications, the head of Udmurtia, Alexander Brechalov, was portrayed as the embodiment of Moscow’s colonial exploitation of the republic. An ethnic Russian born outside Udmurtia, Brechalov was appointed to the position by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2017, following the dismissal of Alexander Solovyov, an ethnic Udmurt who had headed the republic since 2014 and was removed on the grounds of “loss of confidence of the President of the Russian Federation.” Whether coincidentally or not, amid intensifying criticism of Brechalov by the Free Udmurtia movement, he was dismissed from office on July 20, 2026. Olga Abramova, an ethnic Udmurt who had served as an adviser to the Russian Minister of Agriculture since 2024, was appointed acting head of the Udmurt Republic.
In 2026, the Free Udmurtia movement proposed convening a “Council of Representatives of the Peoples of the Udmurt Republic.” The establishment of an organizing committee to oversee elections to the Council was announced. The committee included public figures, most of whom had no direct connection to Udmurtia. Andrei Grigoryev, publisher of the Russian émigré magazine Vskhody and a former Radio Liberty employee, was appointed chairman of the organizing committee. Its other members included Alexander Sabatarov, the former chairman of the Motorists of Udmurtia organization, now residing in New York; Rafis Kashapov, chairman of the government of independent Tatarstan in exile; Dmitry Ushatsky, coordinator of the Free Russia Forum’s representative office in Poland; and Konstantin Kachalov, press secretary of the European representative office of the Don Republican Movement.
The organizing committee’s appeal inviting candidates to stand for election stated, in particular:
“Today, more than ever, Udmurtia needs leaders — people capable of inspiring others, making responsible decisions, and openly opposing Putin’s fascist dictatorship. People who have the courage not only to speak about the need for change but also to assume responsibility for the republic’s future.
“One of the most important objectives of establishing the Council of Representatives is to identify and unite such people: representatives of the constructive forces of Udmurtia’s civil society who are prepared to act together, defend the republic’s interests, and participate in building its democratic institutions. We invite everyone who has ties to Udmurtia, shares democratic values, and supports the republic’s right to freedom, self-determination, and state independence to put forward their candidacies.
“Under the election regulations, candidates must be at least 21 years old and have a connection to Udmurtia on at least one of the following grounds: they were born in the republic, currently reside or previously resided in Udmurtia, or have Udmurt ancestry.”
Information about candidates registered to participate in these elections was published on social media, particularly on the movement’s Facebook page. The initial application deadline was August 20, but it was subsequently extended to September 5. All texts were published in Russian, except for the slogan “Udmurtia eriko shaer” (“Udmurtia is a free country”). Ultimately, ten candidates were registered: Valery Alexeyev, Sergei Antonov, Anatoly Babkin, Roman Basenko, Eduard Gorshkov, Pavel Ivannikov, Ilya Makarov, Artyom Medvedev, Nikolai Suvorov, and Olga Chernenko. Two of them, Valery Alexeyev and Olga Chernenko, are ethnic Udmurts from outside the Udmurt Republic. Another, Pavel Ivannikov, lived in Udmurtia for a period during his childhood, “maintains close ties with it and considers it his second homeland.” The remaining candidates are natives of Udmurtia of various ethnic backgrounds who have spent most of their lives there.
Voting was conducted electronically using OpaVote, an independent American online voting platform. The cost of its services was covered through donations solicited via social media. September 20, 2026, the 36th anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Udmurt Republic, was officially designated as the main election day, although early voting had already begun on September 6.
A total of 1,026 people participated in the elections, and all ten candidates were elected. They formed the Council of Representatives, which presents itself as a representative body of Udmurtia’s civil society. According to its stated mission, “it must become the voice of a free Udmurtia and prepare the democratic transition from war, dictatorship, and imperial subjugation to peace, democracy, freedom, and independence for the Udmurt Republic.”
The Free Udmurtia movement itself, together with the elections it organized to establish a representative body in exile, demonstrates a fundamentally new model within the Russian political context: an active, well-organized movement seeking the secession from Russia of a federal subject in which the assimilation of the titular indigenous ethnic group has progressed very far and nominally ethnic Russians constitute the majority of the population.
At the same time, ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking politicians form the core of this movement. They place primary emphasis on the region’s economic problems resulting from its subordination to Moscow, while using its unique historical, cultural, and linguistic heritage as a symbol justifying its right to independence. It can be expected that this model of a liberation movement will spread, since similar conditions exist in many other federal subjects of the Russian Federation.