PSCRP-BESA Reports No 107 (Dec 28, 2024)
From the first days of the Russian full-scale invasion into Ukraine in February 2022, there were confusions, misunderstandings, and fears spread within the Russian-speaking Jewish (RSJ) community in the United States. One of the goals of the invasion declared by Russia was the “denazification” of Ukraine. It created a big deal of uncertainty among Russian-Jewish immigrants here. For those elderly people who remember a wide-spread antisemitism in Ukraine during the Soviet period and who remembered atrocities committed by the Nazis in Ukraine, the notion of “denazification” resonated. Some of the pre-war reports suggested that Ukrainian nationalists use Nazi symbols and slogans, rename streets in Ukrainian cities to glorify Nazi collaborators like Bandera or Shushkevich, march over streets to celebrate Bandera’s birthday, adding to confusion and fear.
RSJ immigrants in the US have memories of World War II when Nazis did numerous terrible criminal acts. They buy the notion because they have the memory of the atrocities of the World War II. On the other hand, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy is himself of Jewish descent, and part of his family was killed during the Holocaust.
Identity issues also contributed to the confusion. Russian-speaking Jews in the U.S. and in New York mostly used to identify themselves as “Russian Jews” regardless of their place of origin, though more than 40% of them originated from Ukraine and less than 35% from Russia itself. Russian is a commonly spoken first language in the community, and it is the mother tongue of President Zelensky. In recent years, many Jewish New Yorkers who spoke Russian did not object to being described as “Russian Jews,” even if they were from Ukraine. But since Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, which first began in 2014, people started to feel that they have a special Ukrainian identity in addition to their Jewish one, so they started saying they were Ukrainian Jews and didn’t want to call them “Russian” Jews anymore.
During the first few months of the war in Ukraine, spontaneous protests against anything “Russian” were also noticeable in the RSJ communities in the US and around the globe. Some businesses have changed their names (voluntarily or under pressure). Russian cultural events like concerts and exhibitions were also canceled or indefinitely postponed. As Liam Stack explained it, “following the Russian invasion of Ukraine… Western institutions have been quick to sever ties with anyone deemed insufficiently disapproving of Putin or even facially connected to Russian culture. New York City’s Metropolitan Opera and Carnegie Hall said they would not allow people to perform who have supported Putin in the past.”
Some Russians however protested. Thus, a Russian-Jewish immigrant was quoted by Al Jazeera: “We should not give in to this hysteria, where Tchaikovsky isn’t being played, where Russian performers are being made to speak up against Putin, even though they’re Russian citizens and their careers and families back home are at stake…”
Similarly, Julia Barinova, an insurance broker from neighboring Sheepshead Bay, said she was “insulted” by the cultural boycott of all things Russian. “Cancelling things like the cultural wealth of the nation, the history – it’s basically destruction.” (Ibid). Another Russian-Jewish immigrant and former refusenik from Boston published an article in the Tablet Magazine describing his and his family’s personal experience in the days and weeks following the Russian invasion into Ukraine. He testified : “Never before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine have, I observed such an omnipresent, pervasive urge to place an identity (Russian identity) under the yoke of collective responsibility… When Russian identity is targeted for vilification, it falls to Russian expatriates and students of Russian culture and history to explain to the world why wholesale rejection of ‘Russinness’ does not help to stop the carnage in Ukraine”.
The U.S. State Department was also concerned by the wave of anti-Russian rhetoric and cancellation of Russian culture callings. In 2022, it organized two special zoom conferences with the leaders of the Russian-speaking community, which I also attended. The officials assured leaders of the community that the U.S. government does not support any accusations or hostilities against the Russian-speaking community.
There are considerable divisions within the community regarding the war in Ukraine. It started back in 2014 during the Maidan revolution in Kyiv and the following Russian annexation of Crimea and the creation of self-proclaimed independence of Donetsk and Lugansk republics. While no special surveys among Russian immigrants have been conducted at that time, my observation, social media analysis, and focus group discussions undertaken in April-June 2022 indicate the following:
In 2014, about half of Russian-speaking immigrants in New York have acknowledged that Russia have had some legitimate historic claims for Crimea and that its annexation is somehow validated. They argued Crimea would be mostly populated by ethnic Russians, Russia would have historic ties to Crimea, and the annexation would have been done peaceful and somehow validated by referendum. Most of those who expressed these views were elderly people who originated from Russia, and, interestingly, from Azerbaijan (Mountain Jews) and Uzbekistan (Bukharian Jews). Another 30%, mostly younger people from Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, strongly opposed the annexation, while the rest 20% did not have a particular position on the issue. As for the self-proclaimed independence of Donbass republics, its support shrank to about 35%, with about the same number strongly opposing this turn. In any case, the situation in Ukraine was not a factor in political behavior of Russian-speaking immigrants at that time.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the divide within the community deepened and became even more complicated. In the spring and summer of 2022, based on our observations, private conversations, and on two focus group interviews in April-June 2022, about two-third in the community has supported Ukraine. Among them, three opinions could be derived: about half support Ukraine unconditionally; another 30% support with some reservations.
About a third of the respondents expressed their support for Russia. Yet, only a small portion of them supported Russia unconditionally. There are small groups, whose members believe Russia has a legitimate claim to invade Ukraine, although without as much military aggression, and an even smaller group that supports the military invasion. But the divide is more along political beliefs than support for one’s home country. Interestingly, that among the supporters there are some elderly individuals from Ukraine who arrived in the U.S. in the 1970s and remember robust antisemitism in Ukraine. Some of them expressed reservations, while generally supporting Russia.
However, there are some reasons to believe that the proportion of those who supported Russia is even higher. One of the reasons is that many people in private conversations confessed to me they have some sympathy for Russia but are not willing (or are afraid) to share their views publicly, including on the social media platforms. Any support for Russia, even mild and carefully expressed, was and is extremely unpopular.
During the focus group discussion, a question was asked, whether a candidate position on Ukraine in 2024 presidential elections would be important for them. There was a variety of opinions. Most of the focus group participants (70%) agree that they would vote along the party lines regardless of candidate’s position on the war in Ukraine. Also, a majority of 60% was thinking that the war will end by then. About the same number indicated that a candidate’s position on Israel would be of significant matter for them when considering voting. Thus, we may conclude that the war in Ukraine was not a considerable factor in the 2024 election cycle.
Intensive discussion in the focus groups was related to the issue of to what extend Israel should be involved in helping Ukraine. As well as in what way the pressure on Israel to provide more military and financial help to Ukraine, that continues from the beginning of the war and as the war goes on, is legitimate. The variety of opinions expressed could be narrowed to two, somehow contradicting each other.
The first position: Israel should not interfere in the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Israel could probably provide some humanitarian assistance, as it did, for example, in the beginning of the war when Israel unfolded a first field hospital in Western Ukraine. But by no means Israel should sent any military equipment, be it defensive or offensive, because Israel has its own political interests of retaining good relations with both Russia (Iranian and Hezbollah threats were mentioned) and Ukraine. Any pressure on Israel from Ukraine, or any other country for that matter, should be decisively dismissed, and Israel must seek for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.
The second position: Because Ukraine is a victim of Russian aggression, Israel has a moral right to help Ukraine to defend itself. While supplying Ukraine with weapons could be counterproductive and would lead to unpredictable and dangerous consequences, some defensive equipment like anti-drone systems could be given to Ukraine. However, any pressure on Israel regarding this issue should be rejected.
The first option was shared by majority of participants in both focus groups. Interesting results were drawn when we discussed the issue of whether the U.S. should help Ukraine and to what extent. As many Russians share views of Republican party, they are listening intensively to Tucker Carlson, a popular conservative former Fox News anchor, who argues that instead of spending billions in military assistance to Ukraine, more attention should be paid to the dangerous situation at the American-Mexican border, to combat high-level inflation, to improve the schools, and to support American businesses.
Similar views are expressed recently by Florida governor Ron DeSantis who was gaining popularity as a rising star on the U.S. political horizon and was a candidate of the Republican party in 2024 presidential election. Echoing him was Kevin McCarty, then the Speaker of the House in the U.S. Congress. Responding to a recent Tucker Carlson’s question: “Is opposing Russia in Ukraine a vital American strategic interest?”, Ron DeSantis replied: “While the U.S. has many vital national interests… becoming further entangled in a territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia is not one of them.” Former President Trump said: “No, but it is for Europe.” While many Republicans leaders agree, yet many, like former vice president Pence and Nikki Haley, disagree with Carlson and DeSantis. Similarly, there were many nuanced opinions in the Russian-speaking Jewish community indicating the extremely complicated nature of the issue. I tried to narrow them down to three vectors.
One position was that the Russian aggression in Ukraine is a threatening precedent, but it is not a major American strategic interest, and the U.S. should not be too much involved in providing Ukraine with sophisticated weapons that would escalate the conflict further. Moreover, the sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Russia did not work. The longer this confrontation continues, the more Russia is pushed toward China to comprise the Russian-Chinese political block, which is dangerous to America.
Another (opposite) position was that the U.S. must provide Ukraine with all means necessary to win the war, to regain all Ukrainian territory, and to defeat the Russian army. And only then could a peace agreement be achieved.
A third position was that the U.S. should continue its support for Ukraine – military, economically, and politically. However, given the corruption reports, all aid should be transparent, and it should not be unlimited. Also, the war is more of a European issue rather than an American one. The Ukrainian objective of regaining all its territory, including Crimea, is unrealistic. Peace negotiations should start as soon as possible.
Most participants agreed that a further escalation of the war would be very dangerous and could trigger a military conflict between Russia and NATO that may result with a nuclear war. The notion on the necessity of peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine strengthened among Russian immigrants, especially after October 7, 2023, with the horrific terrorist attack on Israel by Hamas and the subsequent war in Gaza.
Dr. Samuel (Sam) Kliger is the American Jewish Committee Director for Eurasian Affairs and founding President and CEO of the Research Institute of New Americans (RINA), New York. He previously served as a visiting and Adjunct Professor of Sociology, Social Psychology and American Government and History at Kings and Molloy Colleges in New York