PSCRP-BESA Reports No 97 (Nov 12, 2024)
by Anatolii Dirun
On November 8, the Central Election Commission of Moldova announced the official results of the presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova. With 55% of the votes, Maia Sandu won in the second round, while her opponent Alexandru Stoianoglo gained 44.8%. Despite this result, the election did not become a triumph for the presidential team. Moreover, the head of the election headquarters, Andrei Spinu, resigned not only from his position as Minister of Infrastructure but also left the ruling party, PAS. This marks the first time since 1991 that Maia Sandu lost the elections within the country, receiving only 48.81% of the votes, while 51.19% of citizens voted for Alexandru Stoianoglo. The decisive contribution to the Moldovan president’s victory was made by the diaspora, voting at 300 foreign polling stations.
This raises a logical question: Why did M. Sandu, who retained political leadership throughout her four-year mandate, give way to Alexandru Stoianoglo within the country? The former Prosecutor General had not been an active figure in Moldovan public politics for the past three years and was significantly disadvantaged in terms of resources. Moreover, as the informal leader of PAS, Maia Sandu also had a parliamentary majority obtained through early elections in 2021, garnering high—some might even say unprecedented—trust from Moldovan citizens. The answer to this question has two sides. Sandu’s supporters cite unprecedented pressure from Russia on Moldovan institutions and interference in the elections to secretly support their candidates. Her opponents insist on the low effectiveness of her economic policies during the initial phase of her rule. In my view, three systemic errors made by Sandu’s team during her first term largely account for the loss within the country:
- Lack of a coalition with right-wing parties: The political leadership of Sandu and PAS created the illusion that there was no need to form a coalition with other pro-European parties. In Moldova’s parliamentary system, such an approach was a strategic mistake, leaving Sandu politically isolated during the elections.
- Monopolizing the idea of European integration: The European integration agenda has been central to Moldovan politics for more than 20 years. The initial turn toward the EU followed the failure of Russia’s Kozak memorandum in 2003, which proposed settling the Transnistrian conflict through an asymmetric federation with Tiraspol. Since then, the European direction has become the sole unifying idea for Moldovan society. PAS’s control over the referendum to amend the Constitution for European integration caused mistrust among potential allies and much of the public.
- Media restrictions: Under Sandu, 15 TV channels and more than 60 news websites were shut down. The Government justifies this as a measure to combat hybrid threats from Moscow. However, even considering the war in Ukraine, such media control is unusual for Moldova, as not even the Plahotniuc regime witnessed this scale of media closures. The lack of judicial orders for these actions provoked a negative response from the public.
Election Campaign
On December 24, Sandu proposed a referendum to gauge citizens’ support for Moldova’s EU membership. Experts interpreted this as an election tactic to mobilize support in the 2024 presidential elections with the goal of securing Sandu’s victory in the first round. The proposal was an unexpected move for both opposition and right-wing parties. In 2016, Prime Minister Vlad Filat proposed a similar referendum, which the Constitutional Court deemed illegal, but in 2024, there were no obstacles to Sandu’s proposal.
However, despite broad support for European integration, opposition criticized Sandu for changes made to the referendum’s question, which now asked if citizens support a constitutional amendment to integrate Moldova into the EU. The referendum, approved by Parliament on May 16, 2024 (Resolution No. 121), defined that European Union laws would override national legislation upon Moldova’s accession.
This created backlash. Statements by EU Ambassador Janis Mažeiks about land sales and PAS MP V. Soimaru’s remarks on renouncing the Russian-affiliated Metropolitanate of Moldova sparked discontent among rural and conservative citizens. Additionally, the refusal to register CUB party leader Igor Muntean as a presidential candidate further alienated right-wing voters.
Sandu’s team, confident in a first-round win, faced challenges when the Socialist Party nominated Alexandru Stoianoglo, who received quiet support from right-wing groups. Despite his low-key campaign, Stoianoglo posed an unexpected threat.
In the first round on October 20, 2024, Sandu received 42.49%, with Stoianoglo at 25.95%. However, 54% of domestic voters rejected the referendum, leading to victory only due to diaspora support at 50.1% to 49.69%.
The elections exposed deepening divisions in Moldovan society. While European integration remains appealing, its legitimacy has been questioned. The upcoming 2025 parliamentary elections may reveal whether Moldova will further split or consolidate under a unifying vision.
Dr. Anatolii Dirun is a Fulbright Visiting Scholar and Postdoctoral researcher at Moldova State University in Chisinau.