PSCRP-BESA Reports No 97 (Nov 05, 2024)
The Power Struggle Among Criminal Groups in Russian Prisons and the Growing Role of Islamist Groups
Russian prisons have long been battlegrounds for influence among various criminal factions, each striving for control over the prison’s internal economy and hierarchies. Traditionally, the power in Russian penitentiaries has been held by groups following the thieves-in-law (“vor v zakone”) code. However, the prison landscape in Russia has been changing. As more individuals from Russia’s North Caucasus and Central Asia regions, many of whom follow Islam, are incarcerated, Islamist influence in prisons has grown. Some of these inmates, including those with ties to radical groups, have started to organize within the prison system, creating alliances based on religious beliefs rather than traditional criminal codes. This has shifted the balance of power, introducing new dynamics into the established prison hierarchy.
Islamist groups within Russian prisons often prioritize religious solidarity over traditional criminal loyalty, uniting along lines of faith and ethnicity. This religious affiliation offers a powerful alternative to the thieves-in-law code. These groups offer a strict, disciplined structure, sometimes enforcing adherence to Islamic practices and framing their activities as part of a broader religious struggle.
As these Islamist groups gain ground, a new trend has been observed: the emergence of so-called “green zones.” In contrast to the “black zones” and the “red zones”, green zones are areas within prisons where Islamist groups hold significant influence. In green zones, the leadership is largely driven by religious principles, and adherence to Islamic practices is encouraged or even enforced among inmates. Here, power structures revolve around religious loyalty rather than the thieves-in-law code, creating a unique social order within the prison.
The rise of green zones and Islamist influence has introduced new tensions and conflicts within the prison system. Traditional criminal groups and Islamist factions often find themselves in direct competition for power and control over resources within the prison. The two groups have fundamentally different worldviews, and their conflicting codes make cooperation difficult. Islamist groups may view the secular stance of thieves-in-law as incompatible with their religious beliefs, leading to conflicts and violence between factions. Conversely, thieves-in-law see Islamist influence as a threat to their long-established dominance and fear that religious factions might undermine their power base.Russian and Central Asian authorities are deeply concerned about the growth of Islamist influence in the prison system, as it not only disrupts the traditional criminal balance but also increases the risk of religious radicalization. The spread of green zones has heightened concerns about prisons serving as recruitment centers for extremist organizations. In response, prison authorities have introduced stricter controls, particularly over inmates who show signs of extremist affiliation, and increased monitoring of religious practices within prisons. However, the ideological strength of Islamist groups makes this issue particularly difficult to address, as radical beliefs offer followers a powerful sense of identity and community, especially in an environment as isolating as prison.
There is one important factor that makes Islamist groups more competitive than traditional criminal groups in Russian prisons. Traditional Russian prison culture, heavily influenced by the “thieves-in-law” ideology, operates on a rigid hierarchical structure. Within this system, inmates are divided into strata, each with specific roles, rights, and expectations. At the top of the hierarchy are the thieves-in-law themselves, respected as leaders who enforce the criminal code and manage conflicts. Below them are “blatnye” (seasoned criminals who support the thieves’ code), and further down are lower groups who lack influence, including outcasts relegated to the lowest “untouchable” status, often doing undesirable work and serving the needs of higher-ranking prisoners.
However, the rise of Islamism in Russian prisons has disrupted this traditional structure. Islamist ideology, by contrast, places less emphasis on criminal hierarchy and is more democratic in its appeal, focusing on shared religious identity over strict social stratification. This egalitarian nature allows Islamist groups to recruit widely, reaching across strata and even drawing in lower-ranking prisoners who previously held little power. Some of these recruits come from non-Muslim backgrounds but are drawn by the promise of protection, community, and status under a new, religiously driven order. Islamism offers them a chance to rise within an alternative structure that values loyalty to faith over criminal reputation and physical strength.
This inclusiveness gives Islamist groups a strategic advantage over the thieves-in-law hierarchy, which is exclusive and rigidly traditional. Islamist networks provide a sense of purpose and solidarity that transcends the traditional criminal code, attracting those who feel weak, oppressed and excluded from the thieves’ culture. By creating alliances with prisoners across different strata, Islamist groups have been able to build a broader base of influence, further challenging the authority of traditional prison leaders and reshaping the power dynamics within Russia’s prisons.
Prison Islam and Scenarios of Potential Growth of Radical Islamist Influence in Russia: Potential Repercussions for Israel and Europe
Scenario 1. Inertial development, moderate threats.
The most favorable scenario, both for Russia and for its neighbors in Europe and Asia, would be to follow an inertial path from the point of view of influence of prison Islam. Let’s call it Scenario 1. According to this scenario, the growing influence of radical Islam in prisons would remain under government control. Issues arising from the convergence of crime and jihadism would increase but remain a purely Russian problem (though neighboring Central Asian countries would continue to face similar challenges).
Scenario 2. Growth and trans-nationalization of radical Islamist networks based on prison Islam.
A more dangerous outcome for Russia itself and for many countries worldwide, including Israel, would be the realization of Scenario 2 “Growth and trans-nationalization of radical Islamist networks based on prison Islam” in Russia, Central Asia and the Wider Middle East.
Let’s describe the tendencies that may lead to realization of this scenario. The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war and the economic strain from Western sanctions have intensified Russia’s socioeconomic challenges, creating a volatile environment that could facilitate the rise of radical Islamist groups. With the Russian economy under increasing pressure, unemployment and poverty rates have grown, particularly affecting marginalized communities, including ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslims. The economic instability may drive disenfranchised youth and individuals from impoverished backgrounds towards radical movements, where promises of solidarity and purpose could provide an appealing alternative to dismal economic prospects.
The situation is further complicated by a demographic shift caused by the war. Mass emigration of middle-class Russians, particularly young professionals, has altered the demographic balance, increasing the proportion of economically and socially vulnerable populations, including migrant communities. This shift is occurring against the backdrop of a long-term trend of demographic growth of national minorities in Russia, driven by differences in birth rate patterns between the ethnic Russian population of Central Russia and the population of the North Caucasus, as well as by large-scale labor migration from Central Asia.
These trends, coupled with rising interethnic tensions and widespread racist practices by Russian authorities, especially, against Central Asian ethnic groups, has created fertile ground for Islamist groups to gain influence. As violence and crime escalate amid the social disorganization of wartime Russia, radical groups may find it easier to recruit, using religious solidarity as a tool to address grievances and perceived injustices.
Moreover, the strained resources of Russian law enforcement, currently focused on internal security challenges and the demands of war, limit their ability to monitor and counter radical groups effectively. This vulnerability creates an opening for radical Islamist organizations to expand their networks and activities.
The likelihood of transnational connections between Russian- and Central Asian -based radical Islamist groups and Middle Eastern organizations is also growing. As Islamist groups gain influence in Russia and Central Asia, they may establish stronger ties with larger networks across the Wider Middle East, accessing funding, ideological support, and strategic resources. This transnational element could enable Russian Islamist groups to solidify their influence domestically while extending their reach, posing a complex and multifaceted security challenge to Russia and other nations.
Additionally, the growth of ties between Russian criminal-Islamist groups and similar groups in the Middle East would create an added threat of terrorist attacks. In particular, some experts, such as Russian Afghanistan specialist Andrey Serenko, claim that ISIS-Khorasan is attempting to use criminal infrastructure (including drug trafficking networks) to organize terrorist attacks in Russia. In this context, one can recall the mass attack at Crocus City Hall near Moscow in March 2024, which was preceded by an attempt by ISIS-Khorasan to organize the bombing of a synagogue.
Through such networks, not only are terrorist attacks organized, but also the recruitment of fighters for the war in the Middle East (for example, in ISIS and groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, such as al-Nusra in Syria). In this context, it is worth recalling the phenomenon of mass recruitment into ISIS and other Sunni Islamist groups based in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, a trend that has already been characteristic of Russia and Central Asian states over the past decade. So, such groups can organize terrorist acts or attacks affecting even the territory of Israel.
From the perspective of Israel’s interests, in this context, the threat of a recurrence of anti-Semitic pogroms, similar to those that took place in the fall of 2023 in the North Caucasus, would also probably sharply increase. In the specific context of the above-mentioned pogrom in the North Caucasus in the fall of 2023, networks of wrestler-athletes were utilized. However, in a number of other interethnic pogroms, such as the Uzbek pogrom in Osh, Kyrgyzstan (2010), the mobilization of rioters occurred through criminal youth groups, albeit not Islamist in nature. The first instance of mobilization for mass pogroms through criminal-Islamist groups (connected to the relatives and associates of former President Nazarbayev, who controlled Kazakh secret police) occurred in January 2022 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. In connection with this case the former head of Kazakh National security committee (KNB) and former prime minister Karim Masimov and some other generals were sentenced for high treason. Overall, given the trends outlined above, the possibility of mobilizing criminal-Islamist groups to organize pogroms, including those with an anti-Semitic component, is entirely feasible.
Scenario 3. The incorporation of elements of Islamic radicalism from criminal subcultures into the country’s political system
The most dangerous scenario for Russia and other countries would be Scenario 3 that foresees the incorporation of elements of Islamic radicalism from criminal subcultures into the country’s political system. Among the trends suggesting the possibility of such a scenario are the following. Since the 1990s, there has been an evident link between Russia’s political and business elite and criminal circles. Currently, there is a notable trend toward the division of key assets among criminal-political groups, particularly those of North Caucasian origin.
The trend toward state conservatism as part of Russia’s modern ideology is leading to de-secularization and strengthening of the connection between Islamic ideology and regional political systems in Russia’s autonomous republics of the North Caucasus. The power structure established in Chechnya under Ramzan Kadyrov, based on political Islam (of a conservative-Sufi nature), is the first example of a stable Islamist regime in the post-Soviet space (experiments with the introduction of Sharia laws in independent Chechnya between the First and Second Chechen Wars lasted a significantly shorter time).
Already, there is a noticeable link between the spread of radical Islam in prisons and among criminal groups, driven by the growing popularity of radical Islam among young people from certain Russian regions and among the most vulnerable migrant groups. Some experts say that there is also growing tendency towards introduction of radical Islamism as the ideology of different criminal groups in Russia and Central Asia. Added to this is the rise in the use of political Islam as a mechanism for integration among power groups at the regional regime level, alongside a trend toward overall instability in Russia.
As a result of all these trends, a situation may quickly emerge, when regional political systems in the North Caucasus, amid a weakening federal center, will begin to rely on support of criminal-Islamist groups. This is logical since the leaders of these groups already use criminal gangs (sometimes with elements of radical Islamic ideology) in the conflicts over property, as the Wildberries case demonstrates.
To understand the reality of such a scenario, one only needs to recall that elements of criminal-Islamist groups were integrated into the official structures of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (specifically, its Armed Forces) between the two Chechen wars. Elements of the practices that developed at that time (including the combination of formal work in security structures with informal criminal activity, particularly informal protection activities) have persisted in a modified form in today’s Chechen Republic. In modern Dagestan and several other national autonomous republics of the North Caucasus, similar processes can be observed along two lines, or trends.
The first trend is the connection between regional elites and organized crime. In this context, two officially documented cases can be mentioned. From 2016 to 2019, Rauf Arashukov was a member of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament. He was delegated there by the executive authority of Karachay-Cherkessia, a national republic in the North Caucasus. He had also previously served as the head of a district and as the first deputy head of the republic’s government. In 2022, he was convicted of organizing a criminal community and for murder. Another, no less high-profile case is the story of the former mayor of Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, Said Amirov, who was convicted in 2014 on similar charges. It is evident that this is only the tip of the iceberg, revealing the connections between regional political systems in the North Caucasus and criminal groups. Based on this, it can be assumed that, in some cases, gangs act as informal (and sometimes even formalized when integrated into official law enforcement agencies) forces relied upon by certain regional elites.
The second trend indicating the real possibility of Scenario 3 is the increasing official Islamic religiosity of regional elites, including within the framework of the conservative ideology that currently dominates in Russia.
Accordingly, it is entirely plausible to hypothetically assume a further convergence of these two developmental trends described above, meaning that regional elites could merge with criminal-Islamist groups.
An example of the merging of the trends described above is the terrorist attack in Dagestan on June 23, 2024. During the attack, a synagogue, two Orthodox churches, and a traffic police checkpoint in Makhachkala and Derbent were targeted. Twenty-one people lost their lives—16 police officers and five civilians, including a 66-year-old Orthodox priest in Derbent—and more than 20 others were injured. It was discovered that three relatives of Magomed Omarov, the head of the Sergokala district in Dagestan, were involved in the attack, including his own son.
Consequently, the influence of radical Islam, with its anti-Western and anti-Semitic tendencies, could expand across all of Russia and may start influence the policy of the federal government. This situation could pose significant threats to Europe and Israel.
The facts described above highlight the need to deepen the study of the links between Jihadism and criminal activity, as well as the study of prison Islam (which, of course, is not solely limited to Islamic radicalism but can also represent prisoners’ legitimate search for meaning, justice and social integration). Two obstacles stand in the way of this endeavor.
One obstacle lies in the politicization of the issue. As a result, experts leaning toward a right-wing discourse tend to focus primarily on counterterrorism and criminal behavior, while academics inclined toward a left-wing discourse may emphasize prisoner rights and religious freedom violations in post-Soviet countries. An accurate assessment of the situation requires a comprehensive approach that integrates both aspects of the issue mentioned above. Today, there are many interesting theoretical and comparative scholarly studies of convergence between criminal and terrorist activities, this approach can be applied also to the case of prison Islam and convergence between criminal and religious extremist activity in Russia and Central Asia.
The second obstacle is the difficulty of accessing both underground criminal-Islamist groups at large (who are not inclined to disseminate information about themselves) and prisoners (since authorities in many post-Soviet countries are not interested in exposing prison conditions due to serious human rights violations within these institutions).