In July 2026, the BESA PSCR program analyzed political developments in Ukraine, Russia, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus.
Velvl Chernin shares his perspective concerning the identity of the Ukrainian Jewry against the backdrop of the recent political developments in Ukraine. He points to the conflict of historical narratives that surrounds the contemporary relations between Ukrainian Jews and the Ukrainian state, specifically pointing to the recent far-right rally at the Independence Square in Kyiv, official Jerusalem’s reactions to the manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism and commemorations of controversial historical figures, and the counter-reactions in the Ukrainian social media. Special attention is paid to the problem of the classification of the Holodomor as the genocide of the Ukrainian people, which Israel does not recognize as such and which is accompanied by the official, and rather tendentious, list of perpetrators including a large share of people of Jewish and Latvian ethnic origin. Chernin underlines that the contemporary Ukrainian Jewish community is rather small and not represented by a universally recognized and influential secular organization; also, Israel is not listed among the countries whose citizenship Ukrainian nationals may legally hold alongside the Ukrainian one, and the linguistic aspect is still able to create tensions within the community, since most informal interactions within the post-Soviet Jewry continue to be held in Russian. The author concludes that it is not certain that, “when confronted with a clash of narratives, they [Ukrainian Jews] sincerely choose the Ukrainian national narrative over the Jewish one.”
Vladimir Ze’ev Khanin sheds light on the potential implications of Foreign Minister Saar’s initiative for a resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide, which was unanimously approved by the government in June 2026 and is waiting for the parliamentary vote. Numerous previous attempts to officially discuss this issue have failed, since an average Israeli is still not willing to equate other tragedies with the Holocaust, and because of the complex relationship with Turkey – the genocide discussions resurfaced whenever Turkish-Israeli relations were reaching a low level. The effectiveness of the recent resolution as a diplomatic move remains questionable, first of all because of the strategic relations Jerusalem has with Baku, where the issue of Armenian genocide recognition is still received painfully. Khanin contends that the Israeli government’s demarche may indeed damage this strategic partnership. Importantly, Azerbaijani Jewish communities have sent letters to the Knesset asking that the recognition resolution not be adopted in a parliamentary vote, and even the Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, has reacted rather indifferently, stating that the Armenian authorities “are not obliged to comment” on this move. Numerous commentators also warn that “advancing the Israeli foreign minister’s bill will strengthen Erdoğan’s standing among Islamist circles in Turkey, worsen the attitude of many Azerbaijanis toward Israel, and is unlikely to improve relations between Jerusalem and Yerevan.”
Gershon Kogan analyzes the same issue from a different but equally important perspective. He contends that in contemporary Iran, where the Armenian minority is among the oldest minority groups, legally recognized, and enjoying its own cultural institutions and two reserved seats in the parliament, the memory of the genocide is tolerated and acknowledged, but without any formal recognition. While Tehran actively denies the Holocaust, the Armenian grief is surrounded by “muted empathy” – not least because the IRI would not like to disrupt its functional relationship with Turkey. The official protest note from the Azerbaijani MFA, demanding reconsideration of the Israeli government’s decision, can be attributed to the pan-Turkic solidarity and the inseparability of any Armenian claims from the conflict in Karabakh. However, this position does not affect the ethnic Azerbaijanis historically living in Iran and deeply integrated into the Iranian society: for them, Armenians are not enemies but old neighbors.
Boris Ginzburg presents his practical analysis of the Azerbaijani-led mediation efforts between Israel and Turkey. For Azerbaijan, both are among the most important allies, but since October 7, 2023, Ankara has significantly hardened its rhetoric against the Jewish state. Baku has mostly provided for “ad hoc measures to de-escalate tensions between Jerusalem and Ankara, aiming to prevent them from spilling over into an open military conflict.” Notably, the talks largely take place directly through the presidential offices and the Prime Minister’s office (in Israel’s case), demonstrating the significance the three parties attach to the current tensions between Ankara and Jerusalem, but, as it was throughout 2025, mostly do not involve any direct meetings. Ginzburg recommends that the Jewish state, at the same time, demonstrate its readiness to de-escalate the tensions and keep undertaking precautionary measures towards Turkey, with the latter including keeping the new Syrian regime, closely aligned with Ankara, out of Lebanon, and strengthening the “Hellenic Alliance” between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus (whose northern part has been occupied by Turkey since 1974). He further stresses the need to differentiate between Turkish domestic and international rhetoric and to involve national foreign ministries in the “crisis management,” since otherwise, an important opportunity to fortify the trust base between the two countries may be missed. Ginzburg additionally recommends including Germany as an additional pillar of support for Israeli-Turkish mediation, as an important ally of Israel and a home to the largest Turkish diaspora in the world. In doing so, Germany might strengthen its role as a peace facilitator, Azerbaijan may deepen its ties with the biggest economy in Europe, and Israel may solidify its ally’s position on the international stage.
Gershon Kogan sheds light on the context within which, in November 2025, the Turkish Ministry of Education replaced the term “Central Asia” (perceived as a Soviet-era geographic category) with “Turkestan” in the Turkish national history curriculum, calling this “correcting a historical injustice” that divided the Turkic world. This was done in the framework of the “Turkey’s Century” education model that has been realized under the patronage of Erdoğan since 2024. The term “Turkestan,” historically associated with the Russian Empire’s legacy, was redeployed with a pan-Turkic ideological charge, effectively “writing over a Persian palimpsest”. In the post-Soviet period, Iran had three instruments of cultural influence in Central Asia, namely, institutional (Saadi Foundation), diplomatic-ceremonial (Nowruz celebrations), and religious (Shia networks). Each of them has significantly degraded in recent years, leading to the “Persophonie” assuming a fragmented, defensive posture, which was accelerated by the 2026 war. Iranian cultural influence was now perceived through the lens of political Islam, with the “added weight of military defeat and internal repression”. Thus, Turkey chose to decisively engage in the cultural competition and cognitive warfare exactly when the instruments for Tehran’s response are degraded, and its regional reputation is damaged.
Alexander Shpunt provides a typological overview of the conflicts surrounding the status of indigenous small-numbered peoples (ISNP) in Russia. Based on the 2025-2026 empirics, he outlines the systemic conflict effects caused by the differentiated legal regime. These include: (1) normative uncertainty of compensatory mechanisms (when the very procedure for calculating losses to the traditional habitat, sometimes excluding key stakeholders from decision-making, is challenged); (2) unclear interpretation of liability for environmental damage; (3) recognition of territories of traditional nature use (especially if they might overlap with the existing production facilities); (4) criteria of belonging to the ISNP; (5) access to preferences associated with the status (with administrative barriers exacerbated by the contradictions between regional and federal approaches). Among the institutional root causes of these conflicts are (1) the multi-level nature of legal regulation; (2) a gap between declaratory norms and law enforcement practice; (3) the competition between industrial and traditional models of territorial development; (4) the bureaucratization of access to preferences. The situation is further aggravated by the clashes between special status and universal state obligations (such as military mobilization), and between national legislation and international commitments.
Last but not least, Alexander Shpunt has prepared his regular overview of several important academic publications that deal with post-Soviet political and economic development.
In the coming months, more analytic materials discussing the ever-changing political and ideological landscape in the post-Soviet space, are to be expected.