PSCRP-BESA Reports No 156 (September 29, 2025)
The core element in the foreign policy of post-Soviet countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is so-called multivectoralism: maintaining relations with multiple global actors without binding themselves exclusively to any single one. These states seek to balance ties with the China–Russia axis and the collective West (including the USA and the EU—although it should be noted that the internal fragility of this grouping has never been as evident as it is now). These actors, who claim global influence in the world politics, can be regarded as the first tier of influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. A second, regional tier consists of other regional neighbors, with Turkey (and, to a lesser extent, Iran) being the most prominent actors in this “regional league.”
Amid today’s global uncertainty and high risks, the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia are striving to diversify their foreign policies as much as possible, with the goal of strengthening their autonomy and agency. In Central Eurasia, where these countries are located, there is currently a clear weakening of the Western vector of influence. There are several reasons for that:
- The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the resulting loss of interest in adjacent post-Soviet regions.
- The war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, both of which have diminished the earlier geopolitical relevance of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
- The weakening of the West due to internal political conflicts and the confrontation between the Trump administration and the European political mainstream.
Nevertheless, preserving good relations with the West – and, in many cases, artificially “boosting” this vector of foreign policy despite limited reciprocal interest from the Western side — has become, within the framework of multivectoralism, a strategy of survival for the post-Soviet South. Otherwise, these states risk falling into complete dependence on the China–Russia bloc, which aspires to global influence, as well as on regional powers such as Turkey and Iran.
The above features of foreign policy were clearly visible in the policies of the several key states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia in late summer and early autumn 2025. Two distinct diplomatic styles can be identified: a “soft” Central Asian one (most evident in the recent diplomatic moves of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), and a “hard” Caucasian one (best exemplified by the policies of Azerbaijan and Armenia). In both cases, however, there is a clear attempt to rebalance foreign policy so as to reduce dependence on immediate Central Eurasian neighbors by strengthening ties with the West – above all with the United States, as the leader of the Western world.
At the 80th session of the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2025, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev delivered a speech in which he called for reform of the UN (a logical position, given his earlier service as UN Deputy Secretary-General) and for strengthening the global role of the “middle powers.”
Tokayev stressed that middle powers such as Kazakhstan can contribute to global balance by acting as intermediaries between major powers. He also advocated for diplomatic solutions to armed conflicts, including the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East.
Amid the UN General Assembly, on 22 September 2025, Wabtec Corporation (USA) announced the signing of a $4.2 billion contract with Kazakhstan’s national railway company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, for the supply of 300 locomotives and their long-term maintenance. This agreement is considered the largest locomotive supply contract in Wabtec’s history. The contract goes beyond delivering locomotive kits, including servicing, technical support, and likely local assembly. The deal creates about 11,000 jobs in the United States across supply chains, manufacturing, and maintenance. Previously, Kazakhstan had procured locomotives from Russian manufacturers (Transmashholding).
Several analysts have also drawn attention to the strategic dimensions of the deal. Kazakhstan’s leadership is not only creating jobs in the United States -something the Trump administration welcomes — but also strengthening the Trans-Caspian route to Europe, bypassing Russia and Iran. It should be noted that the West has long supported this route for strategic reasons, while China has also traditionally favored it as part of its broader policy of diversifying continental transport corridors and assisting the development of Central Asian and South Caucasus states. Thus, although the move is unwelcome in Moscow and Tehran, it is well received in Brussels and Washington, and cannot be described as directed against Beijing. Overall, it can be seen as a subtle diplomatic maneuver within the framework of Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy. In June 2025, Kazakhstan awarded Russia a major contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant; the new U.S. locomotive contract serves to balance that move.
Russian experts paid even closer attention to the meeting that took place on 23 September 2025 on the sidelines of the 80th UN General Assembly in New York between President Tokayev and President Zelensky of Ukraine. Observers noted that the two leaders conversed in English, rather than Russian. For Tokayev – a career diplomat and polyglot – this was natural and carried little symbolic meaning. For Zelensky, however, the choice was more significant, as he consistently conducts his diplomatic communication either in English or in Ukrainian. During the meeting, Zelensky thanked Kazakhstan for supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Tokayev, in turn, emphasized that a final resolution of the conflict must be achieved through diplomacy. The two leaders also discussed economic and humanitarian cooperation. Afterward, Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan was ready to provide a venue for a meeting between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, should both sides express interest.
Kazakhstan had previously played a similar role in facilitating rapprochement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between Russia and Turkey during a flare-up of tensions over Syria. At the same time, in the context of his visit to New York, Uzbekistan’s President Mirziyoyev achieved a significant breakthrough in relations with the Trump administration. Like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan under its second president seeks to strengthen contacts with the West while avoiding rhetoric directly aimed against Russia or China. Unlike his predecessor Islam Karimov, Mirziyoyev generally avoids political framing in such cases, emphasizing instead the economic pragmatism of his actions.
On 23 September 2025 in New York, on the sidelines of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan met with Donald Trump. During the meeting, the two discussed issues of strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and the United States, expansion of economic cooperation, as well as projects in key sectors (aviation, infrastructure, technology). After the meeting, Trump publicly praised Mirziyoyev, calling him a “man of his word” in reference to the fulfillment of agreements.
Before meeting Trump, Mirziyoyev had held talks with representatives of more than 50 American companies and banks, discussing large-scale business deals. During his UN visit, Uzbekistan and Boeing signed a contract for the purchase of up to 22 Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft, valued at more than $8 billion. The initial agreement provides for the delivery of 14 Boeing 787-9 aircraft, with an option for an additional 8 units. The deal is described as the largest of its kind in Central Asia. Deliveries are expected to begin in 2031, with the contract projected to support about 35,000 jobs in the United States.
The foreign policy content of Mirziyoyev’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2025 largely mirrored that of Tokayev’s address. He stressed the need to reform international institutions, especially by strengthening the role of developing countries and reshaping the composition of the UN Security Council to better reflect contemporary challenges. He also noted the growing number of conflicts in today’s world, voiced support for diplomatic efforts to resolve the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East and called for the development of regional transport corridors.
The similarity of the policies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as demonstrated by the September visits of their presidents, became quite clear. In both cases, the countries face growing geopolitical conflicts and global uncertainty, and they seek to strengthen their position through multivector diplomacy—particularly by deepening ties with the U.S. administration. In both cases, diplomacy is pursued through expanding economic cooperation with the United States and promoting transport corridors that enhance economic diversification and reduce dependence on Central Eurasian neighbors.
To strengthen the comparative dimension of the analysis, the diplomatic moves of the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan should be contrasted with the summer actions of the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia.
On 8 August 2025, a ceremony was held at the White House in Washington, where Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a joint declaration. Trump acted as mediator, and the project was named the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.” Under the agreements, Armenia granted the American side a 99-year concession for development of the territory. The corridor will function under Armenian law (meaning Armenian jurisdiction remains in place), but the United States will receive exclusive rights to develop infrastructure — roads, railways, energy pipelines, communication lines, and more. The corridor is intended to provide transport connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia (Syunik/Zangezur). This transit corridor is a key element of the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, aimed at normalizing communications and opening transport routes. Russia and Iran expressed concern over the agreement, viewing it as an expansion of U.S. influence in the South Caucasus and a potential weakening of Moscow’s and Tehran’s role in the region.
The agreements are important not only as a U.S.-backed solution to the previously tense diplomatic situation around Zangezur, which threatened to trigger a new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also from a geopolitical perspective. They represent a major strategic step in developing the same Middle Corridor via the Caspian Sea that bypasses Russia and Iran — a route which, as shown above, Central Asian countries have been developing in a more diplomatically cautious manner. It is also significant that Trump thereby signaled Washington’s claim to hegemony in the South Caucasus. Other actors who had previously played a key role in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan (for instance, France and Russia) were thus sidelined.
It should be noted that both Azerbaijan and Armenia have entered into open confrontation with Russia. In Azerbaijan’s case, this concerns the conflict over the Azerbaijani civilian airliner damaged over Chechnya on 25 December 2024, resulting in the deaths of most of its passengers, as well as the crisis surrounding the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia. Whereas earlier Azerbaijan, within the framework of its multivector foreign policy, sought to maintain a strategic partnership with Russia, this is now far less of a priority for Baku. Demonstrative elements may also be linked to recent developments in the Middle East: the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria and the rise of Turkey-friendly forces, as well as major Israeli strikes — supported by the United States — against the Iranian “axis of resistance.” These events appear to have led President Ilham Aliyev to conclude that Russia’s and Iran’s influence in the Middle East is weakening. At the same time, in the spirit of multivector diplomacy, Aliyev sought to “balance” his deepening contacts with the United States by making a working visit to China on 30 August 2025, during which he exchanged a handshake and brief conversation with then-present Russian President Putin. Thus, Aliyev is leaving open the option of engaging with the China–Russia axis if necessary.
In Armenia’s case, the issue lies in longstanding tensions between Russia’s leadership and Pashinyan’s government. The unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan had represented the sole obstacle preventing Armenia’s full reorientation toward the West. With Trump’s assistance, that obstacle is now beginning to disappear. Moreover, within Armenia’s multivector foreign policy, Yerevan may now have less need to use Tehran — already weakened by Israeli and U.S. actions — alongside the United States and France as a balancing partner in the security sphere. As a “safety net,” however, Armenia remains a member of the Russia-centered CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union, and it has not severed ties with Tehran completely.
Overall, an analysis of the policies of Armenia and Azerbaijan in late summer and early autumn 2025 reveals clear similarities with the strategies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan discussed above. In all the cases, the focus is on multivector foreign policy, on “boosting” the Western vector through engagement with the Trump administration, on economic diplomacy, and on the crucial role of the Trans-Caspian route. The only difference lies in diplomatic style: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while strengthening the American vector, seek to avoid conflict with other foreign policy vectors (above all Moscow), whereas Azerbaijan and Armenia act much more assertively — though still maintaining elements of a multivector “insurance policy” by preserving a certain level of relations with China, Russia, and, in Armenia’s case, Iran.