PSCRP-BESA Reports No 154 (September 25, 2025)
On September 1, the ultimatum set by the European Union expired, threatening to cancel Georgia’s visa-free regime if a number of demands were not met, including repealing the Russian-style law on “foreign agents” and the package of laws “on family values,” essentially directed against the LGBT community, as well as halting repression against protesters.
These demands were not met – the Georgian parliament was on recess throughout August, and even if it had been in session, the country’s political leadership showed no sign of readiness to liberalize its stance on a number of sensitive issues. On the contrary, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze emphasized his refusal to compromise precisely on the two key points – the laws on foreign agents and against LGBT rights.
At the same time, courts have been handing down harsh sentences to participants in the protests, with Russian nationals in particular being sent to prison for long terms on fabricated drug-related charges. Arrests of opposition leaders also continue. In the global Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders, Georgia dropped to 114th place out of 180 – compared to 103rd a year ago and 77th in 2023.
In other words, the Georgian authorities are openly ignoring the demands of the European Union. At the same time, the country’s top leadership is attempting to restore its strategic partnership with the United States (the State Department suspended the relevant agreement in November last year) and has been writing letters to Trump.
The first, private letter was sent by the leadership of Georgian Dream shortly after Trump took office. At the time, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Robin Dunnigan described it as “threatening, insulting, unserious, and very poorly received in Washington.” The U.S. administration never responded.
The next letter was public. Kobakhidze sent it on May 13. The document is saturated with rhetoric clearly intended to act as a trigger for Trump – citing common adversaries such as the “deep state,” USAID, NED, “LGBT propaganda,” and the Biden administration. This letter also received no reply.
Finally, in September, Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili addressed Trump with a letter very similar in meaning and phrased in the same terms.
The strategic partnership agreement has not been restored, but it would also be wrong to say that the efforts of Georgian leaders have been entirely unsuccessful. The so-called Megobari Act, introduced by Joe Wilson—incidentally, a Republican—was passed by the House of Representatives on May 6. It provides for sanctions against the party leadership, state officials, and security forces, as well as support for civil society. But its fast-tracked consideration in the Senate was unexpectedly blocked by Republican Senator Markwayne Mullin, and the further fate of the bill remains unclear (notably, Mullin had previously been a critic of “Georgian Dream”).
Wilson did not give up: at his initiative, a congressional committee proposed including an amendment in the State Department funding bill, according to which no federal funds may be allocated or any actions undertaken that would imply recognition of the current Georgian government led by “Georgian Dream.”
In recent months, the U.S. executive branch has made no public comments on the situation in Georgia. Nor does Brussels plan to raise the “Georgian question” in the near future, viewing threats to revoke visa-free travel as virtually the only leverage against a regime drifting toward Russia.
Unlike visa sanctions against Russians and Belarusians, in Georgia’s case this measure would be more than symbolic: remittances from emigrants are a significant source of foreign currency inflows. For example, in August alone, transfers from the European Union to Georgia amounted to more than $144 million, with nearly another $60 million coming from the United States.
However, according to analysts, more substantial sanctions—above all, personal ones against oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who effectively makes key political decisions, as well as against his close associates and security officials—cannot be adopted because of the EU’s consensus rule. Hungary and Slovakia have stated they will not support such measures.
Even less is there any talk of economic or sectoral sanctions, although there are two obvious groups of reasons for them: first, Georgia’s domestic politics, which are visibly becoming increasingly authoritarian; second, its role in helping Russia circumvent sanctions.
Georgia, which has not introduced sanctions against Russia, formally complies with U.S. and EU sanction requirements. This does not prevent it from remaining one of the largest hubs for actually bypassing them through complex and sophisticated “schemes.” This primarily concerns the re-export of automobiles, but is not limited to that. As early as the first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian intelligence accused Georgia of facilitating the smuggling of sanctioned goods, including military and dual-use items.
In addition to “gray imports,” Russia is also increasing the “gray export” of its oil through Georgia, including to European countries. Georgian economist Vakhtang Partsania emphasizes that businessmen affiliated with the authorities are enriching themselves through sanction circumvention, and therefore have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
It seems that the lack of political will and the EU’s internal divisions are not the only reasons for Brussels’ toothlessness toward the Georgian authorities. An equally, if not more, compelling reason is the fear of pushing Georgia away completely—thus driving it into the Kremlin’s embrace.
This concern is not unfounded. As early as 2023, political scientist Francis Fukuyama warned of such a risk. Now, with Russia having spoiled relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia, and its Black Sea ports under constant Ukrainian attack, Moscow has an even greater interest in Georgia—primarily as a logistical “bridge” to the Global South, but also as a propaganda example demonstrating the success of anti-Western policy; this had already been noted in PSCRP-BESA publications.
This raises the question: is there a “red line,” a threshold that Georgia would have to cross before Europe moves to more decisive measures—and what measures should those be to avoid being counterproductive? Notably, even Prime Minister Kobakhidze’s announced suspension of the EU integration process until 2028—contradicting the country’s constitution, which explicitly enshrines the goal of joining the EU and NATO—has not yet become such a “red line.”
From this perspective, the cancellation of visa-free travel may be the worst, though at the same time the most realistic (since, for such a decision, consensus is not required—only a qualified majority of votes) step. The experience of visa sanctions against Russians and Belarusians shows that they are at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive, leading to resentment and “rallying around the flag.” Ordinary citizens—who are the main ones affected—perceive them as unjust, since the elites still retain plenty of ways to travel freely to Europe. In Georgia, where nearly three-quarters of the population supports a pro-Western orientation, this effect would be even stronger: not only is the opposition-minded part of society facing repression, but in the case of visa-free cancellation, it would also be punished for the actions and decisions of the regime.
The rhetoric of some European leaders regarding anti-Russian visa sanctions suggests that they may believe such restrictions, and the resulting decline in the quality of life for citizens, will push people to pressure their government into changing its political course. On what these expectations are based is unclear: this logic has failed not only in Russia, but essentially everywhere, at all times. Including in Georgia itself: Georgians can hardly be accused of not protesting enough, yet their demonstrations were suppressed by force, while at the same time the ruling party took control of the judiciary and the electoral machinery.
More productive methods of pressure are likely to involve a combination of “sticks and carrots.” Among them:
• personal sanctions against Ivanishvili and a broad circle of the country’s political leaders, as well as judges and security officials involved in repression;
• secondary sanctions for assisting Russia in circumventing restrictions, including a ban on the purchase of Russian oil “laundered” in Georgia;
• financial support and reliable protection for whistleblowers (investigative media, NGOs, activists) who expose information about the authorities’ ties with the Kremlin, their assets, corruption schemes, involvement in human rights violations, etc.;
• encouraging “elite defections,” from a clear “roadmap” for those seeking to get out from under sanctions to the development of attractive investment projects, participation in which would be conditional on some form of disengagement from economic cooperation with Russia.
The prospects for adopting such measures are doubtful for the reasons mentioned above. But even if they could be approved, two additional key factors must be highlighted that will determine the ability of the “collective West” to prevent Georgia’s final transformation into a Russian satellite.
The first is that the West must remain collective. In other words, U.S. and EU policy toward Georgia is currently more or less aligned. This will change if the Georgian leadership succeeds in exploiting the cooling—and often barely concealed animosity—between the current administration in Washington and Brussels.
The second is Europe’s appeal as a model and idea, its ability to remain an attractive and desirable alternative to Russia and a reliable, strong ally. Yet it is precisely the foundation of Europe’s political identity that is now in crisis, with manifestations and likely consequences far more serious than the difficulties of trying to influence Georgia.
By PSCRP team