PSCRP-BESA Reports No 94 (Oct 30, 2024)
Russia and Israel: From Allies to Adversaries?
It is hard not to notice that the war Israel is waging, with the support of the United States and other allies in the Western bloc, against Iran’s terrorist alliance and its radical Islamist Arab proxies—Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and others—has its reflection in the ideological, political, and diplomatic discourse of post-Soviet conflicts, primarily the Russian-Ukrainian and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts. It also introduces adjustments to the foreign policy stance of those USSR successor states that have various geopolitical interests in the Middle East.
A prime example in this regard is the Russian Federation, whose return as a key player in the second half of the 2000s became an important factor in the new configuration of political forces in the region. In Israel, the then Middle Eastern reflection of Russia’s bid to reclaim its status as a global superpower was met with mixed assessments. Optimists were inclined to believe that Moscow was returning to the Middle East not as a proponent of any particular ideology but out of purely pragmatic considerations. Therefore, even if global geopolitical interests might, in principle, place Israel and Russia on opposite sides of the barricades, this would not necessarily lead to direct confrontation between the two countries, leaving ample room for cooperation beyond points of disagreement.
On the other hand, pessimists were convinced that Russia would sooner or later revert to the global political models and views of the late Soviet era—including seeing Israel as a potential adversary, given its strategic partnership with the United States. Consequently, the dynamics of a potential intensification of U.S.-Russian competition in the Middle East would ultimately shift almost any discrepancies between Jerusalem and Moscow from the category of “disagreements between partners” to that of “direct confrontation, leaving little room for compromise.” [1]
Initially, Moscow indeed attempted—with some success at times—to position itself as a party capable of cooperating with virtually all actors in the Middle Eastern conflict and even mediating between them. However, after October 7, 2023, Russia explicitly supported Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian bloc as a whole. At the same time, the profile of the rapidly developing Russian-Israeli relations of the past decade sharply diminished, although Moscow and Jerusalem attempted to maintain a semblance of “business as usual”.
In other words, recent events appear to conclude the nearly fifteen-year debate between “Kremlin optimists” and “Kremlin pessimists.” The current situation fits into a normative framework characteristic of a substantial and influential segment of Russia’s foreign policy elites: Russia’s strategic partner in the region is Iran, which supplies critically important weapons for use on the Ukrainian front and secures Russia’s “southern flanks” in terms of geopolitical interests. This logic does not, however, extend to Russia’s view of Israel’s interests, as Israel is a strategic ally of Russia’s adversary—the United States. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that numerous practical steps and statements by Russian leaders have been widely interpreted as expressing solidarity with Iran’s Arab satellites, including Hamas and Hezbollah.
“Overnight” Shifts in Russian Public Discourse
The Russian public’s response has closely mirrored the foreign policy positions of the Russian political establishment, shaped largely by state-controlled information channels, as outlined in Part 1 of this article.
According to one of the earliest sociological surveys conducted in the USSR—though not fully representative, it provided some insight into the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda and the internal and external policies of Soviet leadership—Israel was among the top five enemies of the USSR, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and China. This survey, conducted by Professor B. Grushin in the late 1960s, highlighted these perceptions. However, after the collapse of the USSR and a shift in foreign policy, attitudes toward Israel appeared to change drastically. Regular sociological measurements by the reputable Yuri Levada Center in Moscow, beginning in the late 1980s, indicated that in the absence of state-driven anti-Israel or anti-Semitic sentiment, Russian public opinion toward Israel was predominantly neutral (“similar to other countries in the region”) or mildly positive. [2]
From the mid-1990s and over the next 25 years, approximately 60% of respondents consistently reported a lack of hostility or animosity toward Israel. About one-fifth of those surveyed expressed positive sentiments or interest in Israel, while an average of only 1 in 10 respondents indicated a negative view of the country. Isolated years marked by “spikes” in anti-Israel or “negatively neutral” attitudes—such as during the 2006 Lebanon War, noted in the first part of our article—were unfortunate exceptions.
Despite this generally neutral or favorable stance, research from this and other sociological agencies found that a considerable legacy of Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda persisted in the public consciousness, particularly among older individuals, residents of rural areas, and those with lower levels of education and income. Superficially, the longstanding Arab-Israeli conflict seems to have little effect on current levels of anti-Semitism in Russia or public attitudes toward Israel. Only 3% of Russians closely follow Middle Eastern political news or actively seek related information, primarily those who have traveled to Israel or have relatives or close friends there. Another 17% follow the situation “from time to time,” while the majority remain indifferent, uninformed, or simply do not follow developments in the region. Three-quarters of respondents stated they do not support either side in the conflict, while 10% expressed sympathy for both. Among the remaining respondents, support was almost evenly split: 8% sided with Israelis, and 7% with Arabs. This neutrality is gradually increasing, as previous surveys showed support levels at 12% and 10%, respectively.
Nevertheless, anti-Zionism, though less overt than in the Soviet era, remains an “acceptable” expression of latent anti-Semitism among certain groups. This includes belief in Zionist conspiracies and notions of Jewish plans for global dominance. “Traces of this ideological indoctrination and propaganda, along with a rejection of liberal values and democracy,” note the authors of a 2020 study by the Levada Center, commissioned by the Russian Jewish Congress, “are still evident today in attitudes toward Israel and Jewish emigration.”
The reversion of Russian leadership to Soviet-era narratives on the Arab-Israeli conflict has notably shifted public sentiment. In an October 2024 Levada Center survey, respondents had a favorable view of China (81%), Brazil (55%), Turkey (52%), and Iran (50%), with only 27% expressing positive views of Israel—comparable to views of France (20%), the UN (19%), the EU (16%), the U.S. (16%), and Ukraine (14%). This is a marked contrast from 2013, when respondents viewed Israel as a friendly state. In September 2018, 52% of Russians surveyed by the Public Opinion Foundation also viewed Israel as friendly, with only 16% holding an opposing view.
Who Is Responsible for the Middle Eastern Conflict?
There is little doubt that the current decline in public sympathy for Israel stems from the official rhetoric and stance of Russian authorities. This trend has had a noticeable impact on Russian public opinion. A survey conducted by the Levada Center in late October 2023 revealed that while two-thirds (66%) of respondents did not support either side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, those who sympathized with the Palestinian Arabs (in this case, Hamas) outnumbered those sympathetic to Israel by 3.5 times. Support for Israel was more common among members of the “internet party”—younger people aged 25-39 and residents of major cities.
In general, compared to data from 2007–2010, the share of supporters of Palestinian Arabs in the conflict with Israel has doubled (from 9–14% to 21%), while support for the Jewish state has similarly halved, dropping to 6%.
Nevertheless, Russians largely consider the United States and NATO countries to be primarily responsible for ongoing bloodshed and instability in the Middle East—a view shaped by both Soviet-era and current Russian state propaganda. The belief that the U.S. and NATO bear the main responsibility is most prevalent among older respondents (44% of those aged 55 and older), low-income respondents (44%), those who believe the country is on the right track (40%), and those who rely on television for information (44%).
However, compared to the 2023 survey, support for this viewpoint has dropped by nearly a quarter—from 45% to 38%—largely due to a nearly twofold increase (from 12% to 22%) in those blaming Israel entirely. The proportion attributing responsibility to Hamas and Palestinian extremists has remained steady over the past year, with less than 10% of respondents holding this view. Meanwhile, the percentage assigning blame to Iran and its allies, or to Russia, hovered around or below the margin of error.
Some demographic divides are present, though not pronounced, along lines of gender, age, political outlook, and socioeconomic status. Men (27%), respondents aged 55 and older, and those who believe “things in Russia are going in the right direction” (25%) are more likely to hold Israel responsible for the continuation and escalation of the conflict. On the other hand, younger respondents under 24 (13%), more affluent respondents (10% of those able to afford durable goods), and those who believe the country is on the wrong track (13%) are more likely to attribute responsibility to Hamas and Palestinian Arabs.
Interest within Russian society in Israel’s conflict with Arab terrorist groups has noticeably waned over the year since the beginning of the IDF’s “Operation Iron Swords” in Gaza. While over 80% of Russians surveyed by the Levada Center in September 2024 stated that they were aware of Israel’s war with Hamas, only one in five respondents (19%) reported closely following the developments—almost half the figure from October 2023 (32%). Nearly two-thirds (62%) of respondents said they had “heard something but without details,” which is only slightly higher than the previous year (56%). Those who admitted to hearing about the conflict “for the first time during the survey” nearly doubled, reaching 18% in September 2024 compared to 11% in October 2023.
In other words, Russian public engagement with Israel’s fight against Iranian-backed Arab terror—and the Middle Eastern conflict more broadly—remains limited. The “television party,” which represents a significant portion of Russian society, continues to follow official narratives. Should a direct confrontation between Russia and Israel occur in the Middle East, Russian society is likely to accept it with the same “understanding” that many Russians displayed toward the military aggression against Ukraine.
That said, another perspective also exists, such as among the dwindling number of “optimists” in Israel who argue that the differences, or even sharp disagreements, between Israel and Russia on various issues do not reflect a fundamental conflict of interests between the two nations but rather the current global context of Russia’s interests. They believe that if the context shifts or Israel’s role within it changes, so too could the state of Russian-Israeli relations—and, with it, Russian public sentiment.
In any case, if this shift does happen, it likely won’t occur until after the wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have concluded—something that does not appear imminent.
[1] Personal interviews conducted by the author with experts and staff from relevant Israeli, American, and Russian think tanks (Tel Aviv, Herzliya, Jerusalem, Ramat Gan, Washington, and Moscow, 2011–2015).
[2] Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia in Contemporary Russia. Analytical Report on Sociological Research. Moscow: “Yuri Levada Analytical Center” and REC, 2020, pp. 85-87.