PSCRP-BESA Reports No 99 (Nov 26, 2024)
Kazakhstan refuses to join BRICS, an organization that Russia (and to some extent China) sees as an alternative to the Western-centric world order. Clearly, such a decision inevitably invites retaliatory pressure from Russia. To offset this to some extent, and for a number of other pragmatic reasons, Kazakhstan continues to actively participate in BRICS+ activities (the organization’s interaction with the Global South). This was evidenced by President Tokayev’s participation in the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, which took place October 22–24, 2024. Prior to the summit, Astana received an invitation from Russia to join BRICS, but declined.
What does this position mean in the context of Kazakhstan’s relations with the two key BRICS members, Russia and China? This is a natural manifestation of Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. This policy is a strategic approach aimed at balancing relationships with leading world powers, including Russia, while preserving sovereignty and advancing national interests. While maintaining close ties with Russia based on economic dependence, cultural and historical bonds, and security cooperation, Kazakhstan is making efforts to avoid excessive reliance on Moscow. Kazakhstan is developing relations with China, the European Union, the United States, and Turkey. This diversification reduces vulnerability to Russian dominance. Kazakhstan has taken a balanced approach to key international issues related to Russia, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia in the context of the Russia-Ukraine armed conflict reflect a delicate balancing act driven by Kazakhstan’s commitment to its sovereignty, regional stability, and balanced multi-vector foreign policy. The war has put the bilateral relationship to the test as Kazakhstan seeks to distance itself from Russia’s actions while maintaining critical ties stemming from shared history, geography, and economic interdependence. Through initiatives such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, Kazakhstan seeks to bypass Russian-controlled trade routes.
Kazakhstan’s relations with China are yet another critical component of its foreign policy. Kazakhstan’s ties with China are driven by economic pragmatism, regional cooperation and efforts to create a counterweight to Russian dominance, while carefully managing public concerns about China’s growing influence. As a result, Kazakhstan remains vigilant in balancing Chinese influence and partnerships with other countries to safeguard its sovereignty and maintain a diversified foreign policy approach.
Kazakhstan’s engagement with BRICS reflects its foreign policy approach, which aims to diversify partnerships with leading global and regional powers while maintaining balanced and pragmatic relations. Although Kazakhstan is not a member of BRICS, it views this grouping as an important platform for fostering economic cooperation, multilateralism and collaboration on global issues.
Kazakhstan’s interest in BRICS is aligned with its desire to reduce its dependence on any single power, such as Russia or China, and to expand international partnerships. Kazakhstan has strong economic ties with BRICS members, especially China and Russia, and also with India. Kazakhstan can also use its participation in regional platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which China, Russia and India are also members, to align with BRICS-related initiatives.
Although Astana is not currently interested in full membership in BRICS, Kazakhstan may qualify for observer status or limited participation in BRICS+ initiatives.
Kazakhstan’s decision not to join BRICS, while President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attended the BRICS summit in Kazan, reflects a calculated move consistent with the country’s multi-vector foreign policy. By refraining from joining BRICS, Kazakhstan maintains a neutral position in the global power dynamics. Joining BRICS could be perceived as aligning too closely with the organization’s dominant members, China and Russia, which could alienate Kazakhstan’s Western partners and other allies. Kazakhstan values its sovereignty and avoids being drawn into the political agenda of any bloc, especially one like BRICS, which often positions itself (mainly due to Moscow’s position) as a counterweight to Western-led institutions.
There are many other reasons for this decision. It allows the country to benefit from partnerships with BRICS countries, such as trade and investment opportunities, without being bound by its policies or decisions. Besides, Kazakhstan already cooperates with BRICS members such as Russia, China and India through organizations like the Eurasian Economic Union (with Russia) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with Russia, China and India). This reduces the need for formal membership in BRICS. In recent years, Kazakhstan has also prioritized strengthening regional cooperation in Central Asia, working closely with neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Joining BRICS could shift the focus away from these regional goals. While BRICS membership may expand trade opportunities, Kazakhstan seeks to diversify its economy by engaging with a wider range of partners, including Western countries, South Korea and Japan, as well as BRICS countries. Public opinion in Kazakhstan is cautious about deepening ties with Russia and China, the two dominant players in BRICS. Joining BRICS, of which Russia is a key member, could undermine Kazakhstan’s neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Tokayev’s attendance at Kazan summit reflects Kazakhstan’s interest in exploring partnerships within the BRICS+ framework, which permits non-members to engage in specific initiatives. This pragmatic approach allows Kazakhstan to selectively participate in economic and development projects without full membership. Tokayev’s visit underscores Kazakhstan’s commitment to multilateral diplomacy and its role as a bridge between different geopolitical blocs.
Since the decision of Kazakhstan’s leadership was perceived by the Russian authorities as yet another refusal to follow Moscow’s lead, Russia responded by intensifying the trade war that is slowly being waged between the member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. On October 17, 2024, Moscow imposed restrictions on import of tomatoes, peppers, fresh melons, wheat, flax seeds and lentils from Kazakhstan. Earlier, on October 2, Russia suspended the transit and import of grain from Kazakhstan. The Russian measures were a response to Kazakhstan’s August 2024 ban on wheat imports, including from Eurasian Economic Union member states. Kazakhstan justified this decision by the need to sell off its own grain stocks, which were not in demand due to cheaper competition from Russian producers.
It is worth noting that since 2022 Russia has been applying various forms of economic pressure on Kazakhstan. Russia has repeatedly interrupted the transit of Kazakh oil through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). These disruptions occurred in mid-2022 and early 2023, affecting Kazakhstan’s oil exports to Europe. Russian control over key energy transit routes has allowed Moscow to exert pressure on Kazakhstan’s plans to increase oil exports to Germany as an alternative to Russian supplies.
This pressure from the Kremlin emphasizes that Kazakhstan has to balance preserving its sovereignty with its multi-vector foreign policy while maintaining deep economic and political ties with Russia.