PSCRP-BESA Reports No 138 (July 3, 2025)
by Alexander Shpunt
Part 1
On Wednesday, June 11, the Supreme Council of Transnistria, during an emergency session, approved the introduction of a state of economic emergency (SEE) in the region. The initial implementation of the SEE regime in the economy took place on December 11, 2024, and it has since undergone five extensions. The Moldovan government initiated a process—long anticipated by experts—to nationalize key energy assets of the republic, which until recently belonged to another state—Russia—not even a neighboring one.
At a government meeting on April 16, amendments to the Natural Gas Law were approved, with the stated objective of “combating the market dominance of Moldovagaz.” This document was prepared with the support of the EU, EBRD, and USAID as part of the MESA energy security project. The explanatory note to the bill indicates that despite a decrease in Moldovagaz’s share of the retail natural gas market recently, the company continues to hold a de facto monopolistic position. The figures confirm this assertion: a reduction from 97.69% in 2022 to 90.5% in the first half of 2024 cannot be considered genuine “demonopolization.”
As early as January 15, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean declared that Moldova intended to establish full control over Moldovagaz, a company in which Gazprom holds a 50% + 1 share. However, the primary political intrigue revolves around the Moldovan GRES (Cuciurgan power station), specifically because the station is located in de facto rebellious Transnistria.
Until very recently, the central authorities of Moldova purchased remarkably inexpensive electricity from the Moldovan GRES. The Moldovan GRES provided electricity to the state-owned company Energocom for many years at a rate of $65/MWh. In comparison, the average European electricity price is $327/MWh, with prices in Germany being approximately a quarter higher. This disparity largely explains why this single station supplied 95% of the country’s total energy consumption.
The cost of raw materials—Russian natural gas—determined the price of electricity. Rebellious Transnistria, which openly declared its political alignment with Moscow, benefited from unprecedented preferences from the Russian authorities in this regard.
This situation, naturally, displeased the authorities in Chisinau but completely suited Moldova’s economic elites. As a result, a unique situation of conflict preservation for years emerged in the post-Soviet space, described as “frozen without de-escalation.” While minimal communication in the 5+2 format effectively ceased five years ago and the sides engage in aggressive rhetoric, there has been no outbreak of violence or even overt forceful actions. “If it works, don’t touch it!” as they say in the IT industry. Business interests maintained the situation, rather than politicians.
These events resulted in Moldova’s manifestation of a systemic conflict, which we have previously discussed in analyses concerning Georgia, Armenia, and Gagauzia.
Political elites in post-Soviet countries build their career trajectories through the process of their states’ integration into the European Union; they observe Estonians and Lithuanians becoming high-ranking European officials, which inspires them.
Conversely, economic elites have structured their business processes with or through Moscow. Each country has done so differently, as we have noted, but Moscow is an indispensable element of the business model everywhere. Practical, rather than rhetorical, rapprochement with the EU is unacceptable for the businesses of almost all dollar billionaires in the post-Soviet space.
This systemic, existential conflict for each side can manifest in various public forms—as an ethnic conflict, ideological conflict, territorial conflict, or even a religious conflict—yet internally, it fundamentally reduces to a conflict between owners of capital and owners of the state’s bureaucratic apparatus.
In January 2025, the transit of Russian gas through Ukrainian territory ceased. An energy crisis ensued, impacting both Moldova and Transnistria. This crisis eroded the foundation for the “frozen without de-escalation” state, prompting businessmen to step aside and yield control to politicians.
Tiraspol shifted the Moldovan GRES to coal and limited its service exclusively to Transnistrian consumers, while Moldova was compelled to transition to more expensive electricity from Romania. Immediately in January, the tariff for consumers of Premier Energy, the largest market operator, increased by 75% to $220/MWh, triggering an energy crisis in both Transnistria and Moldova.
The de facto frozen negotiation process then escalated into a phase of open rhetorical warfare. A week before the cessation of supplies, in December 2024, Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, Oleg Serebrian, proposed on PRO TV two options for Transnistria: “to die either of hunger or of cold.” This statement, while not inherently aggressive, was extremely imprudent and immediately taken out of context by the “war party” on both sides of the conflict, eliciting a sharp response from Vadim Krasnoselsky, the president of unrecognized Transnistria.
At the height of the conflict between Tiraspol’s and Chisinau’s statements, Moscow intervened. As reported by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Moldovan President Maia Sandu, amidst the crisis, demanded the preparation of a forceful seizure of the Moldovan GRES in Transnistria. The Russian intelligence agency claimed that the president of the republic also instructed the development of a plan for a military operation to establish control over Transnistria.
Then, unexpectedly in June, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean informed the Financial Times that Russia planned to increase its military presence in the Transnistrian region to 10,000 soldiers, noting that these data were based on “intelligence assessments.” The Russian Foreign Ministry immediately refuted these plans; however, this was clearly insufficient to halt the surge of discussion surrounding such a scenario, including within serious analytical circles.
The January escalation was successfully overcome. A humanitarian loan from Russia and Dubai gas purchased with these resources provided a respite for the parties. But all signs point to a hot fall and winter—not the heat in Moldovan and Transnistrian homes.
Alexander Shpunt is Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics, resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999 – 2011 he also served as the Executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think-tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.