PSCRP-BESA Reports No 206 (May 25, 2026)
At the time this article was written, it was still unclear whether the White House intended to resume large-scale strikes on the infrastructure of the Islamic Republic of Iran — or whether it would heed the recommendations of the leadership of Pakistan, Qatar, and the UAE to continue negotiations with Tehran. It is clear that, in the event of a military decision, Israel would also join the United States — its leadership is unlikely to take such a step without a “green light” from Washington. For now, however, there appears to be no consensus on this issue within the U.S. president’s team.
In any case, it is still too early to speak of the end — at least of this stage — of the full-scale regional confrontation between the American-Israeli bloc, supported by a number of Arab Gulf states, on the one hand, and the bloc of Iran and its radical Islamist proxies, backed by Russia and China, on the other. Nevertheless, some interim results of this conflict can already be assessed. For example, to what extent each of the regional and global players involved, regardless of further developments, will be able to count the outcome as an unequivocal gain — or will instead have to calculate the balance of geopolitical and economic losses.
Who Came Out Ahead?
In the first weeks of the “Second Iran War,” which began on February 28, a number of observers did not rule out that Russia could become one of the main — if not the main — beneficiaries of what was happening. As during the first “12-day” war between Israel and Iran in the summer of 2025, supported by the United States and its partners, Moscow chose not to intervene directly in the current, far larger and more prolonged conflict either. It limited itself to general statements in support of Tehran and criticism of the United States and Israel, while also offering to assist in “advancing peaceful solutions.” Russia’s support for Iran under the strategic partnership agreement between the two countries, announced in January 2025, and under the package of agreements signed in the spring of that year in the fields of diplomacy, the economy, humanitarian affairs, and security, has been and remains minimal in this war.
Moscow’s position at the beginning of the war was expressed quite clearly by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov in the formula “this war is not our war”, making it clear that, despite diplomatic solidarity with Tehran, Moscow does not consider itself an active participant in this campaign. According to him, Russia must minimize the consequences for the Russian economy of “those global shocks which, as we can already see, are beginning. We probably need to secure benefits for ourselves wherever possible, cynical as that may sound.”
As we have already noted, in exchange for its “limited non-intervention,” fate gave Moscow an opportunity to receive unexpected additional dividends. Apart from hopes that the massive use of American Tomahawk missiles to destroy Iranian facilities theoretically makes supplies of such missiles to Ukraine less likely, any prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz or destruction of oil and gas export capacity in the Persian Gulf expands the market for sanctioned Russian energy resources.
“Moscow rushed to load crude onto tankers to take advantage of soaring oil prices triggered by Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz,” Bloomberg’s observer believed. “A tariff waiver courtesy of Donald Trump, whose administration is under growing pressure over spiking gasoline prices, now permits buyers to purchase those barrels without fear of sanctions tied to the Kremlin’s 12-year war on Ukraine.”
Indeed, if Russian budget revenues from oil and gas in January–February 2026 were almost 50% lower than a year earlier, the budget deficit reached 3.45 trillion rubles — about $44 billion — which was more than 40% higher than in January–February 2025, and the situation was moving toward a 10% cut in non-military budget items, then by March the financial situation had begun to improve significantly. Overall, according to expert estimates, depending on the duration of the conflict, Russia could receive between $45 billion and $151 billion in additional budget revenues in 2026. Moreover, if the war lasts three months, additional export revenues would exceed Russia’s entire budget deficit for 2025; under a six-month scenario, Moscow could even achieve a budget surplus and replenish its sovereign fund, sustaining elevated military spending for many years.
However, not everything ultimately looks so rosy. First, it should be taken into account that the Iranian underground plants destroyed by American cruise missiles and the Israeli Air Force will, until the regime is able — if that is even possible — to resume their operation, cease for the foreseeable future to be sources of weapons and ammunition supplies for the Russian army.
Second, Russia’s refusal to condemn the terrorist strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and its de facto support for the war Tehran is waging with drones against the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are already seriously damaging Moscow’s position in the Gulf states, including by forcing these countries to seek help in securing their airspace not only from the United States and Israel, but also from Kyiv. Not to mention that further strengthening of cooperation between the Gulf states and Western powers during the conflict may mean a further erosion of Russian influence in the region.
Another factor is that Russia has been receiving its share of the sanctioned goods it needs thanks to schemes developed by Iran, which for decades built networks of companies and intermediaries in the UAE, Turkey, and Southeast Asia to circumvent international sanctions. However, Iran’s direct military confrontation with the Arab Gulf states is quite capable of undermining this established mechanism. Not to mention that Iranian aggression may accelerate the formation of a broader regional coalition to contain Iranian ambitions — something that, presumably, would not greatly coincide with Russian interests in the Middle East.
Most importantly, the cessation, at this stage, of hostilities on the Iranian track forces a substantial revision of the most optimistic hopes for windfall profits from oil and gas exports, which account for roughly one fifth of the Russian budget. According to recently published Reuters calculations https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-oil-gas-revenue-seen-up-39-yy-may-thanks-iran-war-2026-05-20/, although Russia’s state oil and gas revenues are set to rise by 39% year on year in May to $9.8 billion, thanks to a global oil price rally, revenues are expected to decline from April by around 17% due to cyclical payments of profit-based tax. Russia’s budget will also lose out from increasing subsidies to refineries in the form of the reverse excise tax and damper payments.
It would seem that the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz first by Iran, and then the U.S. fleet’s blockade of Iranian seaborne oil exports — which has affected https://news.usni.org/2026/05/22/russian-crude-exports-increase-as-other-strait-of-hormuz-transits-remain-low China, Japan, India, and other countries of Southeast and East Asia — opens up additional opportunities for Russia, especially for its energy supplies to China. Some expectations of this kind were linked to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing, where 42 intergovernmental documents were signed on May 20 of this year. However, the “flagship” project of the current stage of the energy partnership — an agreement on Chinese investment in the construction of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline and the corresponding commercial contracts for Russian supplies — was not signed. In Beijing, experts believe, there is still uncertainty over whether China needs another route for Russian hydrocarbons, given the two already existing routes and its own oil reserves, which have not yet been tapped. Especially if, under the current circumstances, the Russian side — lacking other major sales markets — seeks to raise its traditionally low, at times near-dumping, prices.
Russia and Israel
It is also important to understand where Israel fits into this entire configuration, and whether this is affecting — or may affect in the future — its relations with Russia. Over the past two decades, Moscow has built these relations against the backdrop of balancing its partnership with Tehran in its confrontation with the United States and Israel, including military-technical cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and attempts to maintain working contacts with the Jewish state. Within official or semi-official Russian discourse, which is also broadcast to a number of other post-Soviet countries, the United States and Israel are often portrayed as key actors of the “global West,” pursuing aggressive foreign policies and seeking to preserve global hegemony. Accordingly, international crises are interpreted as the result of actions by Western powers, while their opponents are often presented as victims or participants in a defensive struggle.
Moscow continues to condemn the actions of Israel and the United States in their current war with Iran, but at the same time generally avoids steps that could lead to irreversible escalation in its relations with Washington and Jerusalem. It seems that, at least for now, Russia does not wish to see Jerusalem among its open enemies. This, however, does not prevent individual representatives of the Russian political establishment, and especially pro-Kremlin information circles, from participating in anti-Israeli propaganda campaigns — and it is difficult to doubt that these were sanctioned at a fairly high level.
The presence of corresponding messages, or “understandings” of the mood in these circles, explains, for example, the detention by Russian security forces of at least 40 Israeli citizens who arrived at Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport on a flight from Tel Aviv — both holders of dual Israeli and Russian citizenship and those with only Israeli citizenship. According to media reports, people were held for about five hours without water, food, or access to a toilet, and during interrogations they were told directly that Iran is Russia’s ally, and therefore “Iran’s enemy is our enemy as well.” They were released only after the intervention of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the Israeli Embassy in Moscow.
Another important indicator of what is happening is the mood of the Russian public, a significant part of which still forms its political worldview under the influence of federal television channels. Thus, a survey by the authoritative Moscow-based Levada Center, conducted in late March 2025, showed that in the current conflict around 40% of Russians sympathized with Iran, while only 2% sympathized with Israel and the United States. Another 53% of respondents expressed sympathy for neither side.
Given the systematic and consistent language of hatred that has taken root in the post-Soviet space after October 7, 2023, and in particular after Operation “A People Like a Lion,” the new antisemitic wave against the backdrop of the start of Operation “Lion’s Roar” did not come as a surprise, says researcher Nati Kantorovich. However, in stark contrast to the reaction to the operation in June 2025, this time enormous volumes of such language were recorded from the very first day of the operation. According to the data he presented, by March 14, 2026 — two weeks after the start of the war — about 76% of the 59,000 relevant messages analyzed in traditional media and social networks contained antisemitic or anti-Israeli rhetoric to one degree or another. This contrasted with 5–10% — with a significantly smaller volume of source material — in the period preceding the operation.
For their part, more than 80% of Israelis, according to an April 2025 study by the American Pew Research Center, said they had a negative view of Russia — whereas before February 24, 2022, Russia’s image among Israeli citizens had generally been positive. Among repatriates from the former USSR, according to the results of a survey, conducted in December 2025 by the popular Israeli Russian-language news portal NewsRu.co.il — “Israel’s main friends are Azerbaijan and the United States, enemies are Iran and Turkey”. More than half of respondents, 55%, named Russia an enemy of Israel. This compares with 71% in 2024, less than half — 49% — in 2022, and less than a third — 32% — in 2016.
Another 37% of those surveyed at the end of last year believed that Russia was neither a friend nor an enemy of Israel, while only 6% considered Russia its friend. At the same time, more than half of the Russian-speaking Israelis surveyed acknowledged that their attitude toward Russia is influenced by the nature of its voting — usually in support of anti-Israel resolutions — at the UN. Some 52% said that this voting affects them “to a significant extent,” and among those who consider themselves patriots of Israel, the figure was 54%.
As for the Israeli government, it continues, to one degree or another, to maintain the appearance of “business as usual” with Moscow, although the “special relationship” between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Vladimir Putin, which took shape at the height of the Israeli-Russian “honeymoon” in the second decade of this century, is clearly a thing of the past. One of the few exceptions was the conduct of current Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, who, during a visit to Kyiv in July 2025 aimed at launching a strategic dialogue with Ukraine on the Iranian threat, stated that “Israel strongly condemns Russia’s attacks on the civilian population.” He also reaffirmed his country’s commitment to supporting Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.
Sa’ar’s statement during a visit to Estonia was even tougher, when he argued that Russia, China, and North Korea form an “axis of authoritarianism” supporting the “axis of terror” — Iran and its allies in the Middle East: Hamas, Hezbollah, Shiite formations in Iraq, and Palestinian militants. However, apart from some media resonance in Israel and relatively neutral, mildly critical mentions in official Russian media, these démarches had almost no practical significance.
It is possible that the position of the current Israeli leadership toward Moscow will also be shaped with regard to the line of the Donald Trump administration, which does not see Russia’s presumed support for Iran as a major problem. Some observers believe it is prepared to ease anti-Russian sanctions within the framework of an unrealistic — and possibly even destructive and risky, especially for the Middle East — 1980s worldview: friendship with Moscow alongside confrontation with Tehran, doubts about NATO’s authority, and the use of tariffs. Trump’s downplaying of Russia’s alleged support for Iran and easing of sanctions reflect a 1980s-era worldview that favors befriending Moscow, confronting Tehran, questioning NATO, and using tariffs. These views are shaping U.S. policy in ways that may be disruptive and risky, particularly in the Middle East.
On the other hand, some developments that have become public may introduce certain adjustments to this approach. In addition to the supply of Russian drones to Iran, attention was drawn to information obtained by The Jerusalem Post, according to which Russian intelligence provided Iran with a detailed list of 55 critical energy infrastructure sites in Israel, which would allow Iran to carry out precision missile strikes capable, in principle, of paralyzing the country’s national energy system.
It is difficult to say whether such episodes, if repeated, will become a “red line” requiring the Israeli leadership to abandon its traditional “balance of interests” and substantially revise relations with the Russian Federation. For now, only isolated cases are visible on the surface, such as the coordination in April of this year between Russian diplomats and the Israel Defense Forces over the evacuation of about 200 employees of the Russian state nuclear company working at the Bushehr nuclear power plant after Israeli-American strikes in the area. Presumably, the main dialogue between Jerusalem and Moscow is taking place behind the scenes, and its content can only be guessed at for now.