PSCRP-BESA Reports No 60 (May 24, 2024)
On April 16, 2024, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova made a positive decision on the possibility of holding a constitutional referendum on the issue of European integration on October 20, 2024. Taking into account the fact that Moldovan President M. Sandu previously proposed holding a referendum simultaneously with the presidential elections, the topic of European integration actually took center stage on the electoral agenda, dividing potential candidates for the presidency into supporters and opponents of rapprochement with the EU. In the context of the Transnistrian conflict, as well as the ongoing war in Ukraine, the results of the presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova will have a strategic impact on determining the course of the future development of the Republic of Moldova, including the issue of preserving the territorial integrity of the state.
Unstable Leadership
In November 2020, Maia Sandu was elected to the post of President of the Republic of Moldova. The head of state received a record 57.75% of the votes. This success was largely due to a number of factors. The first, M. Sandu’s main competitor, Igor Dodon, spoiled relations with his former political allies, who had serious political influence in society. We are talking, first of all, about Renato Usatîi, the leader of “Our Party,” (Nasha Partia) who took 3rd place in the first round of the 2020 elections and called on his supporters to vote for M. Sandu in the second round. Second, the key theses of M. Sandu’s election program were the fight against corruption, justice reform and de-oligarchization of the state. Third, M. Sandu made proposals for developing relations with both the European Union and Russia. Thus, she managed to attract many Russian-speaking citizens of the Republic of Moldova to her side. Fourth, an innovative approach in M. Sandu’s campaign was the massive participation in voting of the Moldovan diaspora, whose votes turned out to be decisive for victory in the second round of elections.
An unprecedented credit of trust from citizens, as well as the support of European and American partners, allowed M. Sandu to achieve the dissolution of parliament and the calling of early elections in April 2021. As a result of the new election campaign on July 11, 2021, the pro-presidential PAS party won 63 out of 101 seats in parliament. This balance of power allowed PAS to independently pass bills and appoint a prime minister. Thus, as a result of the 2019-2020 elections, the full extent of executive and legislative power was concentrated in the hands of M. Sandu. The concentration of real political power in the hands of the president created the preconditions for the implementation of election promises and reforms. However, despite serious experience in opposition activities, most members of M. Sandu’s team did not have sufficient administrative experience in government. For example, since the removal of the Prosecutor General of Moldova, Alexandru Stoianoglo, from office in October 2021, the authorities have not been able to elect a new prosecutor general to this day. The very removal from office of A. Stoianoglo was declared illegal on October 24, 2023 by a decision of the ECHR.
A serious miscalculation of the Moldovan Government was the revision in October 2021 of the gas payment formula when concluding a new contract with Gazprom JSC. The head of the Moldovan delegation, Andrei Spinu, insisted on new conditions for signing the agreement. However, changes in the gas payment formula, as well as an increase in gas prices on the European market during this period, resulted in a doubling of the final cost for Moldovan citizens. These and other management mistakes of M. Sandu’s team allowed the opposition to move on to harsh criticism of the president, as well as to mass protests demanding new early parliamentary elections. Thus, at the beginning of January 2022, Sandu’s political prospects for re-election were assessed as insignificant. The party in power looked confused, and Galva of the state itself could simply disappear from the information space for several weeks.
Consolidating political leadership
February 24, 2022 was a turning point not only for Ukraine, but also for President Maia Sandu personally. In the first weeks of the war, the leadership of Moldova was afraid of the advance of the Russian army in the south and the amphibious landing operation with the aim of capturing Odessa and thereby reaching the borders of Moldova. The withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the Kyiv region and the removal of the threat around Odessa allowed M. Sandu to seize control of the political situation in the country. Widespread international support for Ukraine, the arrival of US Secretary of State A. Blinken in Chisinau on March 6, 2022, as well as the holding of the second European Summit in Moldova on June 1, 2023, helped M. Sandu completely shift the focus of public attention from internal problems to external challenges and tasks. From that moment on, difficulties in the state’s economy were interpreted as a consequence of the war on the territory of Ukraine, or the result of hybrid Russian attacks on Moldova.
Moreover, it was the war in Ukraine that became the most suitable reason for M. Sandu’s team to clear Moldova’s information space from Russian influence, which has traditionally supported political and public organizations in Moldova that advocate strategic relations with Russia. To solve this and other problems, the Parliament of Moldova decided to introduce a state of emergency, which was in force in the country from February 2022 to December 30, 2023. During this period of time, at the request of the SIS (Moldovan intelligence service) in October 2023, the authorities closed six television channels and 22 Internet portals. They refused to supply Russian gas (with the exception of gas for Transnistria). In August 2023, Chisinau expelled 22 employees of the Russian embassy, and in June 2023, the Constitutional Court banned the activities of the political party SHOR. The result of these efforts was the adoption by Parliament in December 2023 of a new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, in which Russia is listed as one of the two main threats to the Moldovan state. It was simply impossible to imagine such a situation two years ago. Along with an active anti-Russian policy, the war in Ukraine became a decisive factor for Moldova receiving EU candidate status in June 2023, as well as the EU decision in December 2023 to begin negotiations with Moldova on accession to the European Community.
At the same time, successes in foreign policy, as well as serious European financial assistance, could not fully compensate for the failures of M. Sandu’s team in domestic economic policy. New mass opposition rallies, rising prices for electricity, gas and food have become a serious reason for the disappointment of Moldovan citizens in the policies of the Moldovan president. This negative trend was confirmed by the results of local elections in November 2023. Despite all the administrative resources and media control, PAS mayoral candidates were unable to win the elections not only in Chisinau, they lost in all major cities of the country. This failure was partially offset by the victory of PAS representatives in 19 of the 32 district councils. Thus, the unsatisfactory results in the local elections became a clear signal that M. Sandu needs to look for new approaches to achieve victory in the next presidential elections in 2024.
Sandu’s victory in the first round as a super task
On December 24, 2023, in her television address, President M. Sandu announced that she would participate in the presidential elections, and also proposed holding a referendum on Moldova’s accession to the European Union. Despite the fact that the idea of European integration is supported by the majority of Moldovan citizens, M. Sandu’s initiative was criticized both by the opposition and pro-European parties. The main argument used by critics of this idea was that the EU referendum should not be linked to ongoing election campaigns, where citizens vote for different candidates. In this case, the topic of European integration becomes key in the election campaign of the current president. In this regard, there are high chances that M. Sandu’s opponents will vote against Moldova’s accession to the EU, although in general they support the idea of European integration. Sociological research on this issue indicates that society is divided into approximately two equal parts on the question of whether presidential elections and a referendum should be held on the same day.
Despite the controversial nature of this initiative, Maia Sandu herself enjoys a very high level of trust among the citizens six months before the elections; none of the leaders of the opposition parties managed to catch up with the Moldovan president in terms of trust rating in four years. However, this does not mean that the Moldovan opposition has no chance of winning the presidential election campaign. An analysis of various sociological studies shows that when the opposition unites and a single candidate is nominated, there are real opportunities for the opposition candidate to win. M. Sandu’s team is well aware of the existing risks and will make every effort to ensure that their candidate wins in the first round. It is from this point of view that we can consider the introduction on April 27, 2024 of a form of postal voting for the diaspora living in the USA, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. It is also obvious that the US Democratic Party, as a strategic partner of M. Sandu, will provide serious methodological advice on organizing voting by mail, since it is in this form of voting that Democrats are traditionally strong in the United States.
At the moment, the leading opposition parties: the Socialist Party (PSRM), the Communist Party (PCRM), the Chance Party, which is controlled by businessman Ilan Shor, cannot agree on a single candidate for the upcoming elections. As Irina Vlah, ex-head of the Gagauz autonomy and leader of the opposition movement «Platforma Moldova», said, the opposition will support any candidate who makes it to the second round of elections together with M. Sandu. How realistic such a scenario is, remains an open question, since the former President of Moldova, Igor Dodon, who has the highest rating among opposition actors, has failed to become a consolidating political figure for the Moldovan opposition.
Geopolitical dimension of the elections
Since the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement in the Transnistrian region in June 1992, as well as the adoption of the Constitution in 1994, which established the constitutional principle of neutrality, a unique balance of military-political forces has developed on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, influencing the socio-economic situation in republic. On the one hand, Russia traditionally has a strong influence in Transnistria, Gagauzia and the north of Moldova, on the other hand, the EU and the USA, and the role of Romania must be highlighted separately, are systematically pursuing a course to promote Moldova along the European path of development.
The war in Ukraine, as well as the idea of holding a referendum on Moldova’s accession to the EU, have seriously aggravated contradictions in Moldovan society on key issues of the country’s development. In particular, on the prospects for cooperation with Russia, on strengthening military-political interaction with NATO, on the problem of closing the media and censorship issues. It should be noted that the upcoming referendum on Moldova’s accession to the EU is of a constitutional nature. If citizens support the idea of Moldova joining the EU, the principle of European integration will be enshrined in the Constitution of Moldova and will have a priority status over national legislation. In turn, this may increase political tension between Tiraspol and Chisinau in the context of the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. Since in 2006, Transnistria held its own referendum, in which 98% of citizens spoke in favor of independence and gradual entry into the Russian Federation. Serious concerns among experts in terms of escalation of the situation are caused by Bucharest’s legislative initiative on the possibility of using the Romanian army to protect Romanian citizens. Taking into account the fact that about 600 thousand citizens of Moldova have Romanian citizenship, then formally, with an official request from Chisinau to Romania for military assistance, such military support can be provided. It is obvious that this kind of initiative can only be implemented in practice if the course of hostilities in Ukraine changes, and the new offensive of the Russian army to the Odesa region becomes possible.
In any case, no matter how the regional security situation develops, the battle for the presidency of the Republic of Moldova between Russia and the West will be intense. And the fact that this confrontation is taking place through political means gives hope that peace will continue to remain in Moldova.
Dr. Anatolii Dirun, postdoctoral researcher at the Moldova State University, Fulbright Visiting Scholar, director of Tiraspol School of Political Studies.