PSCRP-BESA Reports No 85 (Sept 22, 2024)
The Zangezur corridor is a proposed route that would link the main part of Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan enclave through Armenian territory. Azerbaijan and Turkey support the project, but Armenia opposes it, fearing it might change the region’s borders. Iran views the corridor as a possible threat to its influence in the region.
During his recent visit to Azerbaijan, Russian President Vladimir Putin did not explicitly address the issue of the Zangezur corridor. However, media reports following the visit suggested that Putin and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev may have reached important agreements on the opening of transportation corridors. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov openly stated that Moscow supports Azerbaijan’s plan for unrestricted access to Nakhchivan through the corridor and he accused Armenia of trying to undermine the agreements on opening transportation routes. Maria Zakharova, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, also supported the rumors about Russia’s position on Zangezur, although she said that Russia would try to somehow accommodate Iranian interests as well.
Iran has criticized Russia for supporting Azerbaijan’s demand for unrestricted access to the Nakhchivan enclave by opening the Zangezur transportat corridor through Armenia. The criticism is contained in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran on September 2. The statement noted that Russia’s support would effectively block Iran’s direct access to Armenia. Iran’s Foreign Ministry also mentioned that the Russian ambassador met with Mojtaba Demirchilu, head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s Eurasian Department and assistant minister, in Tehran. During the meeting, it was stated that Iran opposes “any geopolitical changes in the Caucasus.” In addition to blocking Iran’s access to Armenia, Tehran also risks losing its role as an alternative route from China to Europe. Tehran fears that it would also increase Turkey’s influence in the former Soviet south, further undermining Iran’s regional standing.
Iran is putting pressure on Armenia in an attempt to complicate the peace dialog between Yerevan and Baku. At a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who visited Tehran for the inauguration of President Pezeshkian, Ayatollah Khamenei said that Iran still believes that the Zangezur corridor project does not meet Armenia’s interests.
Analyzing the conflict from Israel’s perspective requires considering the complex and often conflicting interests of various international actors.
Russia is currently heavily dependent on its relationship with Turkey, particularly in areas such as trade and energy diversification plans. With Moscow’s focus on the conflict in Ukraine, its influence in the post-Soviet space, especially in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, has weakened considerably. It is therefore unlikely that Moscow will confront Turkey, especially over the Armenian issue, where Russia has already lost much of its former influence after the Second Karabakh War.
The same can be said about Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan. Putin’s visit to Aliyev highlighted the extreme necessity of Moscow’s cooperation with Baku. This is driven both by Moscow’s hopes for energy cooperation and by strategic considerations related to Azerbaijan’s key position on the routes from Central Asia to Europe.
Recently, strategic cooperation between Russia and Iran has been strengthening. Tehran is trying to capitalize on this to get concessions from Moscow on the issue of the Zangezur corridor. However, judging from statements by Russian officials like Lavrov and Zakharova, Moscow considers relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan equally important. Rather, Russia may try to play the role of a mediator between Baku, Ankara and Tehran.
Moreover, Russia still has leverage to maintain some level of control over the Zangezur issue in the future, given its formal military alliance with Armenia (despite its failure to assist Armenia during the Second Karabakh War) and its peacekeeping role in the region under the ceasefire agreement that ended the war. In reality, however, with the ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia is unlikely to capitalize on these factors to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus in the coming years.
The strategic trend is that Russia is gradually withdrawing from the South Caucasus region. Only a change in the position of the current Armenian government to a pro-Russian one can potentially alter the situation. Armenia is in a difficult position because of Iranian pressure. This pressure exacerbates existing fears in Armenian society that the issue of the Zangezur corridor could lead to territorial losses. Zangezur was a key battleground between Azerbaijanis and Armenians after the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 and the brief period of independence for Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In Armenia, debate over the Zangezur corridor sometimes resembles discussions about the Danzig corridor between Poland and Germany before World War II. This issue is a major point of contention between modern Armenian nationalism-revanchism and pro-Western liberalism.
Pashinyan and his government lean more toward pro-Western liberalism, but they have to make concessions to the nationalists. They cannot forget the fall of the liberal government of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan and the rise to power of the so-called Karabakh clan (backed by Russia), led by Kocharyan and Sargsyan under the banner of nationalism.
This downfall was caused by Ter-Petrosyan’s attempts to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which provoked strong opposition from nationalists. The rise of nationalism/revanchism as the dominant political movement in Armenia in the late 1990s included a terrorist attack on the Armenian parliament organized by nationalists that resulted in the assassination of Armenia’s former Soviet leader Demirchyan in 1999.
The ouster of the Karabakh clan under the banner of an anti-corruption campaign was a major achievement of the current Prime Minister Pashinyan. The return of Karabakh to Azerbaijan after 30 years of occupation was also a heavy blow to the revanchists.
It should be noted, however, that Armenian nationalism can be considered neither pro-Iranian nor pro-Russian, but both Russia and Iran have learned to manipulate it effectively. The rise of the Karabakh clan shifted Armenia’s foreign policy orientation toward Russia and Iran (even as Armenia continued to seek partners in the West), which in strategic terms set the stage for the disaster Armenia faced in the Second Karabakh War.
What are Israel’s interests in this complex situation?
Turkey’s leadership under President Erdogan has strained relations with Israel, especially since the outbreak of the war in Gaza. One reason for this is the domestic challenges facing Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Many Turkish voters blame the party for the country’s rampant inflation and corruption. Erdogan has traditionally sought to use foreign policy issues to offset these problems. Part of this strategy involves expanding Turkish influence in the post-Soviet space and increasing anti-Israel rhetoric.
Azerbaijan, by contrast, has a close strategic partnership with Israel. This relationship serves as a counterweight to Iranian pressure on Azerbaijan, which includes anti-Azerbaijani propaganda and intelligence operations conducted by Iranian agencies against Baku. In addition, Iran pressures against the development of trans-Caspian routes through Azerbaijan and opposes the construction of the Zangezur corridor. There is also the issue of self-determination of Southern Azerbaijan, where a significant share of Azerbaijani population lives in the territory controlled by Iran.
For Israel, the primary strategic interest in this situation, consistent with its own national security concerns, is to continue strategic cooperation with Azerbaijan and support the establishment of the Zangezur corridor. It should be noted that Israel is currently not interested in expanding Turkish influence in the post-Soviet space, particularly in the South Caucasus, because of Erdogan’s policies. Erdogan has been pressuring post-Soviet countries to adopt a collective anti-Israeli stance on the war in Gaza. However, Israel’s relations with Turkey are complex, and there may come a point in the future when the expansion of Turkish influence in the region could benefit Israel by providing an alternative to the influence of China and Russia, with whom Israel’s relations have also deteriorated due to the Gaza conflict.
This leads to another possible priority in Israel’s policy toward Zangezur. Israel does not want Armenia, where Russian influence is waning, to fall into Iran’s sphere of influence and become another proxy in the Iranian ecosystem to be used in its war against Israel. In line with this goal, Israel should support the Pashinyan government and its efforts to turn to the West by abandoning its old alliance with Russia. A return to the strategic alliance between Armenia and Russia would be undesirable for Israel, given the growing rapprochement between Moscow and Tehran.
Pashinyan’s attempts to free himself from the logic of confrontation with Baku and Ankara and create a new political system in the South Caucasus with less Russian and Iranian influence also coincide with Israeli interests.
Consequently, Israel cannot endorse Armenian efforts, based on nationalist ideas, to further utilize strategic ties with Iran to counterbalance pressure from Azerbaijan and Turkey. This policy contradicts the liberal direction of Pashinyan’s government, which seeks closer ties with the West. In addition, the potential transfer of military technology or weapons to Iran through Armenia could pose a direct threat to Israel’s national security. Equally dangerous for Jerusalem are attempts by Iranian security services to direct Armenian nationalism against Israel (there are some attempts in this direction, although, they contradict the basic ideas of Armenian nationalists themselves, who are traditionally hostile mainly to Muslim and Turkic states).
Israel also needs to consider that the construction of the Zangezur corridor could have significant implications for the future of the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region. The transit of Central Asian goods to Europe via Turkey could significantly strengthen the independence of Central Asian countries from Russia, China and Iran. It would also increase the chances of successful implementation of trans-Caspian energy projects, which could greatly enhance Europe’s energy security. This aligns with the Western coalition’s policy in the post-Soviet space. Broadly speaking, Israel is part of this coalition, although it has its own national interests aimed at ensuring its security against Iran and preventing Armenia from becoming another proxy ally in Iran’s conflict with Israel.