Russia

Armenia-Azerbaijan map. Image © 2025 Google
The overall situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan has undergone substantial changes in recent years. Both are engaged in peace negotiations that involve numerous difficult decisions on both sides - from border demarcation to the future of regional infrastructure projects such as the Zangezur Corridor. On April 19, 2024, Armenia agreed to return four abandoned border villages to Azerbaijan as an initial step in border delimitation.
Russia officially became a nationalist state in the summer of 2020, when the constitution was amended to declare Russian the state language as “the language of the state-forming people”. That same summer saw the birth of the “Russian Community”. It has since grown into the most numerous and influential nationalist and “protectionist” movement, displacing both the neo-Nazis and the Cossacks.
Chechnya and Ingushetia (AI generated map)
Chechens (Nokhchi) and Ingush (Galgai) are two closely related peoples. Not only are they neighbors: they share religion (Sufi Sunnism), tribal (teip) social structure, traditions, mutually intelligible languages, and historical fate: both peoples were subject to deportation in 1944. The prerequisites for the territorial dispute were laid with the redrawing of the borders of the restored autonomy after the return of the Vainakhs from deportation.
Tallinn (photo by P. Oskolkov)
On 26 March 2025, the Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) voted on changing the country’s constitution in the part defining who is eligible to vote in local (municipal, in the case of cities) elections. On the surface, this measure does not look extraordinary, however, if we take into account the context of the Estonian sociodemographic situation, it becomes clear why the issue of municipal suffrage turned into one of the most discussed Estonian news topics in recent months.
Illustration
In the first part of the study, we showed that it was the position of Georgia's business elites that influenced the country's political course, shifting its vector from European integration to the Russian direction. This position is in no way connected with any phobias or personal preferences of Georgian-Russian magnates. The situation in Armenia is partly similar to Georgia, but has some peculiarities. We will talk about these peculiarities in detail and particulars in the second part of the publication.
Black hole (AI generated)
Since the Kremlin launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has begun acting like a geopolitical black hole in its own neighborhood. Facing Western sanctions and battlefield losses, Moscow is accelerating the draw on the two most dynamic economies in Central Asia — Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — through energy deals, trade manipulation and political theatre. The closer these states drift, the harder (and costlier) it will be for them to break free.
Islamists in Russia (AI generated)
Russia’s attitude toward Islamists in general, and radical Islamist movements in particular, is neither consistent nor unambiguous. In its foreign policy, Russia actively supports Hezbollah and Hamas, which has been especially evident during the current Arab-Israeli war. The patron and protector of these and numerous other terrorist Islamist organizations, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is one of Russia's strategic partners. This partnership was formalized in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed on January 17, 2025.
Grozny (Shutterstock)
The regime cannot afford a “third Chechen war”, so after Kadyrov it will continue its policy of extremely harsh crackdowns and bribery of local elites. Since Kadyrov has no unconditional and universally recognized successor, it is possible that attempts will be made to build complex combinations based on a balance of interests of a number of key figures, with the federal center retaining the role of arbiter.

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