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Public discourse in South Korea and Japan has begun to include discussion of the development of nuclear capabilities. This policy change in the regional nuclear discourse, together with attempts by North Korea and Russia to legitimize the use of tactical nuclear weapons, should raise concerns not just in Asia but in the Middle East as well.
On June 4, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a law banning “individuals designated as ‘extremists’ from running for public office.” There is little doubt that the legislation is aimed primarily at opposition leader Alexei Navalny, now in prison, and whoever supports him. 
Following the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan, Washington is allegedly trying to reestablish a military presence in Central Asia, similar to what it did in the early 2000s. Though some level of cooperation is possible with Russia within the framework of great power relations (and much still depends on Moscow’s goodwill), China opposes any American military or security expansion near its restive Xinjiang province.
The Kremlin's fixation on competing with the West might cost Russia dearly, as its clout in Central Asia is under strain from a rising China. Moscow will try to mitigate the tilting balance of power by applying methods of the post-liberal world order to the region. China and Russia might reach a condominium in which issues of economy and security are subdivided between them.
Many are still wondering whether Vladimir Putin’s massive troop deployment in conflict zones in the Donbas and the Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2021 was preparation for eventual war and territorial gain or simply a public relations exercise meant to intimidate Ukraine and the West. The answer has to do with Putin’s main red line.
Belarus is growing increasingly isolated and is pushing itself more and more into Russia's embrace. Moscow is taking the opportunity to cement Belarus as a buffer state against Western geopolitical influence. But contrary to the established analysis, unless there is a real chance of a pro-Western government being installed in Minsk, Russia is unlikely to push for any radical scenarios, including full integration.
Iran, Turkey, and Russia are building a new model of bilateral ties. Unshackled by formal alliances, the trio is showing it can work together to limit Western influence while avoiding an overreliance on one another. This mixture of correlating and contradictory interests, which characterizes the new Eurasianist model of bilateral relations, is a product of the changing global order.
What Moscow is after with its renewed military pressure on Kyiv is unclear, but the long-term ramifications are discernible. With each passing year, it becomes more and more costly for Russia to undermine Ukraine’s efforts to build more effective military forces and a stronger economy.
The West is facing an increasing challenge from China. There are several ways to meet that challenge: expanding, restoring, and deepening relations across different regions of the world; taking a revolutionary approach toward Russia; and, most drastically, acting like the Chinese.
Having used brutal force to crush nationwide demonstrations in support of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny, President Vladimir Putin has now embarked on a new venture. By mobilizing a huge number of Russian forces at the eastern borders of Ukraine and in the annexed Crimea, he is refueling a conflict that has been simmering since 2014. Or is it all for show?

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