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IDF

IDF Spokesperson
Preventive war/the preemptive strike, defined as the identification of a major threat developing among oneโ€™s enemies and the taking of action to remove that threat before it materializes, was once central to Israel's security concept. Since the rise of Hamas to power in Gaza and the Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah, however, the IDF has abandoned this practice. Instead, strategies were developed to keep escalation below the threshold of war โ€“ the โ€œCampaign Between the Warsโ€ in the north and repeated limited operations in Gaza. Notwithstanding these efforts, both Hamas and Hezbollah subsequently evolved, over the course of almost two decades, into terrorist armies that are a significant threat to Israel. Two recent cases illustrate this trend: Israel's response to the development of Hamas's offensive capability, with an emphasis on tunnels, starting in 2015; and Hezbollah's conversion of rockets into precision-guided rockets starting in 2018. In both cases the option of a preventive war was raised but rejected. In direct response to lessons learned from the Iron Swords War, I propose that the preventive war/preemptive strike be restored to Israel's strategic toolbox. The external and internal legitimacy for doing so stems from the fact that Israel has returned to the era of โ€œwars of no choice.โ€
Over the past six weeks there has been an escalation in Israeli air strikes against Iranian, Hezbollah, and other pro-Iranian militia locations in Syria. The most powerful strike, on 1 April, killed the commander, the deputy commander, and several staff members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard force coordinating the actions of all the allied and proxy Iranian forces operating against Israel. These are the highest-ranking Iranian officers to have been killed since the 2020 assassination by the US of Qassem Soleimani, who was chief of the Iranian al-Quds organization and responsible for all Iranian operations outside Iran aimed at the US, Israel, and pro-western Arab states. The targets of the 1 April strike were convening in a building adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus. The Iranians claim the building was in fact a consulate, so Israel placed its embassies across the world on alert for a tit-for-tat retaliation. During the night of 13-14 April, after two weeks of threats, the Iranians retaliated with their first-ever direct attack from Iranian territory into Israel. The operation is called "The True Promise." According to Israeli officials, Iran launched a barrage containing 185 explosive drones (nicknamed โ€œsuicide-dronesโ€), 36 cruise missiles, and at least 110 ballistic missiles. In addition to the direct Iranian action, their various allies and proxies โ€“ the Houthis in Yemen, Iraqi Hezbollah forces in Iraq and Syria, and the Lebanese Hezbollah โ€“ also fired at Israel.
Israelโ€™s ship of state, facing rough seas, is at high risk and requires clearer rules of navigation. During this period of deep complexity, Israel will need to clarify its strategic direction. The terrorists of Hamas are the tip of Iranโ€™s much larger spear. Israelโ€™s current war against jihadist criminality could thus turn into a wider and more damaging war with Iran. Such a war could emerge as a โ€œbolt from the blueโ€ or incrementally. Ultimately, it could involve the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, and/or North Korea. How might Jerusalem prevent or manage any such derivative conflicts? Israel must consider whether there is a productive role to be played by the โ€œSamson Option.โ€
Israelโ€™s war in Gaza, which is being waged in response to the devastating Hamas attacks of October 7, has prompted a surge of anti-Zionist discourse among many Muslims in the West, including in the US. The American Muslim community has been politically active since 9/11. Muslim activists, clerics and Islamic organizations are among the most prominent Western voices condemning injustices against Muslims worldwide, and the Palestinian cause is often a priority. President Joe Bidenโ€™s support for Israel in the Gaza war has angered many in the American Muslim community, and they may wish to punish him for that support in the November election. Will American Muslim opposition to Bidenโ€™s support for Israel have a political impact on the US election?
ยฉ IDF spokesperson
The occupation and holding of territory, which used to be a central component of the IDF's war concept at all levels, became almost irrelevant during Israelโ€™s many years of fighting terrorism and guerrillas in Gaza and Lebanon. But there are three reasons why it is a big mistake to discount the value of conquered territory. First, the occupation by Israel of enemy territory (while evacuating the local population for its own protection) is considered by Israelโ€™s enemies to be a painful loss, and the possession of territory can serve as a bargaining chip in political negotiations. Second, occupation offers the IDF an asymmetric advantage, as only it can occupy territory, clear it of the enemy, and protect it from counterattack. Third, after a long period of โ€œwars of choiceโ€ in which Israel was the strong side, we have returned to the era of โ€œwars of no choiceโ€ in which the occupation of territory has both internal and external legitimacy. These insights should be applied to any future war in Lebanon.
The IDF is winning the Swords of Iron War, and the position of the State of Israel is being strengthened. Wherever the IDF reaches, Hamas ceases to function as an organization and military force. Israel has had significant achievements in terms of the hostage deal and the IDFโ€™s substantial operational successes against Hezbollah. Israel has also been assisted by the American coalition's activity against the jihadist threat, and there has been a positive change in the Russian approach to the war in light of Israelโ€™s successes. India and Japan have also offered support, helping to balance international public opinion. The challenge will be to maintain and increase this positive momentum. To achieve this, it will be necessary to continue the war and seize the opportunity, both locally and internationally, to start a rebuilding process oriented towards creating a new local government in Gaza that is focused on the population's needs. The goal should be the establishment of a Gazan government that is capable of serving as an effective counterweight to any attempts by Hamas to reassert control.
UN agencies, government aid programs and NGOs have consistently and willfully aided and abetted Hamas as it built its vast terror infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. They diverted aid money to Hamas to fund its terrorist activities, provided propaganda and disinformation support to Hamas in its efforts to tarnish and discredit Israel, and indoctrinated Gazan schoolchildren to hate Jews. Systematic documentation of the roles played by UN and government officials, as well as NGOs operating under the vast framework of international humanitarian aid, in enabling and cooperating with Hamas, both tacitly and actively, is vital to prevent a repetition of this abdication of responsibility and accountability.ย 
Despite compelling logical and historical arguments against a two-state solution, louder and louder demands for a Palestinian state are being voiced worldwide. In response, Israel and its allies should remind global governments and populations that โ€œPalestineโ€ has no intention of ever living peacefully alongside Israel, but intends instead to replace the Jewish State in orchestrated and increasingly violent increments. Any pre-independence Palestinian commitments to remain demilitarized could quickly and even legally be undermined.
The significance of US security aid to Israel extends well beyond the economic realm. It plays a crucial role in the nation's success and resilience. As Israel's war in Gaza continues, a war that was sparked by the invasion of Israel and large-scale massacre of Israeli citizens by Hamas on October 7, 2023, there is a growing call for a reassessment of this aid within the US Senate and among the American public. However, it is essential to remember that the bond between the US and Israel is reciprocal and yields benefits for both nations. Any decision to deviate significantly from the current arrangement would likely require much more substantial pressure on the US administration.

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