Hezbollah Must Be Fought Like a State Army, Not Like a Terrorist Organization

The IDF’s recent spectacular successes in the north, while refreshing and very much worthy of praise, also revealed limitations. The pager operations were not carried out as part of a broad move; neither was the elimination of Aqil and his gang. Precision factories in Lebanon were not destroyed in the manner of the destruction of the Syrian facility in Masyaf. Years spent fighting the war on terror and the “war between the wars” have influenced Israeli strategic thinking. Hezbollah is a military force, but the war is still being conducted as a series of counter-terrorism operations.

Washington’s View of Gaza Truce Does Not Align with Israel’s Security Interests

The US has spent months trying to pressure Israel into a long-term ceasefire with Hamas that would serve American interests by reducing the danger of regional war that could drag in the US. But Washington’s view of a ceasefire in Gaza and subsequent regional de-escalation fails to address three of Israel’s critical security needs: to ensure the IDF’s freedom of operation in Gaza to prevent Hamas from regrouping; to counter Hezbollah’s massive military-terrorist infrastructure and stop its 11-month-long assault on northern Israel; and to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which are intended to provide a protective cover to the entire jihadist Iranian axis.

Relieving Gaza’s Electricity Burden After the War

The Gaza Strip's heavy dependence on electricity and diesel supplied by Israel has turned from an Israeli strategic advantage into an economic and humanitarian burden for Israel. The reconstruction of postwar Gaza must include more independent energy generation capabilities in the form of solar PV expansion and the development of the Gaza Marine gas field. It must also include more grid connections to other electricity suppliers beside Israel, primarily Egypt. Otherwise, Israel will remain responsible for meeting the needs of millions of Gaza’s residents in the coming decades, regardless of who controls the Gaza Strip.

The Long War Phenomenon:
Is a New Security Concept Required After October 7?

David Ben-Gurion's classic security concept made these assumptions: first, that Israel would never be able to force an absolute end to the conflict on its enemies; and second, that Israel cannot maintain a large army for long, so its security requires a reserve army and sufficient warning before war breaks out. This has resulted in a restless reality of short, intense rounds of war. The October 7 disaster prompted a sense that this concept had failed, and that it is time for Israel to adopt a new concept in which the enemy is completely defeated and no longer poses a threat. To a certain extent, the Iron Swords War is an attempt to eliminate the Hamas threat from Gaza once and for all, and possibly after that, the elimination of the Hezbollah threat as well. But can Israel eliminate Hamas (and Hezbollah)? Would attempting to do so be worth the practical price of the long war it would require? Would Israel’s society, economy, and state survive the attempt? Does the failure of Israel’s security concept on October 7 mean a new concept is required, or did the concept fail to be implemented properly on that Sabbath (and even more so since then)? In other words: Should the existing security concept be replaced or strengthened?

The IDF Spokesperson Unit’s Negligence and Iranian-Armenian Campaign of Fakes

On Sunday, August 11, Israeli state-owned TV channel 11KAN reported that the Army leadership had instructed all personnel to evacuate Georgia and Azerbaijan amid concerns over imminent strikes by Iran in retaliation for Ismail Haniyeh’s death in Tehran. The Israeli military press office and other Israeli media outlets have not cited the actual order.

To Defend Israel, Rearrange the Sky

The current war, and Hezbollah's drone strikes, have made clear that Israeli air superiority does not apply to the "low sky" layer. The fact that the enemy is targeting the air defense itself stands out. The security establishment is working on finding solutions to the challenge, but development and procurement alone will not be enough. The basic premise of our air defense system has been undermined. The system must be reorganized on the basis of two understandings: first, that destroying Israeli air defense will be the enemy's first goal; and second, that the challenge of protecting the forces at the front requires different organizational and command and control means than the challenge of protecting the home front. As did the anti-aircraft units of the past, our tactical air defense at the front requires reorganization.

The Secret War Behind the Exchanges of Fire in the North

The current war of attrition in Israel’s north is not just a series of reaction equations. It is a race to learn about the enemy and prepare for a battle in which both sides will try to overwhelm the opposing military force. The exchanges of fire are providing Hezbollah with an opportunity to study the Israeli air defense system in detail. This is a serious risk that deserves to be given its due weight.

It’s Not a Border. It’s a Front.

Israel’s flawed strategy of deterring and appeasing its adversaries has had a negative impact on military thinking. In recent decades, the border fence has turned from a tactical measure into a mental barrier. The fence was seen to distinguish between “their territory” and “our territory,” or between a dangerous space and an apparently safe one. The lesson of the failure of October 7 is not to erect stronger obstacles. We have built border barriers in the north and south many times over the decades, and they always fail. A border is a political concept, not a military one. The relevant military concept is a “front.” A front, on both sides of the border, is a challenging combat space that requires tactical independence for the forces, especially in the areas of combat gathering, fire support and air defense.

Erdoğan, You Can’t Sail a Ship with Words*

Erdoğan's threat that Turkey will enter Israel, as it did Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, is one of the most serious statements in the history of Israel-Turkey relations. This article describes the political context and background of this threat and explores what might be behind it and where it may lead in the relations between the countries. It analyzes the political and economic challenges Erdoğan is facing, with a focus on Turkey's foreign policy in recent years. While Erdoğan's threats should be taken seriously, it is unlikely that they will materialize at this stage, though it is important to keep a close watch on Turkey's actions in the future.

Predicting the Unpredictable: Anticipating Disruptive Terrorist “Innovation”

What core intelligence challenges did Israel fail to meet in the lead-up to October 7? Israeli intelligence, in concert with policymakers, missed the disruptive terrorist “innovation” in Hamas’s strategy toward Israel. This error was facilitated by a related failure to implement existing intelligence across organizational levels. The calamitous intelligence failure that culminated in the events of October 7 illustrates Yakov Ben-Haim’s info-gap theory, which states that commitment to a policy paradoxically increases when the level of what needs to be known is lowered. This allows for the growth of a dangerous tolerance for gaps in information. In Israel’s case, this tolerance blinded the intelligence services and policymakers to disruptive changes in Hamas’s intentions, capabilities and application of resources.