Topic:

IDF

Active Protection Systems in Asymmetric Conflict

A massive concentration of forces is a disadvantage, not an advantage, in the modern era of asymmetric conflict. Active Protection Systems (APS), by contrast, provide small fighting units with protection and enable them to locate hostiles and discriminate them from the surrounding population. They thus reduce the army’s exposure while increasing its effectiveness.

Annexing Parts of the West Bank Area C: An Israeli National Interest

The former commanders who are demanding a referendum on the possible annexation of parts of the West Bank’s Area C misunderstand the threats confronting Israel. One need only consider the latest round of fighting in Gaza to understand what the threat to the cities of the coastal plain would look like if Israel were to give up control of the mountainous terrain dominating the country’s economic-social-industrial heartland.

The Diplomacy of Violence in Gaza

| May 17, 2019

Ever since the unilateral disengagement from Gaza in the summer of 2005, Israel has engaged in “bargaining by the threat of violence” with Hamas. Within that framework, the IDF has conducted three large-scale operations in Gaza in addition to smaller rounds of hostilities. With no possibility in the offing of either serious political negotiations or a decisive war, the only alternative is to continue the “diplomacy of violence.”

The West Bank’s Area C: Israel’s Eastern Line of Defense

This study explores the strategic-military implications of the establishment of a Palestinian state along the pre-June 1967 lines. Its central thesis is that the creation of such a state, on the heels of the IDF’s total withdrawal from the West Bank, will not only deprive Israel of defensible borders but will almost certainly lead to the advent of a terrorist entity like the one created in the Gaza Strip – at a stone’s throw from the Israeli hinterland.

Israel’s Information Campaigns: An Alternative to Kinetic Strikes

| April 17, 2019

In recent months, the Israeli defense establishment has made increasing use of “information campaigns,” or exposure through the media of enemy activity that has been detected by Israeli intelligence. This modus operandi has developed into an alternative to kinetic strikes.

Can Israel Defeat Hamas Without Toppling It?

| February 21, 2019

So far, Israel’s objectives in armed conflicts with Hamas have been limited so as to avoid the need to reoccupy Gaza or to send it down the “Somalia model” path of chaos. But there might be a third option. 

Israel’s Red Lines in Lebanon and Syria

| February 3, 2019

The “War Between Wars” is an ongoing Israeli military and intelligence effort to disrupt the force build-up of the Iranian-Shiite axis throughout the Middle East. This campaign, which has evolved into an entire force activation doctrine, has seen the Israeli defense establishment employ an approach that differentiates between Syria and Lebanon. 

Rethinking Israel’s Syria Campaign

Moscow’s public demand that Israel stop its attacks in Syria places Israel’s longstanding air campaign at a critical juncture despite PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s avowed determination to sustain it for as long as necessary.

Is the IDF Ready for All-Out War?

| January 10, 2019

The Israeli military’s state of readiness has dramatically improved, but it has a lot more catching up to do. It has spent years neglecting the ground forces – and those forces will be essential if enemies like Hezbollah are to be decisively defeated.

The Two Major Strategic Turning Points of 2018

| December 25, 2018

Last summer’s events in the Gaza Strip cast serious doubt on the feasibility of a complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, as the proximity of that area to Israel’s main population centers and economic/strategic assets ensures its transformation into the main combat zone should it undergo a militarization process similar to that experienced by Gaza and Lebanon. The question is whether the IDF has an effective response to the advent of parallel major threats on several fronts.