THE GAZA TERROR OFFENSIVE:
“The Ceasefire War”
16 July – 16 October 2026

The increased delay between updates is because the situation is more or less stagnant. Events occur, but they are largely repetitive and changes in the situation are small. All the participants have reduced the intensity of their efforts, with occasional brief and small escalations, and are playing the long game. However, tension remains as a new major escalation is anticipated—especially in the Iranian arena, but also in Lebanon and Gaza. Over the past few days, there have also been reports that the Israeli military is preparing for a possible escalation of Palestinian attacks in Judea and Samaria – perhaps even by the Palestinian Authority itself.

Open Innovation in Defense: A Strategic Necessity

Nir Reuven
November 9, 2025
Paper No. 2353

In today’s fast-paced technological environment, defense systems can no longer rely solely on internal R&D. Open innovation—systematically engaging with startups, academia, and civilian tech sectors—has become a strategic necessity. The distinct cases of the US and Israel suggest that diverse models can serve a shared imperative: to leverage civilian innovation in order to maintain national security and a technological edge.

Battlefield Decision in the Iron Swords War: Renewing the Discussion

In the Iron Swords War, the IDF achieved battlefield decision over the enemy in two theaters of war in a manner contrary to customary IDF doctrine. In Gaza, a tactical and operational battlefield decision was achieved against Hamas based on the erosion of the enemy’s forces and capabilities, mainly through offensive ground activity. In Lebanon, a strategic, operational, and tactical battlefield decision (in that order) was achieved against Hezbollah that was based on the stratagem of a series of strikes, including the explosion of pagers, air strikes against capabilities and commanders, and a later ground operation against combat infrastructure in the border area. The concept of the battlefield decision has gradually disappeared from IDF discourse in recent years, but it warrants renewed discussion.

War With Iran: Israel’s Legal Obligation to Prevent Iranian Nuclear Weapons

Israel is currently at war with Iran. Despite being non-nuclear, Iran could draw Israel into a protracted conflict involving "only" conventional missile and drone weaponry. Quickly, any such conflict in which both sides would seek "escala-tion dominance" and wherein the Israeli side might not be sufficiently advan-taged could compel a time-urgent decision in Jerusalem: (1) threaten calibrat-ed and plausible nuclear reprisals, or (2) submit to seemingly interminable at-trition warfare. Though the first option would amount to making threats of "asymmetrical nuclear war," it could still represent the most rational and cu-mulatively humane approach to Israeli national survival. In the final analysis, Israel can only succeed in its current war if it prevents Iranian nuclearization.

The Historical Roots of President Trump’s Gaza Relocation Plan

President Donald Trump's controversial initiative to relocate the Palestinian population from the Gaza Strip, primarily to Egypt and Jordan, is causing a stir in the Arab world. While the strong public resistance to the idea expressed by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Jordanian King Abdullah seems to negate the possibility that the president's initiative can be implemented, President Trump insists that his plan is achievable and that Egypt and Jordan will eventually cooperate. His resettlement idea, viewed in today’s political environment as anathema, has a series of historical precedents.

The October 7 War Is Only the First Act

Israel’s original defense strategy strove to maximize wartime operational decisiveness as compensation for inferior resilience. In recent decades, anti-terror tactics have taken over our strategic thinking, pushing this principle aside. The current war is a crossroads. The October 7 attack can be seen as a localized failure, and the strategy of focusing on Hezbollah and Hamas can be continued. This would mean establishing buffer zones, which would lead to protracted guerrilla warfare and further weaken Israel. But there is another way to perceive the Iron Swords War: as the first campaign in a historic war against the Shiite axis. According to this view, this war is a defensive phase. As such, it has served its purpose. Its achievements are to be exploited for a major regrouping and the building of a renewed operational-level decisive capability to prepare us for the next phase of the broader war.

How Did Israel Win the Iron Swords War?

Israel began the Iron Swords War on October 7, 2023, on a “Yom Kippur War” dynamic: the devastating assault on Israel conducted that morning by Hamas was a strategic and operational surprise that collapsed the defense of the Gaza envelope and with it, the foundations of Israel's national security. The war ended on January 17, 2025, on a “Six-Day War” dynamic: a fundamental positive change had occurred on all of Israel's main combat fronts. How did this happen? Israel’s success was the result of intelligent decision-making, military and national strength, and luck. Israel must further improve its decision-making process and enhance its military and national strengths while reducing its reliance on luck and the failures of its opponents, who also learned lessons from this war.

Levy’s Anti-IDF Argument Shows a Loss of Moral Direction

In a recent column in Haaretz, Prof. Yagil Levy argues, based on a "fundamental comparison", that the IDF in its war in Gaza is not the moral army it claims to be. Levy's claim is absurd. According to his method, which is based on the ratio of our forces' casualties to those in the enemy population, sloppy fighting with many IDF casualties would constitute a morally virtuous approach to war. The following response addresses in detail the claims made by Levy, offers a different standard of reference, and argues that the numbers on which Levy relies actually indicate an especially high level of distinction between the enemy and those not involved in the war in Gaza.

The IDF’s Gamble in Lebanon

Israel’s move in the north signals a clear strategy - the return of the residents of the north to their homes based on a narrow security strip and a political demilitarization agreement in the form of UN Resolution 1701. This strategy involves operational and strategic risks. On the operational level, there is a risk to the fighting forces who are exposed to enemy units deployed to their north. Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon were less severely harmed than were the higher ranks of command, and they are relatively free to regain their footing and act. On the strategic level, allowing the enemy's ground power in the south to remain intact almost guarantees the future rehabilitation of the organization. If the current strategy succeeds and the enemy agrees to end the war, the parties will embark on yet another race to prepare for the next one. This strategy illustrates that even at the height of a success like the current campaign against Hezbollah, tactics of the war on terror – however successful they may be – are no substitute for decisive military capability. This understanding should be the basis of Israel’s approach to defeating Hezbollah.

The New York Times Coverage of the Israel-Hamas War:
Random Errors or Endemic Malaise?

Serious errors, vague corrections and omissions of information have appeared in the pages of The New York Times throughout the Israel-Hamas war. The Times is considered a “newspaper of record” and a reliable source of information, and is read by leaders and elites around the world. The paper has nevertheless committed a series of repeated errors about the war, invariably at Israel’s expense, despite editorial promises to apply extra scrutiny. The errors and omissions created false context and lacked transparency. This report focuses on the Al-Ahli Hospital explosion, reports of civilian casualties, the Times’s continued employment of questionable journalists, and testimonials from inside the newsroom.