The publication portfolio of the PSCR program in December 2025 was as diverse as to cover the security problems of the Baltic states, the new U.S. National Security Strategy, antisemitic tropes in post-Soviet wars, the difficulties faced by the post-Soviet Jewish immigrants in Poland, and Iranian officials’ reaction to Armenia’s foreign policies.
Velvl Chernin presents his view, based on both expert knowledge and personal institutional experience, of the Jews from the post-Soviet countries residing in Poland. He notes the limited institutional potential and human resources of the local Jewish organizations, and delves into the particular problems faced by the recent (post-2022) immigrants, some of whom consider Poland as just a transit station to Israel. Chernin specifically points to the problems such potential repatriates have in obtaining the necessary documents (which mostly concern immigrants from Belarus), visiting Nativ consuls, and challenges concerning integration into Polish society for those who opt for remaining in the country.
Ze’ev Khanin’s analysis focuses on the instrumental use of antisemitic conspiracy theories in the post-Soviet conflicts. He points at the instrumentalization of claims of antisemitism in both Russian (accusing Ukrainian leadership of Judeophobia) and Ukrainian (comparing Russia’s actions to the Holocaust and the Soviet anti-Zionism) public discourse. Conspiratorial claims about Jews who are going to “settle” in Eastern Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, or in Azerbaijan (“like they did in Palestine”) are spread by Iranian state-affiliated agencies, some Turkish ideologues, and radical antisemitic (semi)political circles in Armenia, Ukraine, and Russia. Khanin concludes that these theories, “when overlaid on latent or overt antisemitism,” may “become a trigger for both domestic and internal conflicts.”
The PSCRP team describes the newest security threats that the Baltic states can possibly face. The authors focus on Russia’s alleged efforts to damage the local infrastructure, violations of European countries’ airspaces, and the fears around the possible seizure of the Suwalki Gap. The Baltic governments especially fear Washington’s possible disengagement from European security, underline the necessity of supporting Ukraine as self-defense, and actively prepare for the war, which, they believe, can be imminent. Another material prepared by the PSCRP team suggests extrapolating the Baltic states’ security practices to Kazakhstan, against the background of recent arbitrary checks on the country’s border by Russian customs services and Astana’s preservation of strategic vulnerability caused by its reliance on supply routes it does not control.
The material by the PSCRP profoundly analyzes the (semi-)official Tehran’s reaction to the Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister’s recent visit to Israel. The authors argue that Iranian officials are highly sensitive to any moves, however symbolic and impractical, that Yerevan may make towards any external actors, which is supported by numerous examples of Iranian media op-eds and interviews. The main Tehran’s concerns include Israel’s alleged strategic intentions to penetrate Armenia by “soft influence,” and the enactment of the plans of the TRIPP/Zangezur corridor, potentially limiting Iran’s geopolitical and economic capabilities. Armenia, in its turn, is now extremely cautious in its geopolitical choices, since the old alliances proved not to be that reliable, and the new ones are still a work in progress. So, various Armenian officials have spared no effort in reassuring the Islamic Republic of being the “main partner” and “strategic ally.”
Alexander Shpunt critically assesses the U.S. National Security Strategy released in November 2025. Following the “America First” doctrine and based on the idea of the “primacy of nations,” the document shifts the mode of the U.S. foreign policy from value-based to rigidly pragmatic. Declaring non-intervention, non-contingency of particular policies on the counteractor’s political regime and traditions, and de facto recognizing the division of the world into spheres of influence, the NSS stresses the importance of economic security and technological superiority “as the main arena of global competition.” In the doctrine, the U.S. declares the abandonment of the “global policeman” role and shifts the primary burden of international security to its allies. Among the particular post-Soviet countries and regions, for Belarus, the shift in the U.S. approach might mean legitimation; for Ukraine, settlement rather than victory as the objective; and for the Baltic states, the level of guarantees becomes reduced. Russia’s role in the NSS can be described as a “potential deal-making partner,” with whom managed engagement is possible and desirable. However, Shpunt sees several risks derived from the Strategy, including the potential escalation of global conflicts “due to the perception of a power vacuum.” Also, by “surgical” de-escalation and rapid deals among the elites, the root causes of the conflicts may be ignored and preserved.
Last but not least, as always, Alexander Shpunt has prepared his monthly digest of five research publications concerning the conflict dynamics in the post-Soviet space. This month, the broad theme can be described as “civilizational” influence the Soviet past has on various regions long after the USSR’s collapse.
The PSCRP team wishes our readership a productive and inspirational year of 2026, and we will do our best to keep you informed about the post-Soviet regional dynamics.