PSCRP-BESA Reports No 62 (June 7, 2024)
The South Caucasus has been in a zone of political turbulence since September 2020, when after 44 days of fighting Azerbaijan managed to regain control over most of the occupied territories. Much more could have been achieved, however, in November 2020 Moscow intervened, whose aggressive actions forced Baku to sit down at a virtual negotiating table with Armenia and agree to the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping contingent on the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. The parties’ statement of nine points issued at night regulated virtually everything, but solved nothing. However, subsequent events turned out to be extremely favorable for Azerbaijan and extremely unfavorable for Armenia.
The failure of Moscow’s plans to seize Ukraine and the practical implementation of the “USSR 2.0” project, whatever its name may be, untied Baku’s hands in resolving the Karabakh conflict. Already in September 2022, as a result of a brief military operation, the Azerbaijani armed forces took over a number of dominant heights on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and brought under fire control the communications linking the southern Armenian region of Syunik with the central part of the country. For the first time, the territories that were part of the Armenian SSR came under the control of Azerbaijan. For the first time, Armenian society faced a real threat of losing not only Karabakh (in the public Armenian consciousness — the territory of the former NKAO and adjacent occupied Azerbaijani regions), but also the territory of Armenia proper. The Syunik district separating the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic from the central part of Azerbaijan was of particular concern to the Armenian side. By that time, the implementation of almost all the points of interest to Azerbaijan in the trilateral agreements between Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan concluded after the 44-day war had hit a dead end. The Russians stationed their military in Karabakh, provided a transportation corridor with Armenia and “forgot” both about the issues of reintegration of the region into Azerbaijan and the opening of communication with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. However, the Russian military never received the mandate of peacekeepers, but who cared about such trifles, especially since in Baku they were called peacekeepers, trying not to poke the bear.
Therefore, as soon as Baku had an opportunity to change the status quo on the ground, it did not fail to seize it. Let me remind you once again that such an opportunity appeared as a result of the Kharkiv offensive of the Ukrainian armed forces. Then there was a long story with a strange blockade of Karabakh by Azerbaijani environmentalists. Strange, because for several months the de facto authorities of Karabakh were constantly offered to receive everything they needed, however, not through the Lachin corridor, which was controlled by the Russian military, but through the territory of Azerbaijan. In fact, decisions on this issue were made not so much by the Karabakh authorities but in Moscow. And Moscow did not want Karabakh to be reintegrated into Azerbaijan at all.
This situation lasted from December 2022 to September 2023, when Baku managed to regain control over Karabakh as a result of a military operation. The Armenian population, however, left Karabakh. Why this happened is the subject of another detailed discussion. Baku managed to take advantage of another weakness of Russia: let us recall that it was at this time that Ukraine tried to organize an offensive in the Zaporizhzhya region. The offensive was not successful, but then, in September 2022, no one knew how it would turn out. Thus, in fact, the Karabakh issue was completely resolved by Azerbaijan.
The issue of Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement, border delimitation, opening communications and overcoming the burden of the historical past still remains. It is extremely difficult to do all this. There is a comfortable confidence in Armenian society, regardless of political orientation, that the war for Karabakh was lost not to Azerbaijan, but to hostile Turkey and to Russia, which betrayed Armenia. This unwittingly paints a picture of further expansion of Azerbaijan and Turkey against Armenia with the tacit consent of Russia. This, in turn, calls into question the political leadership of the country, and more precisely, the ability of this political leadership to ensure Armenia’s security without Russia.
To be fair, it should be noted that the Armenian leadership has been sparing no effort to address pressing security issues all this time. All possible players were involved in the process, from France and the United States to Iran, India and some Arab countries. The political situation in France and the United States allowed the Armenian diaspora to actively lobby on this issue: with elections ahead, the votes of voters sympathetic to Armenia were not insignificant. There was no need to convince Iran and India of anything. However, it was obvious from the very beginning that the capabilities and even the willingness of external players were clearly insufficient to replace Russia, which for many years had been the exclusive guarantor of Armenia’s security.
Subsequently, Pashinyan and members of his team became convinced that there was no alternative to the agreements with Baku. The last large-scale political attack on Azerbaijan was launched in late 2023-early 2024. But Baku cared little about all those angry resolutions of various parliaments, congressional hearings and so on. Everyone knew that the reaction would be limited to indignant statements that would eventually fade away. The point is that the demand to transfer this territory under some prospective international jurisdiction and to ensure the return of the Armenian population there was so unrealistic that it was, to put it mildly, not serious to consider all this outside the context of election campaigns. And so it happened: the West made some noise and moved on, Tehran started looking for ways to normalize relations with Baku, and Pashinian’s government started normalizing relations with Azerbaijan, not forgetting the normalization of relations with Turkey.
The reason for this development was objective necessity. Many people in today’s Armenia understand this perfectly well. In the absence of any reasonable alternative to himself in the form of an opposition, Pashinyan could afford it. The losing side here were the forces opposing Nikol Pashinyan, and these are the forces associated with the Armenian diaspora. Let us remind the reader that the largest Armenian diasporas are located in Russia, the United States and France. And one of the most important institutions uniting the Armenian diaspora is the Armenian Apostolic Church. The rejection of the idea of miatsum (“unification”) and, what is even scarier for the diaspora, the normalization of relations with Turkey, which is inevitable after the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan, deprives the Armenian diaspora of the political platform on which they have stood for more than a hundred years. Therefore, they could not ignore what was happening.
The most convenient moment to start to sway Pashinyan’s power was the decision to hand over to Azerbaijan four deserted villages (or rather, the ruins thereof) that were part of the Azerbaijani SSR and were seized by the Armenian side during the First Karabakh War.
Archbishop Bagrat was at the head of the protests against the current government. The move has resonated widely both inside and outside the country, especially among the Armenian diaspora, which actively supports the protest movement. For the first time since 2018, the protests have been led by a figure who does not irritate the majority of Armenian society (both inside the country and in the diaspora). And this circumstance may prove to be a key factor in the future.
But who is he, Archbishop Bagrat? Archbishop Bagrat (Vazgen Galstanyan), also known as Bagrat Srbazan, is a well-known figure of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Archbishop of the Diocese of Tavush. He was born on May 20, 1971 in the city of Leninakan (Gyumri). In 2006 Bagrat Galstyan was ordained to the diaconate. He was the head of the Department of Conceptual Provisions of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin.
He actively participated in church events and patriotic movements. In 2018, Bagrat Galstyan became a member of the Board of Trustees of the Aurora Foundation. In 2019, he became a goodwill ambassador of this foundation. And the founder of the Aurora Foundation is none other than Ruben Vardanyan, who is now in a Baku pre-trial detention center. In addition to Armenian citizenship, Bagrat also has Canadian citizenship, which he received while serving in that country. The Canadian passport, by the way, blocks Bagrat’s possibility to take the prime minister’s chair. However, if the case takes a revolutionary turn, no one will pay attention to it.
The “Tavush in the Name of Motherland” movement, created by Archbishop Bagrat, opposes the demarcation of the border with Azerbaijan and believes that Karabakh should not be part of Azerbaijan. In fact, the protest offers nothing new and actually copies the events of 2018. The same foot march of one person, joined by others who are caring about the cause, along with rallying in the square and blocking the streets. What’s different is that, unlike 2018, this protest is not gaining a critical mass of support. And this is understandable. The Achilles’ heel of the current protest is the absence of a positive program — not because Archbishop Bagrat cannot offer it, but because it does not exist in principle. The balance of forces in the region is such that no matter who and no matter how loud calls for the return of Karabakh and the continuation of the struggle, it is physically impossible. Archbishop Bagrat’s protest is based not on calculation, but on emotions — love for one’s homeland, people, history and so on. On the fact that any leader is inevitably responsible for the country’s defeat, and what has happened, in the collective unconscious of the Armenian people, is undoubtedly a defeat and a severe psychological trauma. And those involved in this protest want not so much to change the future as to punish Pashinyan and his revolutionary team for the past.
As of today, it is clear that Pashinyan’s power is not threatened yet, but these actions may well be seen as a potential plan for the future. After all, Pashinyan will still have to make unpopular decisions. Attempts of the opposition from among the former representatives of the ruling elite to take part in the protest are more harmful than useful. But it can’t be helped, no one can forbid them. As for Moscow’s position, everything that weakens Pashinyan in the public space is objectively beneficial to the Kremlin. However, this protest is hardly perceived there as an opportunity to replace the authorities in Armenia. Rather, it is a potential future option in case Pashinyan really decides to reformat Armenia’s foreign policy course and finally move away from Russia. However, this hardly depends on Pashinyan today: at the global level, everything is decided on the fronts of Ukraine, and at the regional level — in Georgia. More on what is happening in Georgia will follow in the next part of this piece.