In August 2024, the PSCRP analysis revolved mostly around the issues of Russia’s internal and external politics.
Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman analyzes the ethnopolitical meanings of the public scandal surrounding Wildberries, Russia’s biggest marketplace, that involves Dagestani and Chechen interest groups. The company suffered from the wartime eroded economic situation, and in 2024, “it was announced that Wildberries would merge with Russ, the largest advertising operator in Russia.” Rumors circulate about the hostile takeover of the (still profitable) company by an elite group linked to Dagestan and supported by Vladimir Putin. Later, Vladislav Bakalchuk, Wildberries’ co-founder and its CEO’s husband, who owns 1 percent of the company’s shares, complained about the situation to Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of Chechnya, who promised him support. Kazantsev-Vaisman uses this example to demonstrate that “the split of the Russian elite can only occur if it affects the security forces or the highest echelons of political power.” In the event of a “significant weakening of the current political regime in Russia, inter-elite clashes (…) over ownership of assets could become much more acute.”
Velvl Chernin explores the historical and political situation in Kaliningrad oblast – a Russian Baltic exclave surrounded by the EU member states. Lithuania views Kaliningrad oblast (former East Prussia) as a threat and calls for its demilitarization. The current population is demographically dominated by East Slavic groups, mostly descendants of immigrants from other parts of Russia, and thus weakly rooted in the region. Chernin scrutinizes the ethnic activism of the German and Lithuanian communities and their infrastructure; for Lithuanians, East Prussia is a part of the historical Lithuania Minor that was ethnically kin to Lithuanians and played an important role in Lithuanian culture. The author also observes the attempts to create a new Kaliningrad identity of the local Russians based on the attempts to “appropriate the pre-Russian history of the region” (including the extinct Prussian language and neo-paganism) and the claims to establish a “Baltic republic” – either independently or as a region within Russian Federation.
Shifting to Russia’s foreign policy, Ze’ev Khanin discusses the prospects for de-escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian war with diplomatic means. After more than 30 months of the war, both sides may seem to have reached a stalemate and fatigue that might prompt preparation for some kind of negotiations. However, even if such preparations are underway, they are at best limited to general ideas and cautious contacts, and denied by both sides. The problem is that neither Kyiv nor Moscow is ready to accept the enemy’s demands, which is demonstrated by both geopolitical considerations and sociological analysis of opinion poll results. The Ukrainian raid on the Kursk region of Russia can alter the picture. It is meant primarily to divert Russian forces away from the Donetsk region, to signal to the West that Ukraine is capable of reversing the “defensive” trend, to put the Kremlin in an uncomfortable position in the citizens’ eyes, and to, naturally, add a bargaining chip to possible negotiations. However, a lot also depends on the Western allies’ strategy – whether they mean to weaken Russia or defeat it. The author comes to the conclusion that “no breakthrough on the negotiation track can be expected until both sides exhaust their capacities.”
Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman answers the question of whether Russia is going to support Iran in case of the latter’s major war against Israel. He asserts that “the instances of pure benefit that the Russian leadership derives from cooperation with Iran are far fewer than in the case of China, and the opportunities to gain from refraining from a sudden change of position are much greater.” The author points to the lack of ideological unity and the nature of Russian-Iranian relationships based on pure (and questionable) benefits, characterized by limited mutual trust. The alliance is tactical and situational, even though both sides prefer to call it “strategic.” An exit from the alliance may start to seem more favorable to Russia if Donald Trump wins in the upcoming US elections; the same might be true for Iran in case Kamala Harris becomes the next US president. Overall, “it is unlikely that Russia would be willing to extend its nuclear umbrella over Iran in the event of a major war. It is evident that Moscow would prefer to reserve this ‘last argument of kings’ for serious complications in Ukraine or for the defense of Russian territory itself.” Kazantsev-Vaisman assumes that “Russia’s support for Iran will be primarily political, accompanied by limited deliveries of advanced weapons, given Russia’s growing need for modern weaponry”. This will also be “an instrument for improving Kremlin’s position in Russian-Ukrainan conflict, therefore, Russia can quickly reverse its policy if it becomes beneficial from this point of view.”
Ze’ev Khanin presents his vision on the broader contexts of Mahmoud Abbas’ visit to Russia and meeting with Vladimir Putin. For Ramallah, this visit seems to be a way to slow down the trend of diminishing PNA/PLO’s importance in Arab-Israeli settlement. For Moscow, close ties with PNA/PLO are a tool to hijack the status of the main sponsor of the “Palestinian cause” from the West in line with the “anti-colonial” foreign policy doctrine adopted in Russia after the eruption of the full-scale war against Ukraine. The consequences of the 7th October massacre became for Russia yet another reason to voice declarations about the “failure” of American diplomacy. Following the “Swords of Iron” operation, in the Russian state media, a pronounced “anti-Israeli line began to dominate literally overnight, shaping the corresponding sentiments of the Russian public.” However, although for Moscow, Hamas is a respectable partner, Russia still needs the more moderate and secular Fatah (represented by Abbas). The former is still officially considered a terrorist organization in most moderate Sunni Arab regimes, and supporting it is unlikely to look legitimate in the eyes of the “Saudi bloc”. For the Kremlin, the “Palestinian issue” “is a convenient way (…) to link the two conflicts: the Ukrainian-Russian and Iranian-Israeli” by comparing itself with Iran: similar to Moscow that “protected its brothers” in “DNR/LNR,” Tehran is doing the same with Palestinian Arabs. This rhetoric serves “the main purpose of Russian foreign policy strategy – to justify and legitimize the new ideology of Russian anti-colonialism.”
The PSCRP team analyzes the preconditions and outcomes of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan in August. It may be characterized as a “necessary show of legitimacy and damage control attempt” taking place “against the backdrop of the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region of Russia.” High-ranked Russian officials are no longer welcome in many post-Soviet countries, with friendly Belarus not being considered “abroad” by Russian citizens, visits to Central Asian countries potentially arousing the uncomfortable question of why they do not join Russia in repelling Ukrainian forces, and Yerevan having escaped the Russian control upon the loss of Karabakh. Azerbaijan as a country with a multi-vector foreign policy might seem a logical option for the “show visit”. Despite being an EU partner, Baku did not cut economic and political relations with Moscow; it is eager to prevent Russia from cooperating with Iran against the Azerbaijani security and economic interests, and Baku’s refusal to host the Russian president would have been seen as an (undesirable) confrontation. Nevertheless, the visit’s results “were modest for the scale of the delegation” and included merely minor agreements concerning food security, labor inspection, the opening of a joint university, and the joint production of oil tankers. The authors conclude that “attempts to portray Baku in the West as pro-Russian due to Putin’s visit and some relatively minor agreements are misguided” – not least because there are a lot of countries in Europe itself and in the post-Soviet area whose (economic) ties with Russia are much closer. “Instead of villainizing Azerbaijan, the United States and European Union should try to take advantage of Baku’s foreign policy approach and use it as a mediator.”
In August, the only subject beyond the “Russian” thematic cluster was a bizarre incident on the Israeli media scrutinized by the PSCRP team. On August 11th, the Israeli state-owned TV channel “Kan11” reported that “the Army leadership instructed all personnel to evacuate from Georgia and Azerbaijan.” This statement, not supported by citing the relevant order, was neither confirmed nor corrected by the IDF press office. This created the impression that Israeli military contingents were present in Azerbaijan and Georgia and that they were threatened by “Iranian retaliation” for the death of Ismail Haniyeh. The spread of this false information was condemned by the Azerbaijan media agency. The Israeli media published a clarification (still in the absence of any clear IDF reaction): they were referring to Israeli tourists who are subject to military service and who could be attacked or kidnapped in these countries. However, it was too late already: the Iranian media and Telegram channels have launched a fake news campaign about the presence of the Israeli military contingent and bases in Azerbaijan. This campaign was actively supported by the Armenian media, both in Armenia proper and in the diaspora; the claims of Israeli bases being present in… Nagorno Karabakh were even discussed by an Armenian National Assembly member. The authors conclude that, first, “the IDF press office and other government agencies should be careful in the wording of their statements, as they will be used by Israel’s enemies to harm the Jewish state and its allies.” Second, “Armenia and the Armenian diaspora, which in most cases follow different political agendas, must now be viewed as hostiles, at the very least, if not as sworn allies of Iran.”
The Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program at the BESA Center continues to keep abreast of the major political events in the former Soviet area and to inform our readership of what is going on in post-Soviet Eurasia.