Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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Does Israel Need a Large Army If It Has Advanced Technology?

Dr. Eado Hecht
May 29, 2024
Paper No. 2277

What are the lessons for IDF force build-up following the Hamas attack on October 7 and the Iron Swords War? A recent article by Prof. Azar Gat concludes that "there is no need to increase the scope of the forces and the existing force build-up should be continued, the main [element] of which is investments in technologies that are the key to the advantage of the IDF on the battlefield and for the current achievements." We do not agree with this conclusion and believe it to have negative strategic consequences. The continuing inability of the IDF to realize the goals of the current war is mainly the result of a lack of ready and available maneuvering units, a lack that military technology cannot compensate for no matter how good it is. If the IDF is to be able to fulfill its responsibilities, it needs more well-trained maneuver divisions to resurrect the territorial defense organization as well as maintain technological superiority.

The “Seven Sins” of Intelligence: A Basis for Discussion

In the wake of the massive intelligence failure of October 7, fundamental changes will have to be made to Israeli national security doctrine. The intelligence community is obliged to improve its early warning capabilities – not merely in an attempt to prevent another great failure of the kind that might occur once in 50 years, but to improve its ability to contribute to the ongoing security effort. Israeli intelligence committed seven “sins” in the lead-up to October 7 that will have to be examined closely if the required changes are to be put in place. Those “sins” are politicization, certainty, preoccupation with cyber, targeting, professionalism, understanding, and risk management.

Preventive War: Its Disappearance from Israel’s Security Toolbox and the Need for Its Return

Preventive war/the preemptive strike, defined as the identification of a major threat developing among one’s enemies and the taking of action to remove that threat before it materializes, was once central to Israel's security concept. Since the rise of Hamas to power in Gaza and the Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah, however, the IDF has abandoned this practice. Instead, strategies were developed to keep escalation below the threshold of war – the “Campaign Between the Wars” in the north and repeated limited operations in Gaza. Notwithstanding these efforts, both Hamas and Hezbollah subsequently evolved, over the course of almost two decades, into terrorist armies that are a significant threat to Israel. Two recent cases illustrate this trend: Israel's response to the development of Hamas's offensive capability, with an emphasis on tunnels, starting in 2015; and Hezbollah's conversion of rockets into precision-guided rockets starting in 2018. In both cases the option of a preventive war was raised but rejected. In direct response to lessons learned from the Iron Swords War, I propose that the preventive war/preemptive strike be restored to Israel's strategic toolbox. The external and internal legitimacy for doing so stems from the fact that Israel has returned to the era of “wars of no choice.”

The EU Engagement in the Red Sea

The ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict contains a maritime dimension in the Red Sea. The Houthi offensive, ostensibly directed against Israel, is not only targeting Israel itself but also commercial and passenger ships under several flags, thereby creating a critical international strategic challenge. The EU has decided to respond by launching Operation ASPIDES. Unlike the US- and UK-led Operations Prosperity Guardian and Poseidon Archer, ASPIDES is not attacking Houthi targets but intercepting their strikes. While this wholly defensive approach can play a useful role in protecting vessels and can contribute to deterrence, it concerns the Israelis, who fear that the EU’s limited response to the Houthi threat reflects a similar stance toward Iran.

Israel’s Targeting of Hamas Commander Marwan Issa Was a Legal Operation

Under authoritative international rules, Israel’s mid-March targeting of senior Hamas commander Marwan Issa was law-enforcing. Among other egregious crimes, Issa was a key planner of the October 7 rampage against Israeli civilians. Maj. Gen. Tamir Hayman, former chief of Israeli military intelligence, accurately described this Palestinian terrorist leader as Hamas’s “strategic mind.” To fully understand this law-based action, geopolitical context is necessary. In essence, the world legal structure compels a vigilante system of justice. It is against the background of continuing global anarchy that terror-beleaguered states must identify and operationally shape their counter-terrorism options.

Urgently needed: Agreed Principles for Initiating a Political Process

The war in Gaza has now been going on for six months, yet to this day, there has been no effort whatsoever toward a long-term political process. Without such a process it will not be possible to formulate an agreed plan for the "day after". The only political process so far is related to the negotiations to Israeli hostages, and temporary ceasefire, clearly much needed agreement sooner than later. The impression this conveys to the international arena is that Israel is not interested in discussing alternatives towards ending the war and adopting steps for stabilizing the situation in the Gaza strip and beyond. Tremendous damage is being caused by this omission. A move towards a political process, based on the main principles suggested in this article, may reduce the damage and serve vital Israeli interests.

What Would “Total Victory” Mean in Gaza?

In recent years, the concept of decisive victory has eroded in Israel. October 7 brought it forcefully back to the center of the national security process. There are four types of victory: tactical (the ability of the IDF to negate the enemy's fighting ability); operational (the ability of the operative echelon to dismantle the fighting system facing it, which is currently happening in Gaza); military strategic (the ability to remove the military threat posed by the enemy for many years to come); and grand, or national, strategic (military victory leads to a fundamental change in the geopolitical situation, like a peace treaty or the establishment of a new regime).

Beyond Humanitarian Aid: A Plan for Gazan Civilians Is a Strategic Necessity for Israel

To continue its mission to defeat Hamas, Israel must take the initiative to replenish the stores of international legitimacy lost due to the acute humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. While the primary blame for the crisis lies with Hamas, which cares nothing for Gazan civilians, Israel is being held responsible even by the US for not doing enough to get aid in.

How Can Israel Hold a Real Discussion on Values Promoted by National Security?

While the confronting of threats is built into national security, the promotion of values is not generally an organic part of it. But in the current war, Israel must define its fundamental values: its commitment to human life with regard to the hostages; its position on the establishment of settlements in disputed territories; and its view on the price to be paid for peace. The injection of values into national security strategy should be based on deep, orderly discourse on the why, the what and the how. A broad consensus should be reached on how to combine these ideas with the principles of national security while dealing with both the inherent tensions they create and the strategic and operative limitations they present. Such a discussion is substantively different from the belief-based skirmishes of the current national security discourse.

Will Muslim Opposition to Biden’s Support for Israel Influence the 2024 Presidential Election?

Israel’s war in Gaza, which is being waged in response to the devastating Hamas attacks of October 7, has prompted a surge of anti-Zionist discourse among many Muslims in the West, including in the US. The American Muslim community has been politically active since 9/11. Muslim activists, clerics and Islamic organizations are among the most prominent Western voices condemning injustices against Muslims worldwide, and the Palestinian cause is often a priority. President Joe Biden’s support for Israel in the Gaza war has angered many in the American Muslim community, and they may wish to punish him for that support in the November election. Will American Muslim opposition to Biden’s support for Israel have a political impact on the US election?