Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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Two messages continue to ring out on the eve of the anniversary of the Yom Kippur War. One concerns the severity of the intelligence failure at the time, and the other promises that the right lessons have been learned and the IDF is now prepared for any scenario. When the failure is portrayed as essentially the lack of an intelligence warning, it is easy to promise that it has been diagnosed and remedied in a way that prevent its future recurrence. But an in-depth look at the war shows that the reasons for the fiasco went far beyond the intelligence failure.
The IDF’s difficulties at the outset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War stemmed from an inherent command flaw rather than an intelligence failure as is commonly believed. The roots of this flaw date back to 1957, when Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan decided on an early retirement age for IDF personnel so as to enable them to embark on a second career. Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion, who saw the dangers of the decision, opposed it but did not use his authority to revoke it. 
In times of major uncertainty it is important for the strategist to define key issues that could be relevant in shaping the future. By following their developments and gradually adding additional subjects, one can get a clearer picture of where society is headed. The longer the COVID-19 pandemic lasts, the more likely it is that there will be major areas in which the post-virus reality differs significantly from the pre-virus reality.
The national agendas of Greece and Turkey continue to clash in the Mediterranean. Even if Turkey discontinues its explorations south of the Greek island of Kastelorizo in the medium term, it will be difficult for the two to conduct a productive bilateral dialogue. The European idea of a multilateral summit of all Eastern Mediterranean countries is more promising, but not yet concrete. Israel supports the right of Greece to delimit its continental shelf and favors regional cooperation as a member of the East Med Gas Forum (EMGF), but understands that as matters stand, the possibility of a breakthrough is limited.
Historians covering the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 tend to focus on the strategic and regional ramifications deriving from the unexpected victory of the Japanese. Less attention is paid to the motives behind Japan’s decision to launch a surprise attack on Russia. An article written in 1935 by Israeli historian Prof. Joseph Klausner may solve this mystery. Based upon the testimony of a Japanese intelligence agent, the article points to the 1903 Kishinev pogrom as the decisive factor that led the Japanese to initiate war with Russia. 

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