PSCRP-BESA Reports No 96 (Nov 07, 2024)
Islamist-led uprisings in Russian prisons
On June 16, 2024, a hostage situation occurred in Detention Center No. 1 in Rostov-on-Don, southern Russia, orchestrated by Islamic terrorists acting on behalf of the “Islamic State.” The incident took place in the morning. To free the hostages, special forces conducted an assault on the detention center, during which five terrorists were killed, and one fell into a coma after being shot in the head. On August 23, 2024, in Russian Correctional Colony No. 19 in the city of Surovikino, Volgograd Region (Volga region), four radical Islamist inmates armed with knives attacked prison staff and other inmates, taking some of them hostage. All four rioters were killed a few hours later during the hostage rescue operation. In addition to the rioters, four other people lost their lives.
Clashes connected to prison Islam are not limited to the incidents mentioned above. Last years, a series of Islamist-led uprisings in Russian prisons underscored the growing influence of radical Islam within the penal system and presented serious challenges for prison authorities. These uprisings, involving groups of inmates aligned with Islamist ideologies, were marked by organized protests, violence, and confrontations with prison staff. The unrest reflects the increasing influence of Islamist groups in Russian prisons, a trend that has disrupted the traditional criminal hierarchy and threatened prison stability.
The Islamist-led uprisings have often been ignited by conflicts over prison conditions and alleged mistreatment by guards, which Islamist leaders have used as rallying points. These leaders, drawing on religious motivations, present their actions as part of a broader “struggle” against an oppressive system. The uprisings have included organized sit-ins, hunger strikes, and, in more severe cases, violent clashes with guards. In some cases, Islamist groups have taken control of sections of the prison, barricading themselves and demanding better conditions or the transfer of specific inmates.
One notable aspect of these uprisings is their level of coordination, which has sometimes extended across multiple prisons. Using covert communication channels, including encrypted messaging and coded messages relayed by visitors or other prisoners, Islamist groups have been able to plan simultaneous protests and organize resistance efforts that catch prison authorities off-guard. This level of organization demonstrates both the ideological commitment and strategic planning capabilities of Islamist groups within the prison system.
As a result, the spread of radical Islam in Russian prisons, previously known only to a small circle of specialists, has become a topic of discussion in both the official press and opposition media. Let us analyze how an out-of-control situation with the spread of radical Islam in Russian prisons could impact Russian society and politics. It is particularly important to consider whether the growing influence of Islam in criminal and socially marginalized circles, as well as in prisons, can interact with the increasing activity of bureaucratic-criminal groups, especially in the North Caucasus.
Thieves’ Traditions in the USSR and Russia
In the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia, a unique criminal culture developed within the prison system, known for its strict code of behavior and internal hierarchy. One of the most significant aspects of this culture is the institution of the “Thief-in-Law” (“Vor v zakone”), a high-ranking criminal with authority among inmates. This concept, which emerged in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, encompasses a set of traditions, rules, and structures that govern behavior, respect, and order within the criminal world.
Thieves-in-law operate under a strict code that forbids cooperation with authorities, mandates loyalty to criminal “brothers,” and promotes a strict anti-establishment ideology. The roots of these traditions can be traced back to the Gulag system, where inmates formed their own hierarchies and organized structures to survive. A Thief-in-Law is someone who has proven their loyalty to this lifestyle and is “crowned” by other high-ranking members. This title brings significant influence in prison and on the streets, but it requires total dedication to the criminal code, including rejecting family life and abstaining from legal work. Thieves-in-law are respected arbiters of disputes, organizers, and leaders who maintain the values of the criminal underworld.
One important division in the Russian prison system is between “black” and “red” zones. Black zones are prisons controlled by inmates who follow the Thief-in-Law code, rejecting cooperation with prison authorities and maintaining internal order based on criminal rules. Thieves-in-law often hold power in these zones, and the prison management exerts minimal influence over inmates. Red zones, in contrast, are prisons where authorities maintain strict control, often with the help of informants or inmates who act on behalf of the administration. In these zones, the influence of thieves-in-law is limited, and inmates who try to uphold criminal values often face retaliation from authorities or “red” inmates.
The distinction between black and red zones is a fundamental aspect of life in Russian prisons, impacting prisoners’ experiences and the stability of criminal hierarchies. Black zones are seen as places where prisoners can adhere to the Thief-in-Law code, while red zones represent a more oppressive environment with little tolerance for criminal traditions. This division has persisted into modern Russian penal institutions, even as the authority of thieves-in-law has been challenged by changing laws and government policies.
It should be noted that in the 1990s and 2000s, Russia witnessed two opposing trends. On one hand, there was an ongoing expansion of traditional criminal culture into youth subcultures (it is called AUE in Russian), which faced increased resistance from the state (Russian government even introduced the law banning criminal subculture among young people under the pretext that it is a “criminal and extremist movement”, which caused serious criticism because criminalization of subculture is legal nonsense). On the other hand, there was a crisis of traditional groups associated with criminal ideology, which were partially pushed aside by groups of athletes and ethnic criminal organizations, including Islamist ones. Process of expansion of ethnic criminal groups pushing aside traditional criminal groups started even before the dissolution of the USSR, it was noticeable already from the 1980-s, and, in some cases, even from the 1970-s.
The Rise of Radical Islamism in Criminal Subcultures in Central Asia and the North Caucasus
In recent years, radical Islamism has increasingly influenced criminal subcultures in Central Asia and the North Caucasus. To a certain degree a rise of radical Islamism (in the 1990-s old Soviet Islamic clerics called it “Vahhabism”) was a response towards multifaceted socio-cultural crisis that accompanied the collapse of the USSR. Central Asia and the North Caucasus have long histories of strong local identities (including significant Muslim element) and, more recently, socio-political instability, which has created fertile ground for the merging of extremist religious ideologies with criminal activities. This trend is especially pronounced among youth and ethnic criminal groups who are often drawn to radical movements as a form of rebellion, identity, or economic opportunity.
Ethnic criminal networks often provide a sense of belonging and protection, which is sometimes intertwined with a shared religious identity. For these groups, radical Islamism can serve both as a moral justification for criminal actions and as a unifying ideology that reinforces group loyalty. These young people, often disillusioned with traditional social structures, find empowerment in a combination of religious and criminal identity. This alignment of faith and crime not only fosters loyalty but also justifies activities such as extortion, smuggling, and trafficking as part of a “holy war” against perceived enemies.
This fusion of radical Islamism with criminality has allowed some extremist groups to finance their operations through illicit means, including drug trafficking, arms trading, and human trafficking. Radicalized criminal groups operate under the guise of jihad, often justifying violent crimes against the state and rival factions as religiously motivated. These groups may claim adherence to strict Islamic principles, but their operations are fundamentally profit-driven, using ideology as a tool to recruit and maintain loyalty within their ranks. The blending of crime and radical ideology poses significant challenges to regional stability, as these groups often resist government intervention and view law enforcement as an enemy.
In sum, the intertwining of radical Islamism with criminal subcultures in Central Asia and the North Caucasus represents a complex and evolving issue. It highlights the power of ideology to transcend traditional criminal codes, merging extremist beliefs with organized crime. This hybridization not only destabilizes these regions but also complicates efforts to address criminality and extremism independently, as they become inseparably linked in the eyes of many young, disillusioned recruits.
The northern drug trafficking route from Afghanistan to Russia is a key path for heroin and opium smuggling, with significant impacts on regional security and public health. Afghanistan, as one of the world’s largest producers of opiates, supplies much of the narcotics that flow northward through Central Asia and ultimately reach Russia and parts of Europe. This route, often running through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, is heavily utilized by organized criminal networks and increasingly by groups affiliated with radical Islamism.
Radical Islamist and jihadist groups have exploited this lucrative trade to fund their operations. Although drug trafficking is generally condemned in Islamic teachings, these groups often justify their involvement by framing it as a means to harm Western or non-Muslim societies, which they see as enemies. This ideological rationalization provides a “higher purpose” for their criminal activities, portraying it as a form of economic jihad. The profits from drug trafficking are substantial, allowing these groups to finance recruitment, purchase weapons, and expand their influence across Central Asia and into Russia.