PSCRP-BESA Reports No 204 (May 20, 2026)

by Alexander Shpunt

This text was prepared with a deliberate restriction on the sources of information consulted. The author set an exceptionally demanding methodological objective: to abstain entirely from drawing on sources that are opposed to the Kremlin, and even from publications issued by foreign analytical centers. Regrettably, the degree of politicization that has come to pervade the analytical discourse surrounding electoral politics in Russia has resulted in the complete devaluation of these centers – undeniably authoritative on other matters – as credible sources of knowledge regarding the Kremlin’s electoral strategy and the conduct of Russia’s parliamentary parties.

We have resolved to rely exclusively on information openly published within Russia through registered outlets. These, too, are not without their political biases; their assessments and conclusions have likewise become instruments of ideological contestation, no less so than the analyses produced by opposition commentators.

We have nonetheless selected them as our primary source for one straightforward reason: if something said about the presidential administration  has been published within Russia, then at the very minimum, the Kremlin’s own political managers do not object to having their actions and decisions characterized in precisely that manner, in precisely those terms, and in the public domain.

This approach has not, to our knowledge, been employed in any prior study – which made it a challenging, yet intellectually rewarding, line of inquiry to pursue.

Before proceeding to the substantive analysis of Russia’s electoral landscape, the author wishes to address one additional factor separately.

The role of the political leadership of Russia’s presidential administration in electoral processes is, regrettably, treated in a superficial manner in the overwhelming majority of existing works. Some studies mythologize this role, attributing to the Kremlin the function of a “political Gosplan” – a central planning authority regulating every electoral development across the country. Other studies categorically deny the presidential administration any role whatsoever in electoral processes and simply disregard its political managers altogether.

Viewed without prejudice, there is nothing exceptional about the electoral influence exercised by Russia’s presidential administration. Across the post-Soviet space, there is not a single country – including the Baltic states, which are members of the European Union – in which the political managers of the ruling executive are not directly and actively integrated into electoral processes. This pattern is observable everywhere: from Lithuania to Central Asia, from Moldova to Armenia. The instruments employed do not differ substantially either.

Moreover, if one surveys the global electoral landscape, it becomes evident that the orchestration of electoral processes is by no means a feature exclusive to the post-Soviet space. The Arab world’s nascent democratic experiments, the post-authoritarian regimes of Southeast Asia, the countries of Latin America with their entrenched “military” component in the electoral model, and, of course, the entirety of sub-Saharan Africa – in all of these contexts, the political managers of the governing establishment exercise varying degrees of control over electoral procedures. And this does not render such polities “less democratic” in the estimation of the international community.

Against this backdrop, the mythologization of the presidential administration ’s role in political research is attributable to one factor alone: Russia’s outsized significance in global economic and political processes.

 

A New Game Under New Rules

The reduction of “quotas” allocated to the systemic parliamentary opposition for agreed-upon single-member constituencies in the run-up to the 2026 State Duma elections is described as an amendment to the informal rules of engagement, driven by the presidential administration ’s political bloc under the direction of Sergei Kirienko. According to data cited in analytical commentary, the number of such “cleared” single-member constituencies is expected to stand at approximately 10–13, compared with roughly 20 in both 2016 and 2021. Analysts characterize this as a narrowing of the guaranteed passage corridor for candidates from the parliamentary parties – the so-called “systemic opposition,” comprising the CPRF, the LDPR, A Just Russia – For Truth, and the New People party – and as a reconfiguration of the administrative arrangements underpinning that access.

As early as 21 April 2025, Russia’s presidential administration , acting in concert with United Russia, commenced preparations for the 2026 Duma elections. Incumbent deputies are being assessed through a “traffic light” system drawing on regional-level data. Those who lack the support of local constituencies are being encouraged to identify prospective replacements. The presidential administration  takes into account whether a deputy maintains a stable base of committed supporters, while United Russia’s party managers evaluate the legislative activity, policy initiatives, and standing of their membership.

 

«United Russia»: Preempting Electoral Risk

No serious, authoritative analytical centers – either within Russia or abroad – regards as probable a scenario in which United Russia fails to secure a parliamentary majority. However, assessments of the electoral quality and scale of that majority vary considerably.

Party leadership is fully cognizant of this reality, and has taken pre-emptive steps to ensure the party’s readiness for a vigorous electoral campaign.

In the course of preparations for the elections, the leadership of United Russia underwent substantial restructuring  in 2025 – at both the federal and regional levels. Party governance has been rendered more compact and centralized. Under Vladimir Yakushev, who assumed the position of General Council Secretary in 2024, the General Council Presidium was reduced from 35 to 14 members, and the number of deputy secretaries was cut from six to one.

United Russia’s internal primary system has undergone a substantive transformation since its inception. The most significant development has been the near-complete transition to online voting via the Gosuslugi (Public Services) digital platform. This shift has enabled a substantial increase in the number of rank-and-file party members participating in candidate selection, thereby enhancing the sociological representativeness of the process. Analysts from the Expert Institute of Social Research (EISI) – one of United Russia’s key think tanks – have positioned  the transition to the Gosuslugi platform as a safeguard against external interference and a mechanism for purging the electorate of so-called “bots.

Observers note that the substantive weight attached to the primaries within United Russia has grown considerably. Whereas previously this procedure – particularly at the regional level – served primarily as a legitimizing formality for candidates already selected through administrative channels, it now functions as a genuine instrument for identifying those whose electoral standing exceeds the prescribed threshold parameters.

 

The Communists: A Forced Departure from the Comfort Zone

Relations between the presidential administration ’s political bloc and the CPRF in the context of the 2026 State Duma elections are described as more contentious and less predictable than those with any other “systemic” party, and as more conflictual than in previous electoral cycles. Several key factors account for this.

Chief among these is the risk of losing “second place” and the intensifying competition with New People and the LDPR. Within the presidential administration , analysts note, the surge in New People’s popularity – combined with the Liberal Democrats’ full recovery following their change of political leadership – is being viewed as a lever for displacing the CPRF from its status as the “second political force” in the country.

Since 2003, the Communists have traditionally occupied second place, and their position as the “default choice” for any protest-minded voter has become a source of concern for the Kremlin. A scenario in which the CPRF loses its lead within the parliamentary opposition segment – ceding second place to another party, whether New People or the LDPR – serves the Kremlin’s interests, not least because the Communists’ strength rests on genuinely effective regional and local party branches, an organisational capacity that no other opposition party can match.

Analysts observe that in this context the CPRF has been compelled to engage in direct confrontations with the Kremlin’s political managers, including public broadsides against Sergei Kirienko. A specific instance is cited: Gennady Zyuganov’s statement in January 2026, in which he publicly criticized multi-day voting and what he characterized as the “uncontrolled” nature of vote-counting procedures.

Observers note that this represents a genuinely new phenomenon. For decades, the CPRF directed its criticism at the authorities “in general,” without personalizing its critique or formulating precise political grievances. It should be noted, of course, that even now there is no question of crossing over into the non-systemic opposition – the dynamic is rather one of signaling to local activists: adopt a harder line at elections, show less deference in preserving working relationships with regional political authorities. The stakes of this particular electoral cycle for the CPRF are simply too high to do otherwise.

In response to these departures from the established rules of engagement by Zyuganov, the authorities have also demonstrated their capacity for coercive pressure. Analysts have recorded a significant intensification of pressure on regional CPRF branches – a development likewise absent for decades. In the Altai Krai, for instance – one of the party’s key stronghold regions – a wave of detentions and arrests of party members was reported in late 2025 and early 2026. CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov directly accused the authorities of conducting a deliberate campaign to weaken the party in advance of the elections.

A second factor is the party’s need to demonstrate to its electorate an “ideological distance from the authorities.” Unlike the LDPR or A Just Russia, which project an almost complete consensus with the ruling establishment, the CPRF has maintained, in its “Program of Victory” (April 2026), a trenchant critique of the government’s socio-economic policy. This renders the CPRF’s campaign less predictable and more adversarial from the perspective of the presidential administration ’s political technologists – particularly at the regional and local levels, where oversight is extremely difficult to maintain.

That said, for both parties this remains a familiar script, one in which each side has long since rehearsed its assigned role.

The Liberal Democratic Party: Competing for Silver

According to polling data for March 2026, more than half of Russians regard the LDPR and the CPRF as the principal contenders for second place, though the Communists’ prospects are subjectively rated somewhat higher.

The figures indicate that 29% of respondents believe the CPRF will finish second in the September 2026 State Duma elections, while 25% favors the LDPR in the contest for “silver,” with the remaining parties trailing markedly. The nationwide telephone survey of 1,600 respondents was conducted by Russian Field between 20 and 27 January 2026.

Political analysts in Russia’s regions observe that under the leadership of Leonid Slutsky, the party has undergone a stylistic transformation, moving away from eccentric personalize populism towards a more systematic and institutionalized variant. The LDPR’s programmatic commitments elaborate this trajectory:

• The Russian Question: The central campaign slogan for 2026 is “Let us restore greatness to the Russian people!” The LDPR places primary emphasis on the defense of the traditions, culture, and interests of the Russian people, both domestically and abroad.
• Social Priorities: The party’s program is built on “direct citizen demands” gathered during regional tours. Key themes include migration policy, demography, support for veterans of the special military operation, and the development of small towns.
• Economic Policy: The party advocates for a more accommodating taxation regime and moderate economic protectionism.

Some political analysts, however, suggest that New People may mount a serious challenge to the LDPR in the competition for leadership of the “alternative” (non-pro-governmental) political space.

A Just Russia Party: Demonstrating the Right to Survive

The future of A Just Russia – For Truth within the configuration of the 2026 State Duma is described as a matter subject to determination in the Kremlin. Loyalist analytical commentary states explicitly that whether or not the party secures representation in the next Duma, and the degree of support it receives from the presidential administration ’s political bloc, will determine not merely its electoral performance on this occasion – but the very continued existence of the political project itself.

The party is currently in the grip of a profound structural crisis. At its annual congress on 25 October 2025, A Just Russia – For Truth reverted to its former name, A Just Russia. Among the reasons cited for this rebranding, analysts note the effective departure from the party’s leadership of the former heads of Patriots of Russia and For Truth in recent years: Gennady Semigin resigned in 2024, while Zakhar Prilepin had by that point been largely absent from the party’s management structures. The position of co-chair, established in 2021 for Semigin and Prilepin, was abolished, as were their respective roles as chairman of the Central Council and secretary.

In the assessment of observers, the party has traditionally served in the Kremlin’s eyes as an instrument for “absorbing protest voters” – that is, attracting the votes of those unwilling to support the CPRF or the LDPR, but who do not regard United Russia as sufficiently socially oriented. Its defining red line is to avoid siphoning votes from United Russia. Its continued presence in the State Duma therefore depends, in large measure, on its ability to fulfil this traditional function within the existing political configuration.

Konstantin Kalachev, head of the Political Expert Group – an influential Russian think tank – identifies the party’s target constituency – one broadly acceptable to both the party itself and the presidential administration ’s domestic political bloc – as “angry patriots.” He argues that targeting this electorate will allow A Just Russia to simultaneously satisfy the boundary conditions described above: “Since fervent patriots typically gravitate toward United Russia, and ‘kvass patriots’ tend toward outright monarchism, the ‘angry patriots’ are really the only segment worth contesting. And that contest will be conducted under very specific conditions. Much will depend on the pace of ongoing developments – specifically, whether the situation can be held together until 2026 and whether an inertial scenario can be realized. For the presidential administration , the optimal outcome is, of course, a ‘rally around the flag’ effect, version 2.0.”

New People: Projected Twofold Growth

In the State Duma elections scheduled for autumn 2026, the New People party is positioning itself as the principal systemic alternative to the “old” political forces. The central question is whether the party can achieve a substantial increase in its parliamentary representation – with some projections targeting second place by seat count – an ambition that has already prompted a far-reaching reconfiguration of Russia’s party landscape.

According to a VTSIOM poll conducted between 13 and 19 April 2026, the electoral rating of the New People party reached 13.4%, placing it second among all parliamentary parties – ahead of the CPRF at 10.9% and the LDPR at 10.1%. In and of themselves, such ratings do not guarantee a second-place finish: the Communists and the Liberal Democrats both possess far more experienced and organizationally robust regional structures than New People, and an active pre-election campaign will alter these figures – but the bid for second place has been staked, and the party’s rivals have taken note.

Several converging factors have contributed to this improvement in the party’s electoral standing.

“The Party of No Prohibitions”: In its electoral campaign, the party has centered its messaging on the dismantling of excessive restrictions, internet blocking, and the regulation of VPN services. Party leader Alexei Nechayev has proposed designating 2026 as “the year without prohibitions.”

Merger with the Party of Growth: The legal amalgamation with Boris Titov’s Party of Growth has been completed, strengthening the party’s presence among business constituencies and urban liberals. Moreover, Boris Titov is a figure of considerable weight in Russian establishment politics, having served for many years as Business Ombudsman – and in that capacity a direct interlocutor of President Putin and the presidential administration.

Beyond the political dimension, Titov has also brought substantial business resources to the merged party: his agro-industrial holding, Abrau-Dyurso, is not only the country’s largest wine producer but also one of the largest landowners in the fertile south of Russia, with a diversified agricultural portfolio.

New People are currently regarded by political observers as the most dynamically ascendant parliamentary faction, with a campaign built on “rapid information responsiveness.”

The party presents itself as the vehicle of choice for those who seek change but remain within the bounds of the law. It has pursued an active presence in protest-prone regions (Primorsky Krai, Khabarovsk Krai) and has conducted open candidate recruitment drives.

Its new program, “12 Steps Toward a Country Worth Living In,” draws explicitly on the rights and freedoms provisions of the 1993 Constitution. According to analysts operating within Russia, this is expected to attract upwards of 10% of the “syslib” – the systemic liberal – electorate.

 

SVO Veterans: An Alloying Element Among Loyalists in These Elections

On the subject of veterans of the special military operation in Russia’s south-east and Ukraine entering the political arena, we have published a separate, detailed analysis.

Here we wish to focus specifically on the forthcoming elections this autumn.

Beyond the obvious resource they represent for the authorities, the co-optation of SVO veterans into political life carries, in the view of analysts, significant intra-elite institutional tensions within the processes of “elite renewal” in advance of the State Duma elections.

The primary concern relates to risks for political manageability: accustomed as they are to direct political action in its most uncompromising form – the battlefield, where the world is divided into “friend” and ‟enemy” – SVO veterans are not naturally disposed toward the political compromises expected of those they regard not merely as electoral opponents, but as political adversaries.

The CPRF’s principal think tank, the Centre for Research into Russia’s Political Culture, in its report dated 7 May 2026, identifies a growing popular demand for the “purification” of the political system.

Communist party analysts identify two constituent elements of this demand:

• Uncompromising posture: The patriotic milieu, and veterans of the SVO above all, has ceased debating details and has begun to question the current system’s capacity to reach any accommodation with its “internal enemies” – defined as the corrupt and the liberal wing of the establishment.
• Direct action: Veterans anticipate not political bargaining but decisive measures, interpreting any concession to opponents as weakness or betrayal of those still serving at the front.

It is to be expected that, as SVO veterans accumulate political and administrative experience upon their return to civilian life, this uncompromising orientation will soften, and they will come to appreciate the value of compromise; but to anticipate such a development in time for the autumn elections would be, in the view of analysts working in loyalist think tanks in Russia, unrealistic. What is needed is time – time that will forge political experience. The reader may find a more detailed treatment of this subject in the academic article “The Utilization of the Political Potential of Special Military Operation Participants within Russia’s State System,” by Dina Sikorskaya of Ryazan State University, recently published in the peer-reviewed Russian journal Caspian Region: Politics, Economics, Culture.

Russia’s autumn 2026 elections cannot be characterized as routine. In many respects, they will constitute a plebiscite on the very survival of the “systemic opposition” model – a model that has endured without fundamental change for two decades.

Even the Kremlin’s opponents do not dispute United Russia’s commanding electoral advantage. What remains in question is the architecture of the internal-systemic opposition to the party of power – an architecture that, by all indications, will look markedly different from the present one.