PSCRP-BESA Reports No 65 (June 21, 2024)
A number of observers compare the current situation in Georgia with the events in Ukraine in late 2013, when President Viktor Yanukovych abandoned the European course and chose a pro-Russian one, which led to the Revolution of Dignity and the overthrow of the pro-Russian regime. The ruling party Georgian Dream, controlled by billionaire and former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, has been compared to the dissolved Ukrainian Party of Regions. However, the main difference is that the Russian occupation of Georgian territories began even before Ivanishvili and his party appeared on the political scene.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the USSR and then Russia supported Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatists, which led to the loss of Georgian control over significant territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the surrounding areas. As a result, about 20% of Georgia’s territory fell under Russian control. These actions led to ethnic cleansing, forcing hundreds of thousands of Georgians and Georgian-speaking Jews to leave their homes. The problem of internally displaced persons from Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains a pressing issue for Georgia.
Against this background, during the 2012 election campaign, the newly established Georgian Dream party promoted the idea of restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity through the peaceful reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the country. This came just a few years after Georgia’s crushing defeat in the five-day war with the Russian Federation. Georgian Dream won the elections and has remained the party of power ever since.
The idea of peaceful reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has long remained abstract and did not cause concern among the elites of these Russian-controlled quasi-states. However, there is now widespread speculation that the Georgian leadership’s turn towards Russia and promotion of the law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence”, similar to the Russian law on foreign agents, is a payment for the “surrender” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Abkhazian journalist Inal Khashig believes that this law may be adopted in exchange for concessions from Moscow on the territorial issue. Similar discussions are occurring in the leadership of the Russian-controlled Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Russia uses autonomous “Trojan horses” to increase its influence over post-Soviet states, as in the case of the pro-Russian Gagauzia in Moldova and the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldovan Republic . Before invading Ukraine in 2022, they attempted to incorporate the DNR and LNR into Ukraine through the Minsk agreements. The attempt to reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia in order to increase Russian influence is in line with the Russian modus operandi. Moscow used the national movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for its own purposes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but there are significant differences between these regions.
Abkhazia, despite its connection with Georgia, has a centuries-old tradition of statehood. The Kingdom of Abkhazia was formed in the late 8th century, and in the early 9th century it included almost all of western Georgia and moved its capital to Kutaisi, changing the ethnic framework of the state. The principality of Abkhazia separated from the Kingdom of Imereti in the late 15th century, but was under Turkish influence.
In 1810 the principality of Abkhazia became a vassal of the Russian Empire. In 1864 the Russians dissolved it, incorporating it into the Kutaisi province. Rebellion of Abkhazians in 1866 was suppressed, which led to mass exodus of Abkhazian Muslims to Turkey. In their place Russian authorities settled Armenians, Mingrels, Greeks and others. As a result, Abkhazia lost its mono-ethnic character. According to the census of 1897, Abkhazians made up 55% of the population of Sukhumi district, Mingrelians — 22.4%, Georgians — 1.7%, Armenians — 6.2%, Greeks — 5.1%, Russians — 4.8%.
In 1918 Abkhazia became part of the independent Republic of Georgia, but in February 1921 it was captured by the Red Army. In March 1921, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia, nominally independent, was proclaimed. Abkhazian separatists believe that from 1921 to 1931 Abkhazia was not a part of the Georgian SSR, but an equal state entity within the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. Since 1931 Abkhazia became an ASSR within Georgia, where a policy of Georgianization was pursued. In 1938–1954 Abkhazian writing was based on the Georgian alphabet, despite the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in the XIX century and the Latin alphabet in 1926–1938. By the end of the Soviet period, Abkhazians were a minority. According to the 1989 census, they made up 17.8% of the population of the Abkhaz ASSR, Georgians (including Mingrels) — 45.7%, Armenians — 15%, Russians — 14%, Greeks — 3%.
The threat of assimilation by Georgians was a key factor in the radicalization of the Abkhaz national movement. However, without Russian involvement, the Abkhaz, who made up less than a fifth of the population, would not have been able to make such progress. In 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz ASSR declared its independence, announcing its secession from the Georgian SSR. After Georgia’s declaration of independence in 1991, Abkhazia set out on a course to establish an independent state.
During the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992–1993, in which Russian troops and North Caucasian units took the side of the Abkhazians, Georgia was defeated. About a quarter of a million ethnic Georgians (including Mingrels) fled Abkhazia. Russian “peacekeepers” were stationed in the country. Only the Kodori Gorge, populated by Svans, remained under Georgian control. In 2008, Abkhazia took control of the Kodori Gorge, most of whose inhabitants left with the Georgian troops. After this ethnic cleansing, Abkhazians became the majority in their country, making up 51% of the population in 2016. At the same time, Georgians (almost exclusively Mingrelians) made up 18 % of the population, Armenians — 17 %, Russians — 9 % (National composition of the current population as of January 1, 2016. Department of State Statistics of the Republic of Abkhazia). Mingrelians make up 98.21% in the Gali district and 62.37% in the Tkvarcheli district. Teaching in Georgian is impeded, schools operate in Abkhazian, Russian and Armenian languages. The majority of Mingrels in Abkhazia retain Georgian citizenship and do not speak Abkhazian.
The numerical prevalence of Abkhazians in the Republic of Abkhazia is small and the authorities are seeking to increase or maintain it. To this end, the State Committee on Repatriation has been established. According to the Constitutional Law on Repatriates, ethnic Abkhazians and their descendants who left their historical territory as a result of the wars of the 19th century can apply for repatriation. This right extends to Abazinians as well. The bulk of foreign Abkhazians (and Abazinians) live in Turkey, their number is estimated at about 600 thousand people, but they are highly assimilated and less than one tenth speaks the Abkhazian language.
Several thousand repatriates from Turkey live in Abkhazia. According to the 2010 census, there are more than 11 thousand Abkhazians living in the Russian Federation (apart from more than 40 thousand Abazinians). In Georgia, outside Abkhazia, according to 2002 data, there were 3.5 thousand Abkhazians.
Abkhaz nationalists have discussed the possibility of taking measures to change the national identity of the Mingrelians of the Gali district to Abkhazian, but have not achieved actual results.
It is likely that Abkhaz nationalists will resist the return of Georgian refugees. With Abkhazia’s current population of around a quarter of a million, of which just over half are ethnic Abkhazians, the return of even a quarter of all refugees would once again make Abkhazians a minority.
The history of South Ossetia’s relations with Georgia was different. Ossetians arrived in eastern Georgia in several waves from the North Caucasus in the late Middle Ages and settled alongside Georgians. Being Orthodox Christians, they often entered into mixed marriages. Relations were good-neighborly until 1919, when the Bolsheviks organized a peasant uprising in the Ossetian regions against the Menshevik Republic of Georgia. In June 1920, the Bolsheviks took Tskhinvali, where Ossetians were a minority, and the revcom (revolutionary committee) of South Ossetia announced its annexation to the RSFSR. The uprising was suppressed by the Georgian authorities, but in 1921 the Bolsheviks took over all of Georgia.
In April 1922, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was created within the Georgian SSR, not united with the North Ossetian ASSR within the RSFSR. Ossetians made up about two-thirds of the population of the autonomous oblast. The share of Georgian population grew insignificantly: from 26.9% in 1926 to 28.9% in 1989. About half of all Ossetians of the Georgian SSR lived outside the autonomous region: in 1926, 60,351 Ossetians lived in the South Ossetian Autonomous Region and 52,927 in other parts of Georgia. In 1938–1954 in South Ossetia the Ossetian language used the Georgian alphabet, later replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet, as in North Ossetia.
On November 10, 1989, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was declared autonomous, which caused conflict with the central Georgian authorities and provoked inter-ethnic clashes. In 1990, the South Ossetian authorities opposed the collapse of the USSR. In January 1991, two months before Georgia’s declaration of independence, the Georgian-Ossetian war began, which lasted until June 1992. The war led to the flight of many Ossetians and Georgians, but there was no ethnic cleansing, unlike in Abkhazia. Before the Russian aggression of 2008, South Ossetia had a Georgian population and Georgian schools. There is no Ossetian-language secondary education, Ossetian is taught only as a subject, other subjects are taught in Russian. The Russian authorities have not annexed South Ossetia to North Ossetia, which indirectly indicates possible reintegration into Georgia.
In conclusion, the economic situation in both quasi-states is very dire. In agrarian South Ossetia, landlocked and deprived of trade with Georgia since the start of the 2008 war, the population has dropped from 98,500 in 1989 to just over 53,000 in 2016. This situation makes it possible for South Ossetia to reintegrate into Georgia without serious conflict, while retaining some autonomy.
Abkhazia (population of about 245,000) has the advantage of access to the sea. The presence of a significant diaspora in Turkey provides Abkhazia with political support in that country and the potential of a demographic resource. The high level of Abkhaz national consciousness and heavy memories of the 1992–1993 war make the reintegration of Abkhazia into Georgia extremely problematic, even with Russia’s insistence.