The 1982 Lebanon War and Its Repercussions for Israel’s National Security

Dr. Hanan Shai
June 4, 2020
Paper No. 1596

The conquest of southern Lebanon in Operation Peace for Galilee, and Israel’s long sojourn in the area, had political and military justification. But defects in the IDF’s deployment during the operation, and later in its protracted security activity, culminated in the May 2000 hurried withdrawal that continues to this day to negatively affect Israel’s national security.

Despite Coronavirus, Hezbollah Remains a Dangerous Threat to Israel

Yaakov Lappin
April 26, 2020
Paper No. 1540

The coronavirus pandemic has turned into a serious challenge for the Iran-backed Lebanese terror organization Hezbollah, placing the world’s most heavily equipped non-state armed group under strain. Nevertheless, recent reports indicate that these conditions have not stopped Hezbollah’s ongoing military and terrorist activity in the region.

Israel vs. Hezbollah: The Third Lebanon War

Dr. Ehud Eilam
March 9, 2020
Paper No. 1474

Ever since the 2006 war, Israel has preferred to contain Hezbollah rather than fight it directly. So determined was Israel to avoid going to war with the terrorist group that it tolerated its significant military buildup. Since 2012, however, the IAF has carried out hundreds of sorties inside Syria aimed at stopping the delivery of advanced weapons to Hezbollah. Israel can continue to delay the arming of Hezbollah, but it has already become quite strong, and a war could occur even if neither side wants it.

Hebzollah Chief: “Kill Every American Soldier in the Middle East”

Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, chief of Tehran’s Lebanese proxy terror group Hezbollah, made a speech earlier this month encouraging the killing of every American soldier and officer in the Middle East. It is not every day that a terrorist leader expressly calls for the mass killing of Americans. Will Trump respond?

The WhatsApp Crisis Reveals Cracks in Iran’s Soft Power Strategy

The “WhatsApp crisis” in Lebanon revealed a crack in Iran’s grand diplomatic strategy of using its proxies to push ideological soft power concurrently with hard power. Since 1979, Tehran has been trying to brand itself as the epicenter of the Islamic Revolution. That notion is being challenged—not by Lebanese tanks and Iraqi bullets but by citizens armed with smartphones.

Iran and Its Proxies Face the Costs of Imperialism

In both Iraq and Lebanon, Shiites are participating in protests against Iranian-backed, Shiite-led governments. As protests and violence in Iraq and Lebanon continue, Iran is beginning to learn that imperialism in a world of mass politics and protest has unintended costs.

Hezbollah’s Demographic Problem Explains Its Restraint

Hezbollah responded with restraint to Israel’s three-pronged attacks over the past two weeks in Syria, Iraq, and, above all, a neighborhood in Dahiya, the vast Shiite area in Beirut where Hezbollah is headquartered. The organization’s effort to avoid escalation reflects its demographic problem in Lebanon.

Israel’s New Existential Challenge

The creation of an Iranian military/terrorist axis along Israel’s northern and southern borders, comprising Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, lays the groundwork for the long-term multi-frontal attrition of the Jewish state.

The Prospect of an Iran-Israel Escalation

Yaakov Lappin
June 2, 2019
Paper No. 1189

The recent rise in military tensions in the Persian Gulf between the US and Iran introduces a heightened possibility that Iran will activate proxies against Israel. In the event of further escalation, Jerusalem must assume that Tehran’s plans will include possible proxy attacks on Israeli territory and overseas Israeli targets.

Deterrence Is Not Everything

Israel’s decisions a) to contain Hamas’s continuous provocations rather than use them as a casus belli and b) to refrain from an immediate military response to the discovery of Hezbollah tunnels into Israeli sovereign territory in the northern Galilee highlight the issue of deterrence as a core factor affecting the Israeli image in the region. Assuming the current Israeli modus operandi is the product of rational and thoughtful staff work, it can be inferred that deterrence is no longer either a decisive factor or even a strategic goal in the asymmetric conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah.