How Energy Considerations Affect Hezbollah’s Involvement in the War in Gaza

The events of October 7 and Hezbollah's subsequent attacks on Israel’s northern border have renewed the question of whether energy considerations can serve as a lever on Hezbollah's policy towards Israel, as was claimed following the signing of a maritime border agreement by Israel and Lebanon in October 2022. During the months of fighting, reports have emerged of internal pressure being exerted by Beirut on Hezbollah not to enter the conflict against Israel as doing so would likely exacerbate Lebanon's state of deep crisis. This crisis includes frequent power outages in Beirut, unprecedented fuel shortages nationwide, and delays in gas exploration in Lebanon's waters. If Lebanon's energy crisis does lead to the “concentration” of Hezbollah within Lebanon's economic and political arena, it is possible that Israel, through US mediation, could exploit this to undermine Hezbollah and restore stability on the northern border.

French Policy in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe vs Israeli interests

It is likely that France does not have enough resources to prioritize both Ukraine and Armenia at the same time. Concentrating on two tracks at once, especially when resources are scarce, may lead to their inefficient allocation across both tracks.

The War of October 7 – and the One to Follow

Although the war in Gaza is still in its early stages, Israel must begin learning from it now. The next challenge, a war in the north, might be imminent. The primary lesson taught by the war in Gaza is that no military-size terror threat should ever again be allowed anywhere on Israel’s borders. Such threats should be removed by force on the other side of the border. A concentrated force-design process, focused on four or five plans, in addition to basic preparations will enable the creation of a sharper and readier military force. Israel should focus on embarking on about two years’ worth of preparations for the next war.

The “Lebanonization” of Hezbollah Has Not Altered Its Commitment to Israel’s Destruction

Hezbollah began in 1982 as an Islamist organization founded and shaped according to the ideological model of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The organization was founded to establish an Islamist regime in Lebanon and conduct a jihadist war against the enemies of Islam: the West and Israel. Hezbollah gradually “Lebanonized”, meaning it claimed to be limit the military struggle to Lebanese territory, integrated into the Lebanese political system, and established an extensive civil infrastructure. This transformation was accompanied by a new discourse stressing its role as defender of Lebanon. But Hezbollah’s Lebanonization has not in any way diluted or moderated its conception of Israel, with which it believes itself to be in a doomsday war. Hezbollah’s military empowerment since the withdrawal of the IDF in 2000 does not correspond with its discourse about defending Lebanon. Hezbollah's involvement in the fighting since October 8 is not mere lip service but a demonstration of its total commitment to what it perceives as its deterministic conflict with Israel.

URGENT: An Israeli Strategy for a Post-Hamas Gaza

BESA Center
October 25, 2023
Paper No. 2225

Israelis have united around the goal of toppling the Hamas regime, but little has been said about what would come after. This issue is critical to Israel’s security and must be addressed. Israeli interests are best served by establishing in Gaza a PA-linked administration alongside a massive reconstruction program backed by the US and other international and regional actors. Israel’s declaration of support for establishing such a regime in Gaza as soon as possible would provide a political direction to the military operation and enhance its international legitimacy. Defeating Hamas must ultimately mean not only its military destruction but the empowerment of a moderate Palestinian alternative.

Swords of Iron: There Is No “Political Hourglass,” But Clear Decisions Are Required

Unlike during previous conflicts, Israel is not constrained this time by a “political hourglass” and it would be wise to remove this concern from the table if a decisive outcome in the ground operation against Hamas is to be achieved. The ability to maintain this situation over time is in Israel’s hands. Seven clear decisions, detailed below, will be required to strengthen Israel’s hand, along with the establishment of mechanisms necessary for their implementation.

The Oslo Disaster 30 Years On

Thirty years after its euphoric launch, the “Oslo peace process” between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) stands as the worst calamity to have afflicted Israelis and Palestinians since the 1948 war, and the most catastrophic strategic blunder in Israel’s history. By replacing Israel’s control of the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians with corrupt and repressive terrorist entities that indoctrinated their subjects with burning hatred of Jews and Israelis, as well as murdered some 2,000 Israelis and rained thousands of rockets and missiles on their population centers, the Oslo process has made the prospects for peace and reconciliation ever more remote. By deflating the fighting spirit and combative ethos of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), it has weakened Israel’s national security and made the outbreak of a multi-front war—a scenario that effectively vanished after the 1973 war—a distinct possibility. By transforming the PLO (and, to a lesser extent, Hamas) into internationally accepted political actors without forcing them to shed their genocidal commitment to the Jewish state’s destruction, it weakened Israel’s international standing and subjected it to sustained de-legitimization campaigns. And by deepening Israel’s internal cleavages and destabilizing its sociopolitical system, it has created a clear and present danger to the Jewish State’s thriving democracy, indeed to its very existence.

Why Israel Approved Development of the Gaza Marine Gas Field

Elai Rettig
July 17, 2023
Paper No. 2207

In June 2023, Israel quietly approved the development of Gaza Marine, a small offshore gas field near Gaza that will benefit both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas in terms of revenue and energy independence. Why was the deal approved by the most right-wing Israeli government to date, and how does this relate to the Lebanon maritime border deal from October 2022?

Will Hamas and Hezbollah Try Again to Tear the Israeli Spiderweb?

From their earliest days, Hezbollah and Hamas have seen immense value in closely monitoring Israel’s media. However, their reliance on open source information has proven a double-edged sword, as both groups have been misled into making poor strategic decisions. Either Hezbollah or Hamas is likely to identify the current crisis in Israel over the new government’s proposed reform of Israel’s judiciary as an opportunity to act against it. They might be surprised, however, by Israel’s response.

The Real Lesson of the Afghanistan Debacle

Afghanistan has proved once again that even a superpower cannot win a war against a proxy as long as it refuses to confront the power that supports it. This is of vital importance to Israel, which is facing a proxy war being waged against it by Iran via its regional proxies Hezbollah and Hamas.