How Did Israel Win the Iron Swords War?

Israel began the Iron Swords War on October 7, 2023, on a “Yom Kippur War” dynamic: the devastating assault on Israel conducted that morning by Hamas was a strategic and operational surprise that collapsed the defense of the Gaza envelope and with it, the foundations of Israel's national security. The war ended on January 17, 2025, on a “Six-Day War” dynamic: a fundamental positive change had occurred on all of Israel's main combat fronts. How did this happen? Israel’s success was the result of intelligent decision-making, military and national strength, and luck. Israel must further improve its decision-making process and enhance its military and national strengths while reducing its reliance on luck and the failures of its opponents, who also learned lessons from this war.

Hezbollah’s Soul-Searching Reveals Its Defeat

Hezbollah's leadership cannot ignore growing voices supporting a new strategy for the movement that emphasizes its Lebanese identity. If adopted, this approach could mean a reduction of the organization's traditional dependence on Iran and a more practical and substantive integration into domestic Lebanese politics. Right now, the likelihood that Hezbollah will take the initiative to renew fighting with Israel seems slim.

Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Friendship Between Russia and Hamas Through the Prism of Russian Militarists

To position itself in the Muslim world, Russia needs to openly sympathize with the Palestinians, and close relations with Iran in the energy and military sectors make close ties with Israel difficult.

To Defend Israel, Rearrange the Sky

The current war, and Hezbollah's drone strikes, have made clear that Israeli air superiority does not apply to the "low sky" layer. The fact that the enemy is targeting the air defense itself stands out. The security establishment is working on finding solutions to the challenge, but development and procurement alone will not be enough. The basic premise of our air defense system has been undermined. The system must be reorganized on the basis of two understandings: first, that destroying Israeli air defense will be the enemy's first goal; and second, that the challenge of protecting the forces at the front requires different organizational and command and control means than the challenge of protecting the home front. As did the anti-aircraft units of the past, our tactical air defense at the front requires reorganization.

The Secret War Behind the Exchanges of Fire in the North

The current war of attrition in Israel’s north is not just a series of reaction equations. It is a race to learn about the enemy and prepare for a battle in which both sides will try to overwhelm the opposing military force. The exchanges of fire are providing Hezbollah with an opportunity to study the Israeli air defense system in detail. This is a serious risk that deserves to be given its due weight.

War in the North, the Defense Budget, and Strategy

An Israeli offensive in Lebanon has to be militarily decisive. The removal of the Hezbollah threat is the only possible enabler of a reliable agreement. The punishment approach, which some still preach, has been proven ineffective. Lebanese "state responsibility" rhymes with the discredited notion of a "weakened and deterred Hamas." The IDF, built for decades on the premise of fighting non-decisive stand-off operations, is not ready for a decisive war, especially after nine long and exhausting months. A supreme national effort to end the current campaign and renew the crushing power of the IDF is now urgently needed. The aim should be to defeat Hezbollah, including complementary efforts in the south, after a two- to three-year period of emergency preparations for the next war.

A Sustainable Strategy: Principles for Updating Israel’s Strategy and Security Concept

In the aftermath of October 7, there is a clear need to reexamine Israel’s principles of defense. It is already clear that a considerable military build-up and additional investments will be required. However, we must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past. More of the same – the restoration of a strategy based on deterrence, greater firepower, a wider order of forces, and more durable fortifications – may prove unsatisfactory and even distracting. This study seeks to contribute to the formulation of a sustainable strategy. We will do this not by citing principles that should be added to the concept of security but by addressing the type of discussion that is required. Along the way we will question some of the automatic responses to the crisis.

The Iron Swords War: The Strategic Balance So Far and What’s Next

Ten months after the surprise attack by Hamas on October 7, it is possible to assess the strategic achievements of the antagonists. In addition to inflicting heavy casualties and many wounded on the Israelis, Hamas succeeded in undermining Israeli society and causing divisions within it on the issue of the hostages. Hamas also succeeded in undermining Israel’s international status. Israel’s economic situation has been severely damaged and continues to deteriorate. Hamas brought the Palestinian issue back to center stage as a condition for a regional settlement, and recruited the Iranian proxies, mainly Hezbollah and the Houthis, for a war of attrition against Israel. Perhaps its greatest achievement is the evacuation of the populations of Jewish settlements within sovereign Israel for the first time since the establishment of the state. On the other hand, Israel is on the verge of crushing Hamas as an organized military force and removing one front from the “ring of fire" created by Iran around Israel. The Iranian attack on Israel proved the effective cooperation of a regional military coalition under the leadership of US Central Command and proved that Israel has an effective defense system against ballistic missiles. Israel regained its trust in the major ground maneuver and reserve soldiers were reestablished as an effective force in the IDF. Civil society also demonstrated its ability to mobilize. Hamas was unable to mobilize the Israeli Arabs to join it nor to mobilize the West Bank for a significant uprising. At this point, Israel is faced with a difficult dilemma. However, it is possible that a major strategic shift in events, should one occur, will not be related to regional developments but to developments in the global order, as has happened before in the region’s history.

How Energy Considerations Affect Hezbollah’s Involvement in the War in Gaza

The events of October 7 and Hezbollah's subsequent attacks on Israel’s northern border have renewed the question of whether energy considerations can serve as a lever on Hezbollah's policy towards Israel, as was claimed following the signing of a maritime border agreement by Israel and Lebanon in October 2022. During the months of fighting, reports have emerged of internal pressure being exerted by Beirut on Hezbollah not to enter the conflict against Israel as doing so would likely exacerbate Lebanon's state of deep crisis. This crisis includes frequent power outages in Beirut, unprecedented fuel shortages nationwide, and delays in gas exploration in Lebanon's waters. If Lebanon's energy crisis does lead to the “concentration” of Hezbollah within Lebanon's economic and political arena, it is possible that Israel, through US mediation, could exploit this to undermine Hezbollah and restore stability on the northern border.

French Policy in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe vs Israeli interests

It is likely that France does not have enough resources to prioritize both Ukraine and Armenia at the same time. Concentrating on two tracks at once, especially when resources are scarce, may lead to their inefficient allocation across both tracks.