IDF

The Israeli defense establishment is playing a central role in the country’s response to the coronavirus pandemic while also carrying out its many daily security missions. Yet at the same time, it is in the middle of an intense race against time. The goal of this race is to adapt to the growing threats posed to the country’s home front, and to strategic targets such as ports and power plants, from the terror armies located on Israel’s doorstep—threats that will remain long after Israel is able to place the pandemic behind it.
Although Israeli PM Golda Meir lacked military knowledge, her questions during government discussions on the eve of the Yom Kippur War exposed the fact that deterrence and early warning, the two cornerstones of Israel’s security conception, had not been adequately addressed. If the IDF officers and the many bithonistim (officials with a security background) in her government had heeded her questions, the war could have gone very differently and perhaps even have been averted.   
The IDF’s difficulties at the outset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War stemmed from an inherent command flaw rather than an intelligence failure as is commonly believed. The roots of this flaw date back to 1957, when Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan decided on an early retirement age for IDF personnel so as to enable them to embark on a second career. Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion, who saw the dangers of the decision, opposed it but did not use his authority to revoke it. 
This assessment of Israel's military capability relative to the threats it faces is based on historically proven combat data, which in turn reflects the impact of human and  technical quality on military combat effectiveness. This study also reflects a unique understanding of the significant variation in the efficiency of alternate national defense systems and the realistic impact of time on the generation of regional military power.

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