The Benefits of Decreased Security Cooperation with the PA

A lull in security cooperation between Israel and the PA could be a blessing in disguise for Israel’s security forces. A changed environment is always a summons to organizational innovation and self-reliance, the lack of which cost many lives during the Oslo years and Arafat’s war against Israel that began in 2000.

The 1982 Lebanon War and Its Repercussions for Israel’s National Security

Dr. Hanan Shai
June 4, 2020
Paper No. 1596

The conquest of southern Lebanon in Operation Peace for Galilee, and Israel’s long sojourn in the area, had political and military justification. But defects in the IDF’s deployment during the operation, and later in its protracted security activity, culminated in the May 2000 hurried withdrawal that continues to this day to negatively affect Israel’s national security.

Israel’s Frustrating Experience in South Lebanon

Twenty years after Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon, it is worth considering basic questions about its experience over years of warfare in a campaign that did not aim for victory. Those questions include what was going on, what Israel was fighting for, and what ultimately impelled it to withdraw. Such considerations have immediate significance in terms of clarifying the tenets of Israel’s security concept.

The Abandonment of the South Lebanon Army: A Moral and a Strategic Failure

With the May 2000 abandonment of the South Lebanon Army, Israel signaled to its regional allies that it is not a reliable mainstay. This influenced the lukewarm response of the Golan Heights Druze to the Israeli offer of citizenship, as well as Israeli decision-making during the Syrian civil war regarding cooperation with Syrian militias in the villages near the Golan border.

Israel’s Flight from South Lebanon 20 Years On

Israel’s May 2000 rushed evacuation of its security zone in south Lebanon and the desertion of its longstanding local allies there tarnished the Jewish State’s deterrent posture and helped spark a string of large-scale armed confrontations with Hezbollah (2006), the PLO (the so-called “al-Aqsa Intifada”), and Hamas (2008/9, 2012, 2014). The withdrawal transformed south Lebanon into an ineradicable terror entity that can harass northern Israel at will and expedited Hezbollah’s evolvement into a formidable military power armed with 150,000 rockets and missiles capable of reaching anywhere in Israel. It also dented the IDF’s fighting ethos and operational competence, as illustrated by its lukewarm performance during the Second Lebanon War (2006) and Operation Protective Edge (2014).

How an Elite IDF Unit Is Mobilizing to Fight Coronavirus

Yaakov Lappin
May 19, 2020
Paper No. 1572

The IDF has assigned a new role to an elite naval commando unit to apply its special skills and training to assist civilians in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic.

Has Syria Reactivated Its Chemical Weapons Program?

Yaakov Lappin
March 26, 2020
Paper No. 1506

Syrian media reports of Israeli airstrikes, allegedly launched early on March 5 in central and southern Syria, may be a sign that Damascus has renewed its chemical weapons program.

The IDF’s Momentum Plan Aims to Create a New Type of War Machine

Yaakov Lappin
March 22, 2020
Paper No. 1497

After a year of planning, including a thorough and at times painful ”self MRI scan,” the IDF has set itself the target of creating a networked force that can destroy enemy capabilities in as little time and at as low a cost as possible. According to its new multi-year Momentum program, the IDF has changed its definition of victory, marking a significant and potentially extremely fruitful shift in military thinking.

Dangerous Streamlining in the IDF

Combat in well defended built-up areas and in underground fortified facilities requires a large-scale order of battle quantitatively greater than anything known in the past. Meeting this challenge depends on the right integration of an elite, top-quality strike force with a large-scale quantitative mass at a medium level of quality. And while the IDF has been renewing and strengthening itself in those regards, when it comes to ground combat, where a quantitative mass is critical, a worrisome gap is widening.

Israel vs. Hezbollah: The Third Lebanon War

Dr. Ehud Eilam
March 9, 2020
Paper No. 1474

Ever since the 2006 war, Israel has preferred to contain Hezbollah rather than fight it directly. So determined was Israel to avoid going to war with the terrorist group that it tolerated its significant military buildup. Since 2012, however, the IAF has carried out hundreds of sorties inside Syria aimed at stopping the delivery of advanced weapons to Hezbollah. Israel can continue to delay the arming of Hezbollah, but it has already become quite strong, and a war could occur even if neither side wants it.