Where Is the Israeli Military Heading?

The army’s new multi-year plan shows a reorganizing of priorities for the coming decade, with a focus on intelligence, active defense systems, cyber warfare, and border protection. The ground forces will be downgraded in importance and priority.

Can the IDF Afford a Small Army?

The IDF must take into consideration that a smaller military comes with a price, as even low-intensity conflicts require a large number of troops to enable the army to succeed.

Why the Schalit Decision Makes Military Sense

The Schalit prisoner exchange was a rational and sensible recognition of the need to reaffirm society's commitment to the welfare of its soldiers. The obligation of the state is even more pronounced in Israel’s case, as the IDF is a conscript army, in which far from all draft-age youngsters in fact serve.

Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi: A Balance Sheet

Outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Ashkenazi's greatest achievement is the restoration of Israeli public faith in the IDF as an effective fighting force after the failures of the Second Lebanon War. An overall assessment of his tenure, however, also points to shortcomings in areas such as IDF battle doctrine and commanders' education.

Has the IDF Earned the Support of the Israeli Public? An Interim Assessment of the IDF’s Performance in Operation Cast Lead

The IDF gets an interim, mixed assessment for its early performance in the war against Hamas, in three spheres: (a) public communications; (b) treatment of reservists; and (c) performance of the Rear Command.

The False “Crisis” in Military Recruitment: An IDF Red Herring

According to figures released by the IDF, 25% of Israeli male youth are shirking military duty. However, the statistics simply do not support this: Israeli enlistment remains at extraordinarily high levels. Why then the hysteria? The IDF is cynically seeking to legitimize its budget demands by creating the aura of crisis.

Strategic Follies: Israel’s Mistakes in the Second Lebanese War

Israel's political and military leadership was ill-prepared for the war against the Hizballah in the summer of 2006. A series of strategic mistakes on the part of Israeli leaders denied Israel a military victory and squandered an important opportunity to destroy the majority of Hizballah's military presence in Southern Lebanon, settle scores and enhance Israel's deterrence. Hopefully, Israeli leadership will be better strategically prepared so as to attain a clearly-defined victory in the next round.

Defeating Arafat’s War: The IDF’s Success Against Asymmetric Warfare

A recent assessment of the IDF's response to the Palestinian terror campaign was mixed at best, but this assessment was not backed up by a presentation of the evidence. A closer look shows that the IDF and security forces did extremely well in fighting what is known as Arafat's War.

The IDF’s Record in the Current Intifada: An Interim Scorecard

At their recent meeting in Sharm-el-Sheik, Ariel Sharon and Abu Mazen announced the cessation of the hostilities that erupted in September 2000. Whether or not the ceasefire will hold remains, of course, to be seen. But its announcement certainly offers an opportunity for a retrospective, interim assessment of the IDF's operational performance during the past four-and-a-half years of violence. Its record, however, is no better than mixed.