Russia

Islamists in Russia (AI generated)
Russia’s attitude toward Islamists in general, and radical Islamist movements in particular, is neither consistent nor unambiguous. In its foreign policy, Russia actively supports Hezbollah and Hamas, which has been especially evident during the current Arab-Israeli war. The patron and protector of these and numerous other terrorist Islamist organizations, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is one of Russia's strategic partners. This partnership was formalized in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed on January 17, 2025.
Grozny (Shutterstock)
The regime cannot afford a “third Chechen war”, so after Kadyrov it will continue its policy of extremely harsh crackdowns and bribery of local elites. Since Kadyrov has no unconditional and universally recognized successor, it is possible that attempts will be made to build complex combinations based on a balance of interests of a number of key figures, with the federal center retaining the role of arbiter.
Georgia applied for EU membership alongside Moldova on March 3, 2022. In June of the same year, the European Commission recommended granting candidate status to both republics, but the decision on Tbilisi’s application was postponed. Georgia ultimately received candidate status in December 2023. Yet, on November 28, 2024, the Georgian authorities announced their decision to suspend EU accession negotiations from the national agenda until 2028. What happened?
Erzyan national flag
The Erzyan national movement deserves special consideration: the problems it is trying to solve are characteristic not only of the Republic of Mordovia. They are also relevant for other national autonomies located in the east of the European part of the Russian Federation, far from the state borders, where the peoples belonging to the Finno-Ugric linguistic group live: the Republic of Komi, the Republic of Udmurtia and the Republic of Mari El.
Chinese fright train (AI generated illustration)
Russia, which a dozen years ago aspired to be a major transportation corridor from the Pacific to the Atlantic, is gradually turning into a transportation and logistics desert. The new joint Chinese-Kazakh railroad project has become another stepping stone to exclude Russia from transcontinental logistics chains. At that, Russia loses not only Europe and the Far East as customers and partners: it also loses its leverage in the region it used to consider its fiefdom - namely, Central Asia.
A year and a half ago, in the summer of 2023, a forum titled "Yakutia and the Provinces of China: Sister-City Relations for Strengthening Russian-Chinese Relations" was held in Yakutsk. The ties between China and the Republic of Sakha continue to strengthen. It is also worth noting that directly south of Yakutia are Russian regions to which China has almost openly laid claim, as they were once part of the Qing Empire. From the Chinese perspective, Russia still occupies much larger Chinese territories, meaning historical justice has not been restored.
Copyright Dor Shabashewitz
Secessionist movements have existed in Russia for as long as the Russian Federation itself. As of late 2021, pro-independence voices enjoyed little recognition outside of niche internet communities—mainstream ethnic activism criticized the government but not to the point of demanding secession. This started changing when Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Congress of the Oirat-Kalmyk People provides an example of this shift.
In the ongoing geopolitical conflict between Iran and Israel, Iran’s relations with post-Soviet states—especially those with which it shares a direct border—play a crucial role. The tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan are well-known to experts, same goes for Iran’s close ties with Armenia. However, a less frequently discussed yet highly significant aspect is the nature of Iran’s relationship with the third post-Soviet state with which it shares a border—Turkmenistan.

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