In November 2024, the PSCRP program at the BESA Center published analytical materials covering three subregions of the post-Soviet area, namely, Central Asia, “the West” (focusing this time on Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia), and the South Caucasus.
Ariel Kogan comments on Rabbi Zvi Kogan’s abduction and subsequent murder in the UAE by three terrorists of Uzbek origin, shedding light on Iran’s efforts to recruit citizens of the Central Asian states into its network. Though “direct ties of the apprehended perpetrators to Iran have not been confirmed,” Kogan highlights that the assassination was consistent with the common trademark tactics of the IRGC (“targeting individuals abroad through criminal proxies”) and happened “amid heightened tensions between Israel and Iran.” ISIS might have claimed the operation but it often does so for the sake of clout, while clearly preferring mass casualty attacks to individual murders. The author also lists a series of failed attempts to attack Jewish and Israeli objects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 2023-2024, carried out by Kata’ib Hezbollah – an IRGC-controlled militia coordinated mainly by Muhammad Ali Burhanov, a Tajik operative who was recruited to Qods Force’s Department 400 (of the IRGC) while studying in Iran. By recruiting Tajiks and (less frequently) Uzbeks, Iran tries to counterbalance Sunni groups in the region (like ISIS-Khorasan which is naturally hostile to the Shiite Tehran authorities). In further support of his hypothesis, Kogan lists the Iran-led organization Hussainiyoun operating in Azerbaijan and aiming to destabilize the local government, incite unrest, and emphasize opposition to any ties with Israel (in 2023, even the assassination attempt of the Azerbaijani MP was prevented by the local security service), and the “IRGC plot to assassinate an Israeli businessman” thwarted by the Georgian security service in 2022.
Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman offers his explanation for the recent dynamics in the difficult Kazakhstan-BRICS relationships. Despite Russia’s official invitation, Astana refused to join BRICS; nevertheless, in October 2024, the country’s President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, attended the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Kazantsev-Vaisman finds that Kazakhstan’s participation in BRICS+, without formally joining its ranks, is yet another epitome of the country’s multivector foreign policy aimed at preserving sovereignty and avoiding excessive reliance on Moscow, even despite the inevitable economic interdependence between Russia and Kazakhstan. At the same time, Astana tries to bypass Russia-controlled trade routes and maintain relations with China (another prominent BRICS member), stemming from economic pragmatism and the need to counterweight Russian dominance. Selective participation in BRICS projects allows Kazakhstan to “reduce its dependence on any single power” and “to expand international partnerships,” while joining it “could be perceived as aligning too closely” with China and Russia and would create unnecessary restrictions for Kazakhstani policies. This strategy is perceived in Moscow with certain suspicion: since 2022, the latter has been trying to exert various types of economic pressure on Astana, including interruption of oil transit and agricultural import restrictions.
As the political protests in Georgia escalate, the PSCRP team has, inter alia, scrutinized France’s role in the Georgian political process. Since the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, Tbilisi has sought closer ties with the EU and NATO, which however was often met with limited support, indecision, and keeping Tbilisi at arm’s length. The 2024 elections have further highlighted the political struggle between the camps that might be, albeit cautiously, called “pro-EU” and “pro-Russian.” President Macron’s pre-election remarks about the need for Georgia to “return to the European path” were viewed by many Georgian voters as some sort of a provocation and not a genuine support. The incumbent Georgian president, Salome Zourabichvili, is also sometimes viewed with suspicion: born in France and having worked for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs for several decades, she gave up French citizenship in 2018 only, following the Georgian legislation. Three weeks before the elections, she met Macron in Paris. In an interview before the elections, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of the “Georgian Dream” party that is considered a pro-Russian actor, alluded to the talks between some unknown “Western leader” and Georgia’s former Prime Minister (who was then in office), with the former persuading Georgian authorities to engage in a war with Russia, despite potential losses. For a significant part of the Georgian public, the “Western leader”’s style was reminiscent of that of Emanuel Macron, especially since the French policy in the South Caucasus “appears to rely on destabilization to assert influence.” The latter trend is evidenced by open support to Armenia’s claims over Nagorno-Karabakh region and Paris’ extensive arms supplies to Yerevan. Thus, Ivanishvili’s party has, at least partially, secured its victory by framing the election as a choice between “war and peace,” with France being one of the “external Others.”
Moving “westwards,” Velvl Chernin, based on his expertise and personal experience, assesses the recent sociological trends in Ukrainian society. He notes the rapid symbolic exclusion of the Russian language from all official and semi-official domains, that started after the beginning of the full-scale invasion. A significant part of Ukrainians from the central and south-eastern parts of the country are now trying to switch to Ukrainian even in their everyday life (though under stress, they often involuntarily resort to Russian), which becomes a special challenge to the numerous migrants from Eastern Ukraine to the West of the country. Even though some kind of quasi-normal life is sustained, war fatigue is observable in Ukraine, and obviously, Ukrainian society is going to suffer from PTSD for a long time. This condition is aggravated by the unjust distribution of the war burden within Ukrainian society itself, caused by the lack of proper rotation at the frontline, the de facto failure of mobilization efforts, the notorious activities of enlistment offices, and the behavior of high-ranked officials who often secure for their family members reservations from mobilization and try to earn money in the war situation. Chernin also stresses the long-time impacts of what looks like the largest migration crisis in Europe since World War II, and the presence of strong sympathies for Israel as a role model.
Anatolii Dirun presents his vision of the formal and informal outcomes of the presidential elections in Moldova. On November 8th, the official results became known, with Maia Sandu getting 55 percent of the votes and thus prolonging her presidential career. However, in Moldova “proper,” she received only 49 percent of the votes and won thus only thanks to the diaspora electorate. The author thinks that the absence of the landslide victory can be explained by three systemic errors Sandu made during her first term. These are the PAS party’s unwillingness to build a coalition with right-wing partners (thus leaving the presidential party isolated), monopolizing the idea of European integration (though it had been popular in the country for many years before Sandu’s presidency, attempts to monopolize it sowed mistrust among potential allies and the general public), and the unprecedented media restrictions (15 TV channels and more than 60 news websites were shut down, with some of these actions clearly lacking judicial grounds, which is unusual for Moldova). The referendum about the EU accession, proposed by Sandu to mobilize support for her candidacy, defined that the EU laws should override national legislation. Together with the ambiguous statements by the EU Ambassador and the controversial remarks of Vasile Șoimaru, PAS MP, on the possible renouncement of the status of the Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova (Russian-affiliated, but the largest church in the country), this caused discontent among conservative citizens. Even the more right-leaning electorate was alienated by the non-registration of the CUB party leader Igor Munteanu as a presidential candidate. Dirun concludes that the presidential “elections exposed deepening divisions in Moldovan society,” and the appeal of European integration, though remaining popular, has been questioned.
Alexander Kovalenko analyzes the political rationale behind the authorization to use Western weaponry to strike Russian territory, eventually received by the Ukrainian armed forces. In November 2024, ATACMS ballistic missiles and Storm Shadow cruise missiles were already employed to strike targets in the Bryansk and Kursk regions of Russia, respectively. For Ukrainian diplomacy, getting this authorization has proved to be a complex diplomatic effort that took almost three years, even though more than 200 significant Russian targets, such as airbases, ammunition depots, and command centers, are situated within 300 km range from the Ukrainian borders, and the restrictions to use weapons on the adversary’s territory are often characterized as an anomaly. The decision to lift the restrictions was unlikely to provoke any congressional opposition from either Republicans or Democrats, and it might be the Biden administration’s preemptive measure to counteract a radical policy shift under Donald Trump. Though the newly elected president is unlikely to take steps to weaken Ukraine, especially regarding the decisions already made (so as not to appear less “decisive” compared to Biden), it is important for Ukrainian diplomacy to persuade Trump of the necessity of further additional approvals.
Finally, Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman, in his two subsequent materials, analyzed the emergent phenomenon in Russia’s social sphere. During incarceration, many people become radicalized. Nowadays, in Russia, the decades-old division between “black zones” (large prisons de facto controlled by the criminal elite, “thieves-in-law,” and in accordance with their code of conduct) and “red zones” (large prisons totally controlled by the official administration) does not fully represent the exact situation anymore. The new prison type is emergent, what the author calls “green zones,” that is, incarceration facilities dominated by the norms of radical Islam. In recent years, “a series of Islamist-led uprisings in Russian prisons underscored the growing influence of radical Islam within the penal system,” which disrupts the traditional criminal hierarchy. The uprisings’ leaders have used (mis)treatment by the prisons’ authorities as a rallying point to present their actions as a part of a broader “struggle against an oppressive system,” manifested as sit-ins, hunger strikes, and sometimes violent clashes with the guards. The inmates originating from the Russian North Caucasus and Central Asian countries that are often already organized into religiously tainted networks, have started creating alliances within the penal system, offering an attractive alternative to the traditional Russian criminal hierarchy. These Islamic networks transcend the rigid prison stratification, with this egalitarianism attracting even non-Muslim prisoners who seek protection and are offered a “chance to rise within an alternative structure that values loyalty to faith over criminal reputation and physical strength.” Kazantsev-Vaisman highlights two main dangers proceeding from the described situation. First, as “violence and crime escalate amid the social disorganization of wartime Russia, radical groups may find it easier to recruit, using religious solidarity as a tool to address grievances and perceived injustices”; and since the Russian law enforcement agencies are “currently focused on internal security challenges and the demands of war,” their ability to effectively counter radical groups might be limited. Second, “a situation may quickly emerge, when regional political systems in the North Caucasus (…) will begin to rely on support of criminal-Islamist groups.”
From the materials summarized above, it is obvious that, in the post-Soviet region, it may be sometimes difficult to survive but it is never boring. Our team continues to monitor the ever-changing dynamics and to inform our readership about what is going on in the FSU countries.